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Abstract 
This thesis examines how the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party 
(PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have ‘Europeanised’ their 
organisations in three different arenas: (1) in the electorate and party system; (2) in 
central government and parliament; and (3) in their internal procedures and activities. 
‘Europeanisation’ is defined as ‘a shorthand term for a complex process whereby 
national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, and also seek to shape, the trajectory of 
European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular’ 
(Bomberg: 2002, 32). The underlying argument is that social democratic parties have 
to respond to challenges created by the European Single Market, which demands the 
reduction of state subsidies, and by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which 
sets limits to public spending. Social democratic parties are expected to react to these 
challenges by Europeanising their organisations.  
This thesis draws on the academic literature, party documents and 
contemporary newspaper articles, together with insights gained from 70 semi-
structured interviews with EU experts at the European and national levels.  
The central claim is that Labour, the PS and SPD have not become as 
Europeanised as might have been supposed for three ostensibly pro-European parties. 
Whilst successive party leaderships have paid lip service to the increasing importance 
of European integration, their party organisations have barely been involved in the 
formulation of European policy. The findings have serious implications for the three 
parties and domestic politics in Britain, France and Germany, since the memberships 
lack the enthusiasm and expertise to lead well-informed, critical, Europeanised 
debates and election campaigns. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of Europe on centre-left parties in Great Britain, 
France and Germany. More specifically, it analyses the direct and indirect impact of 
European Union (EU) membership on their internal party organisations, defined 
broadly as ‘the informal and formal distribution of power within a party that will give 
power-holders the authority to pursue their preferred goals relating to office, votes and 
policy’ (Carter et al., 2007: 10). The thesis explores how political parties in EU 
member states have adapted and how their organisational structures have become 
‘Europeanised’ to meet the demands of EU integration and EU policy-making, 
including the demands of Europeanised domestic institutions and practices. 
Despite a general decline in levels of mass memberships in past decades, 
political parties remain fundamental to democratic governance in Europe and abroad 
(Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994). They connect citizens with the 
institutions of the state and thereby represent ‘a central linkage between citizens’ 
preferences and actions of democratic governments’ (Poguntke, 2005: 43). Political 
parties in the European Union operate in a challenging system of multi-level 
governance: party politics take place primarily at the national level, whilst an ever 
increasing amount of policy is made at the European level. Parties have responded 
accordingly, but there is still much we do not know, especially in terms of the impact 
of EU membership on the internal workings of national parties.  
The key analytical lens adopted by this study is the concept of 
‘Europeanisation’, which is ‘a shorthand term for a complex process whereby national 
actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, and also seek to shape, the trajectory of 
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European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular’ 
(Bomberg: 2002, 32). Since parties are complex organisations that operate in a 
number of distinct arenas, this thesis follows loosely Key’s (1964) famous tripartite 
framework and examines the Europeanisation of parties in three senses: as parties in 
the electorate (i.e. the attitudes of their supporters and potential supporters); as parties 
in office (i.e. the actions and behaviour of individuals elected to governmental office); 
and as political organisations (i.e. the units that comprise the party and the individuals 
who staff them).  Throughout the thesis, Europeanisation is interpreted as a 
multidirectional process. At times, it takes place in a top-down manner, with the party 
leadership pressurising (or encouraging) the lower levels of the party organisation to 
adapt to the process of European integration. At other times, Europeanisation can be a 
bottom-up process in which the lower levels of the party organisation actively engage 
with the EU and put pressure on the party leadership to keep them informed and 
involve them in the formulation of European policy. Last but not least, ‘horizontal’ 
Europeanisation can take place when sister parties across the EU discuss European 
policy, publish common statements, or organise campaign exchanges at different 
levels of the party organisation.  
The Europeanisation of party organisations is an ongoing process in which 
parties adapt to a continuously changing system of EU governance. Europeanisation 
can be an active process in which party activists or politicians choose to actively 
engage with EU policy, for instance by setting up working groups, organising 
discussions and talks, organising exchanges with sister parties or visits to Brussels. In 
these cases, Europeanisation can be expected to be strong. Yet it can also be a passive 
process, forced upon parties by external pressures such as EU treaty change. The 
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Maastricht Treaty, for instance, has led national parliaments to set up European affairs 
committees and party working groups. Europeanisation can be strong, moderate or 
weak. The strength is measured differently in each of the three arenas according to a 
distinct set of indicators.   
In simple terms, the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party would have a 
number of characteristics. First, it would include a leadership that recognises and 
stresses the relevance of the EU in its speeches, policy statements and interviews 
during and outside of election campaigns. By doing this, the party would actively 
involve and engage members and voters in EU debates. Second, it would involve a 
broad group of actors from different party levels in the formulation of European 
policy. Third, it would have close links to its Europarty and sister parties and make all 
party members aware of the existence of them and the possibility to engage with 
them. Finally, a fully Europeanised party would, when in government, push for 
institutional adaptation to make sure that central government and parliament can more 
effectively and efficiently deal with EU legislation. In practice, of course, there are 
likely to be gradations of Europeanisation; some parties will inevitably be more 
Europeanised than others. 
This thesis analyses and compares the extent of the Europeanisation of the 
British Labour Party, the PS and SPD from 1997 until 2009. It does so by drawing on 
the academic literature, party documents and contemporary newspaper articles, 
together with insights gained from 70 semi-structured interviews with party officials 
at the European and national levels, MPs, MEPs, activists, former ministers, 
government advisors and other experts. Its central claim is that Labour, the PS and 
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SPD have not become as Europeanised as might have been supposed for three 
ostensibly pro-European parties. Whilst successive party leaderships have paid lip 
service to the increasing importance of European integration, their party organisations 
have barely been involved in the formulation of European policy. Leaders have made 
European policy, relying, when in government, on the expertise of advisers and civil 
servants. Top-down Europeanisation has not taken place, nor have the parties become 
Europeanised in either a bottom-up or horizontal process.  
The findings have serious implications for the three parties and domestic 
politics in Britain, France and Germany, since the memberships lack the enthusiasm 
and expertise to lead well-informed, critical, Europeanised debates and election 
campaigns. It leads to a situation in which Europeanised party elites make policy 
whilst the broader organisation is not consulted and processes of democratic decision-
making become wishful thinking. Moreover, parties spend little time and resources on 
educating members and the wider public about the EU. As successive Eurobarometer 
surveys show, citizens’ levels of knowledge about the functioning of the EU are 
already very low, particularly in Britain. This not only leads to Euroscepticism, but 
also perhaps contributes to citizens’ political disengagement. The low, continuously 
decreasing rates of participation in European elections demonstrate this trend.    
 
1.1 Parties in Europe 
For more than a hundred years, political parties have been a popular subject of 
research. This is unsurprising; after all, parties play a central role in both the theory 
and the practice of modern liberal democracy (Müller, 2000). In particular, the ways 
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in which parties organise has received much scholarly attention. From the advent of 
the mass parties in Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Duverger, 1964; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), through the development towards catch-
all parties after the Second World War (Kirchheimer, 1990), to the rise of ‘cartel 
parties’ at the end of the twentieth century (Katz and Mair, 1995), party organisational 
change remains a fascinating research topic in Europe and abroad.  
Like other institutions, political parties may seem to be resistant to 
organisational change. Yet empirical evidence shows that parties do change (Harmel, 
2005: 119). As Luther and Müller-Rommel (2005) point out, political parties in 
Western Europe at the start of the twenty-first century are subject to six factors that 
prompt change: (1) substantial socio-economic changes; (2) shifts in citizens’ political 
values and behaviour and (3) in due course also national political cultures; (4) a 
radical transformation in the structures of political communication; (5) the rise of new 
political issues and policy agendas; and (6) the dynamics of European integration. 
Whilst most of these challenges are interlinked, this thesis focuses exclusively on the 
impact of the last, European integration, on social democratic party organisations.  
EU membership is likely to impact on national party organisations for a 
number of reasons. Above all, ‘EU politics is party politics’ (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 
137). Politicians at the European level share party ties and belong to sister 
organisations, which provide vital links between national and EU arenas. Party 
politicians define policy guidelines in the European Council, write EU treaties and 
make day-to-day policy in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
Members of the European Commission are also party politicians. However, whilst 
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leading politicians are involved in EU policy-making, their national party 
organisations are limited in what they can do at the European level. Admittedly, 
national parties remain in charge of organising European parliamentary election 
campaigns, as will be demonstrated in the last chapter of this thesis. Moreover, they 
can mobilise citizens to support or oppose EU treaty changes in member states where 
referendums are held on such matters (like in France, as will be discussed in Chapters 
3 and 4). Yet, what national party organisations can accomplish at European level 
appears to be ‘rather modest’ (Ladrech, 2010: 134).  
Nevertheless, parties are very much affected by European integration, if only 
indirectly. With the increasing number of policy areas that have been transferred to or 
shared with the EU’s jurisdiction, parties have less policy space available at national 
level. For example, according to an official parliamentary report, roughly a third (31.5 
per cent) of all legislation pronounced and ratified by the Bundestag between 2005 
and 2009 had EU origins (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/09/2009). Although all 
parties are affected by EU membership, European integration places particular 
constraints on social democratic parties, which tend to promote equality through state 
activity. They have had to respond to challenges created by the European Single 
Market, which demands the reduction of state subsidies, and by the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), which sets limits to public spending (Paterson and Sloam, 
2006: 235). According to Mair (2007), this narrowing of the policy space can lead to a 
‘hollowing out’ of policy competition between political parties. It can result in the 
convergence of main-stream centre-left and centre-right parties on economic issues 
(Ladrech, 2010: 137). Ultimately, this dampening down of differences between parties 
in government has led to an increasing de-politicisation of political competition at 
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national level (Mair, 2007: 160). It has created a situation in which ‘the EU makes 
policy without politics, [while] given the marginalization of national partisan politics, 
its member states suffer from having politics without policies’ (Schmidt, 2006: 5).  
The Europeanisation of national party politics has found its place on the 
research agenda comparatively recently. Robert Ladrech (2002) identifies five 
potential areas of investigation: programmatic change; organisational change; patterns 
of party competition; party-government relations; and relations beyond the national 
party system. Research has progressed in all five areas, but the EU political 
environment is dynamic: as a consequence of European integration, new parties have 
emerged at the national level whilst existing parties and party systems have changed. 
In particular the transnational party federations that emerged at EU level 
(‘Europarties’) are young organisations and are undergoing significant organisational 
change. The power dynamics between them and their member parties are likely to 
evolve.  
In this dynamic political context, there is a need for more systematic and 
comparative research of the Europeanisation of national party politics. Since the 
negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, and in particular since 2005, when the Dutch and 
French voters rejected the European Constitutional Treaty, the EU has undergone a 
legitimacy crisis (Lord and Magnette, 2004; Føllesdal, 2006). The debate surrounding 
the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has reached pro-European mainstream parties like the 
German Social Democrats. Even more recently, voters in many EU Member States 
have been very critical if not hostile to the way the Eurozone is managed. Citizens in 
wealthier countries have opposed the bailout of insolvent member states like Portugal, 
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Ireland and Greece. National parties clearly matter in this context. They could provide 
the crucial and missing link between citizens and the EU, providing up-to-date 
information on EU policy whilst promoting the debate amongst party members and 
the wider electorate. A Europeanised party organisation could be beneficial not only 
for parties’ internal democracy, but also for wider democratic debate on European 
issues.  
 
1.2 The three cases 
This thesis analyses the impact of EU membership on the party organisations of the 
British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic 
Party. The advantage of comparative research is that it improves the classification of 
political systems, policy processes and organisations such as political parties (Hague 
and Harrop, 2007: 84). In the case of this thesis, a comparative study allows us to 
analyse how the organisations of three major centre-left parties of government, 
operating in the three biggest EU Member States, have Europeanised. Whilst all three 
parties have had to deal with the challenge of EU-level politics and policy-making, 
they have operated in different national political systems and cultures. Moreover, they 
differ in their historical backgrounds and organisational structures. The historical 
background of their countries’ EU membership remains important for the three 
parties. It influences not only their approach to European integration in general, but 
also the political culture in which they operate (Krell, 2009: 42).  
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Britain, France and Germany joined the EU for different reasons
1
. For France, 
European integration offered economic prosperity and a means to contain Germany. 
For the West German political elite, it offered an opportunity to re-define German 
national identity after the horrors and crimes of the Second World War. France and 
Germany were amongst the six founding members of the EU and their relationship 
has been crucial for the development of the European Union. It has been described as 
the ‘tandem’ and ‘motor’ of European integration (Guérot, 2007). The British joined 
the EU two decades after its foundation for primarily economic reasons and were 
never comfortable with the notion of political union.  
Much has been written about Britain’s complex and ambiguous relationship 
with the European Union (Gowland et al., 2010; Bache and Jordan, 2006; Geddes, 
2004; Young, 1999; George, 1998). When the negotiations began in 1950 that led to 
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Clement Attlee’s 
Labour government was invited to join, but it declined. Britain did not apply for 
membership in the 1950s for economic and political reasons. British rates of 
economic growth were extremely high by historical standards (Young, 1999: 7). This 
sense of economic well-being was only gradually undermined by the realisation that 
the ECSC member states were out performing Britain from the mid 1950s onwards. 
Moreover, the realisation that Britain was no longer a global player only slowly took 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this thesis the term ‘EU’ is used to describe the European Union (which was created with 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993) and its predecessor, the European Communities: the European Coal 
and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. 
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hold over British governments. They reconsidered their approach when balance of 
payments crises became a recurrent problem as imports expanded faster than exports, 
and inflation rose more rapidly than in the French and German economies (Young, 
1999: 7). The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed the British government that the special 
relationship with the United States, if it still existed, was, for Britain, the ‘relationship 
of a subordinate to a superior’ (Bogdanor, 2005: 693). Slowly, the end of empire 
convinced many Conservatives that there was no longer an alternative alignment 
which could sustain Britain’s role as a major power (Bogdanor, 2005).  
For these reasons, Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government opened 
negotiations to see whether a basis could be found for British EU membership in 
1961-1963. Because of French resistance, however, it took until 1973, and two further 
applications, before British membership could be achieved. When Britain finally 
joined the EU in 1973, both the institutions and policies had already taken on a shape 
that suited the six founding members far better than it suited Britain. Ever since its EU 
accession Britain has acquired the reputation of being a ‘reluctant European’ (Geddes, 
2004), or a ‘semi-detached’ and ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998).  As George 
(1998: 40) outlines, in Britain there was no conversion to the ideal of a political union 
that was supported by the leaders of the six founding states. This has continually led 
to differences with other member states. It is true that Britain’s relationship with the 
European Union has been one of the most divisive issues of domestic British politics 
over the past fifty years (Baker, 2001: 276).  
France’s relationship with the EU is no less ambiguous than Britain’s, and at 
times, France could also have been labelled an ‘awkward partner’. Krell (2009: 44) 
identifies two central doctrines that have shaped French foreign and EU policy since 
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the end of the Second World War. The first one is the attempt to contain Germany’s 
power. The second is the perception of the EU as a means to increase France’s 
political influence in Europe and the world.  
French politicians have played a key role in the European integration process. 
After all, the European Coal and Steel Community was the brainchild of Jean Monnet 
and Robert Schuman. Its aims were economic growth whilst keeping the German coal 
and steel industries under control. However, French input was not always pro-
integrationist. When Charles de Gaulle became President in 1958 he was keen to limit 
the power of supranational actors. He preferred an intergovernmental mode of 
decision-making in which member states could keep their veto power. In 1965 the 
European Commission put forward a proposal for funding the Common Agricultural 
Policy which would have allowed the Community to develop its own financial 
resources, independent of the member states. Moreover, the Council of Ministers 
would have taken decisions with a qualified majority, thereby ending the veto power 
of the Member States. De Gaulle’s opposition to these plans led to the ‘Empty Chair 
Crisis’, which was a French boycott of the Community institutions between July 1965 
and January 1966 (Ludlow, 1999). His successors - Georges Pompidou (1969-1974), 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), François Mitterrand (1981-1995), Jacques 
Chirac (1995-2007), and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007 until present) - have been less 
confrontational in their European policies. In particular socialist President Mitterrand 
advanced European integration through close cooperation with German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and became characterised as ‘père l’Europe’ (Axt, 1999: 476). Both 
president Chirac and Sarkozy have displayed more continuity than change in their EU 
policies, and cooperation with the German authorities remains close. At the same 
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time, French politicians across the political spectrum continue to emphasise the gains 
through French leadership in the European Union, whilst the public is convinced that 
France no longer leads Europe and that the EU no longer protects France against 
globalisation (Schmidt, 2007). 
In contrast to Britain and France, Germany’s engagement with the European 
Union has not been distracted by other international-role aspirations, whether of being 
a post-colonial global player or a sovereign nation-state (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 4). 
After its total defeat in the Second World War and partition, West Germany, 
supported and supervised by the Western Allies, sought to re-establish its political 
institutions and re-define its foreign policy paradigms. ‘The Federal Republic was 
therefore very deficient in “actorness” and European integration offered it an 
opportunity to expand its role as an actor’, as Paterson (2011: 60) writes. The West 
German political elite saw European integration as a means to transform its post-
Second World War nation-state identity and develop a kind of ‘German 
Europatriotism’ (Risse, 2001: 209). West Germany was thus able to gain sovereignty 
through the European integration process, which went hand in hand with the 
foundation of the Federal Republic. It has since been argued that the German 
constitution was Europeanised in its infancy (Goetz, 1995). In the early 1960s a strong 
pro-integrationist, cross-party elite consensus emerged which was shared by the wider 
public. This has given domestic actors more discretion in exercising their power at 
European and national level. Germany has been able to upload its institutional model 
and policy preferences to the European level, and as a consequence, ‘the EU feels 
familiar’ to Germany (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 4).  
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So much for the three national contexts; what of the individual parties that 
operate in them? The British Labour Party was founded in 1900 as a federation of 
working-class organisations. Only in 1918 were individual members allowed to join 
the party. Until today, however, affiliate organisations such as trade unions and 
socialist societies play an important role. Although the unions’ shares of votes at the 
annual conference have been reduced and their block vote been ended (Ludlam, 2004: 
102), they continue to push their weight during the annual party conferences and 
leadership elections (Webb, 2000). Compared to the SPD, Labour is a small party; the 
bulk of its members comprised affiliated trades unionists. Labout’s membership 
peaked at 405,000 in 1997 in the aftermath of Tony Blair’s election, but ten years later 
it had fallen back to 176,891, which is thought to be the lowest level since it was 
founded (The Guardian, 13/05/2010). The Labour Party operates at the local, regional 
and national level. Local branches constitute the party’s organisational grassroots, and 
both individual and corporatist members such as trade unions and socialist 
organisations can join a local branch. Several branches together make a Constituency 
Labour Party (CLP), which coincides with a parliamentary constituency. At the 
national level of the party organisation, four important bodies are worth mentioning
2
: 
The Annual Conference (which is the ultimate authority in the party); the National 
Policy Forum (NPF) which meets several times per year to unite the party’s views on 
policy; the National Executive Committee (NEC), which sets the party's objectives 
and oversees the running of the party, including the headquarters; and the party leader 
                                                          
2
 The role of theses bodies in the Labour Party, PS and SPD’s formulation of European policy will be 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
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(who is elected by three distinct electorates: MPs and MEPs; individual party 
members; affiliated organisations such as trade unions and socialist societies).  
Since the late 1970s the Labour Party leadership has become more 
autonomous from official party decision-making bodies for a number of reasons.  As 
mentioned earlier, the unions’ weight in the policy-making process has been reduced. 
Moreover, since Neil Kinnock was in office (1983-1992), Labour party leaders had an 
increasing amount of staff including personal advisors at their disposal, which made 
them more independent from the National Policy Forum (NPF) and party conference. 
In addition, in a ‘somewhat paradoxical blend of democratization and centralization’ 
(Webb, 1999: 103), members were given the possibility to decide through 
referendums over issues such as election manifestoes or reforms of the party statutes. 
Ultimately, these referendums have contributed to the empowerment of the party 
leadership: Under Tony Blair, some fundamental decisions were taken by ordinary 
party members whilst MPs and formal policy-making bodies such as the NPF have 
lost influence on party policy. As Faucher-King (2003) highlights, the objective of 
these reforms was not only to increase the legitimacy of the leader, but, in the case of 
the PS, also to try to erode the power of the factions. Hence, what party leaders have 
sold as a democratisation and decentralisation of the policy-making process has 
instead led to centralisation (Mair, 1997).  
The French Socialist Party (PS) was founded in 1969 as the successor to the 
French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO). It has never been a mass party in 
the Duvergerian sense because it could not count on the trade unions for membership 
and support. As a consequence, since the 1930s, the PS has lacked funding, a strong 
organisational structure and an industrial working-class clientele (Bell and Criddle, 
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1984: 146). Compared with many other Western European countries, party 
membership in France is generally low (Offerle, 2000). Yet, as French parties are not 
obliged to publish accurate membership statistics, their numbers tend to be unreliable 
and differ significantly from those published by newspapers and researchers (Billordo, 
2003). In September 2009, the PS claimed 200,319 members (Le Canard enchaîné, 
25/11/2009). However, this number is likely to be overstated.  
Like Labour, the PS is organised at local, regional and national level. The 
local branches, called ‘sections’, were inherited from the SFIO but stripped of their 
former powers when the PS was founded in 1969. At regional level the party is 
divided into federations. Regional party conferences elect regional party leaders and 
select delegates for the national party conference which takes places only every three 
years. The party conference elects the members for the national council and bureau. 
However, the real power house of the party is the national secretariat, which can be 
compared to Labour’s NEC. It is elected on the party leader’s suggestions, and as a 
consequence, the leader is surrounded by confidants. This is particularly important 
because much of the party’s internal life is dictated by its different factions (courants) 
that organise around presidential candidates. As in the case of Labour, the PS leader 
has become more autonomous over the past decades. President Mitterrand officially 
yielded the party leadership but de facto continued to make the party’s policy without 
consulting the formal decision-making bodies.  
The German Social Democrats (SPD) were founded in May 1875 as a highly 
complex, densely organised socialist workers’ party with a large membership. Like 
the Labour Party, the SPD is organised at the local, regional and national level. The 
local branches or Ortsvereine are where grassroots activism takes place. Ortsvereine 
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are integrated into sub-districts or Unterbezirke, which equal local council borders. 
The next level is the regional party or Landesverband, which plays an important role 
especially in the recruitment of personnel. At national level, the party conference is 
the highest authority, but in practice, policy is made by the party leadership: the 
Vorstand (the party’s national executive committee) and the Präsidium, which has 
been described as the party’s ‘inner cabinet’ (de Deken, 1999: 84).  
The SPD’s membership peaked at 1,022,200 in 1976 but has decreased to 
540,000 in 2007 and continues to shrink (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
22/02/2010). The SPD is no longer a party of workers; it has transformed itself into a 
party of employees and civil servants. However, change has not only occurred within 
the membership; the leadership has also transformed itself. In recent decades, it has 
become more autonomous from formal policy-making bodies such as the party 
conference. This tendency of the SPD to centralise power and follow an ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’ has already been observed by the sociologist Robert Michels (1962). Thus, 
the key player in the SPD’s policy-making process is the party leadership. 
Europeanisation has further enhanced the empowerment of the party leadership, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
1.3 Conceptual framework, questions and methods  
Any analysis of the Europeanisation of parties can be approached by thinking about 
the Europeanisation of ‘parties in the electorate’, ‘parties in government’ and ‘parties 
as organisations’. In each case, Europeanisation means something different and is 
driven by distinctive forces.  Table 1.1 (below) summarises the nature and indicators 
of Europeanisation in each respect and also identifies the general and country-specific 
drivers behind the process. 
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Table 1.1: The Europeanisation of ‘the party in the electorate’, ‘the party in government’ and ‘the party as organisation’  
 Parties in the electorate Parties in government Parties as political organisations 
Nature of 
Europeanisation 
and indicators  
Top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation 
 
Party system:  
 Format (number of parties); 
 Mechanics (patterns of party 
competition). 
 
Public opinion: 
 Level of EU knowledge; 
 Level of pro-European support. 
 
Top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation 
 
Central government and parliament: 
 Institutional  adaptation; 
 Strategic adaptation. 
Top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation 
 
EU policy-making: 
 Involvement of party members. 
 
European parliamentary election 
campaigning:  
 Adequate funding; 
 Close cooperation with PES; 
 Use of national and PES 
manifestoes and logos; 
 Common ‘top’ candidate at the EU 
level.  
General drivers of 
Europeanisation 
 Salience of Europe amongst the 
public and parties;  
 Electoral system; 
 Use of referendums. 
 EU treaty change; 
 Government turnover; 
 EU attitudes of party leadership.; 
 The strength of parliament vis-à-vis 
government. 
 Whether the party is in government 
or opposition; 
 EU attitude of the party leadership 
and their attitude towards the PES;  
 Ideological coherence within the 
PES.  
Country or case-
specific drivers of 
Europeanisation  
  Power constellations within 
coalition governments; 
 Divided government (in France).  
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In terms of the party in the electorate, Europeanisation is expected to work in a 
bottom-up and top-down manner. The public arena is understood as comprising: (1) 
public opinion towards European integration and the effects this has on party 
organisational Europeanisation and vice versa; and (2) as the party system in which 
parties operate. A Europeanised public is one that displays a high level of knowledge 
of the political system of the EU. In such an environment, parties are expected to 
Europeanise. In return, if parties actively engage members and citizens in debates 
about the EU, they can contribute to the Europeanisation of the public. Yet, 
Europeanisation of party organisations also depends on whether European policy is a 
cleavage amongst parties and whether Europe is a salient issue. A Europeanised party 
system is one whose format – that is, the number of parties competing in elections – 
has been affected by European integration, but also the patterns of party competition.  
In terms of the party in government, Europeanisation is again expected to be a 
two-way process. As central governments and parliaments adapt to the process of 
European integration, they are expected to affect the attitudes and behaviour of party 
elites, while in return, Europeanised politicians can drive forward the Europeanisation 
of executives and legislatures. A Europeanised central government is one that has 
adapted to the EU style of policy-making and can ‘upload’ its institutional model and 
policies onto the European level. In a similar vein, a Europeanised parliament is one 
that deals efficiently and effectively with EU legislation and has adapted its structures 
and strategies accordingly. This adaptation is expected to affect parliamentary parties 
and their engagement with European policy. General drivers for Europeanisation can 
be EU treaty change (e.g. when the EU extends its powers); government turnover; and 
the EU attitudes of the party leadership.  
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In terms of the party as organisation, Europeanisation can be expected to 
manifest itself in two core party activities, namely policy-making and election 
campaigning, both of which will reflect the informal and formal distribution of power 
in a party.  A Europeanised policy-making process involves not only the party 
leadership, but also activists and EU ‘experts’, for example MEPs, in policy forums 
and party conferences. Moreover, a Europeanised party is expected to be geared 
towards leading Europeanised campaigns. European parliamentary election 
campaigns are good indicators of whether parties discuss EU policy within their 
organisational structures and with the wider electorate; whether they provide enough 
funding to lead awareness-raising campaigns; whether they cooperate closely with 
sister parties (to enhance bi-directional Europeanisation) and with Europarties (the 
Party of European Socialists or PES in the case of centre-left social democratic 
parties); and whether they nominate a top EU-level candidate in order to politicise the 
debate.  
There is presently no shortage of literature on political parties and their 
European policies. Yet, the literature hardly grasps the informal processes of 
European policy-making that takes place within parties. Nor does the literature 
examine European networks within the parties. In order to shed light on these 
activities, in-depth interviews with elite members of the three parties were conducted 
and a period of participant observation undertaken. The interview fieldwork began 
with a six-week period of participant observation at the PES headquarters in Brussels 
during the final phase of the 2009 European parliamentary election campaign. 
Participant observation is ‘the process of learning through exposure to or involvement 
in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting’ (Schensul 
et al., 1999:99). It entailed participation in the day-to-day work of the PES whilst 
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maintaining sufficient distance to observe the situation. The headquarters of the PES, 
the general secretariat, is the nodal point where party officials discuss policy and 
campaign strategies. During the six weeks in May and June 2009, valuable insights 
into the workings of the PES were gained, most notably into the processes of policy-
making and election campaigning. One of my tasks was to analyse and compare the 
European election campaigns of PES member parties and to liaise with the parties’ 
international departments. During this period of participant observation, insider 
information on national election campaigns was gained and the contact details of EU 
experts in the Labour Party, PS and SPD were obtained.  
During the second phase of the fieldwork, 70 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with policy-makers and party activists were conducted in Brussels, Paris, 
Berlin and London. MPs, MEPs, PES activists and other EU experts, such as former 
ministers and researchers working on European policy for party-affiliated think tanks 
and trade unions, were interviewed. Table 1.2 (below) gives an overview of the 
number of interviews conducted in each country and the position of the interviewee. 
A full list of all interviewees can be found in the appendix. 
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Table 1.2: Number of interviews  
Position of 
interviewees 
EU level Britain France  Germany Total  
Party officials  
 
11 2 5 3 21 
Government officials 
and advisors  
 2  4 6 
Parliamentary officials 
 
3 1  3 7 
Members of 
parliament 
 1  3 4 
Members of the 
European Parliament 
 2 6 8 16 
Former ministers 
 
  1  1 
Party activists 
 
5    5 
Think-tank researchers 
 
  2 4 6 
Others  
 
 1  3 4 
Total 
 
19 9 14 28 70 
Note: All party activists interviewed were PES activists. At the same time they were 
members of a national party or several national parties. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, fewer interviews were conducted with Labour 
politicians. As a party used to being attacked by a Eurosceptic media, some Labour 
politicians took a defensive approach during the interviews, and many did not agree to 
being interviewed at all. Unfortunately, most MEPs and MPs either replied saying that 
they had no time for interviews or did not reply at all.  One Labour MEP wrote in an 
e-mail:  
Thank you for your request for an interview with me. Unfortunately due to the 
volume of such requests that I receive, and the nature of my work schedule, I 
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am unable to give any interviews for research projects. Please accept my 
apologies. 
Given the apparent prevalence of such attitudes, there is inevitably a risk that 
those who did agree to be interviewed were unrepresentative of the broader 
population from which they were drawn. 
PS politicians had been in opposition for a number of years and were more 
willing to being interviewed and apparently to speak their mind than their 
counterparts from the Labour Party. Moreover, PS politicians had more time to speak 
with researchers. An exception were (the few) socialist MPs with EU expertise who 
all replied that they had no time for interviews.  
Working with asymmetrical data is a challenge for comparative research. 
Therefore, some sections of this thesis, mainly the ones dealing with the SPD, contain 
more original data and are therefore more detailed than the ones on the PS and 
Labour. In July and August 2009, when the majority of interviews were conducted, 
the SPD had just experienced its lowest result in European elections (20.8 per cent). 
In this context, many social democratic politicians agreed to being interviewed and 
saw this as a means to reflect upon the election campaign and the party’s 
Europeanisation more generally.  
The majority of interviews, 61 out of 70, were conducted face-to-face, whilst 
the rest were conducted over the telephone. Face-to-face interviews were the preferred 
method: shaking hands, keeping eye contact and a friendly smile make it easier to 
establish a good rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee.  Moreover, 
face-to-face interviews tended to last longer (over 30 minutes) and some interviewees 
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shared confidential documents or put me in touch with colleagues. Most face-to-face 
interviews took longer than expected. I asked for 30 minutes, but many interviewees 
spoke for longer, often for up to one hour. All interviews were semi-structured, 
following a catalogue of questions: opening questions, key questions and closing 
questions (Hennink et al., 2011: 109). Open questions were asked because they 
‘provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organise their answers within their 
own frameworks’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674). The questions were adapted 
to each person’s role and functions. For instance, all MEPs were asked the same two 
opening and two key questions, but those who were more experienced or were in 
leading positions were asked additional questions relating to their personal 
experience. Moreover, some questions were country or case-specific and related to 
national election campaigns, political events and politicians. This format left enough 
room for flexibility for both the interviewer and interviewee. As Legard et al. (2010) 
stress, ‘the first key feature of the in-depth interview is that it is intended to combine 
structure with flexibility’. Some interviewees asked for the questions to be sent in 
advance, and all agreed to being taped. In two interviews with Labour politicians, 
however, the most interesting experiences were revealed at the end, when the 
dictaphone was switched off.  
As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 673) explain, ‘Interviewing is often 
important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an 
event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do’. The 
interviews conducted for this study offered the unique opportunity to get information 
on personal experiences from the policy-makers about their roles, functions and 
views. This information cannot be found in the academic literature or official party 
documents. Most interviewees showed great interest in the research topic and were 
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willing to share their impressions. However, whilst in-depth interviews are a valuable 
research tool, they are by no means perfect (Richards, 1996). First of all, since 
interviewees share their personal views, much of the information is highly subjective 
and cannot always be taken at its face value. For example, many interviewees saw our 
discussions as an opportunity to share their frustration about their parties’ lack of 
interest in European politics. Secondly, interviewees can stir the conversation in other 
directions. For instance, elected politicians often used the interviews to criticise their 
opponents’ ‘bad’ European policies, and it was difficult to guide them back to the 
topic of interest. Thirdly, a number of questions related to events in the past, such as 
policy decisions or election campaigns. In some cases, memories were no longer 
fresh. Last but not least, conducting a good interview is also a challenging task for the 
interviewer. A good interviewer is well-informed about the professional background, 
role and functions of the interviewee and has carefully prepared the catalogue of 
questions. During the interview, and especially when open questions are asked, a high 
level of attention is required because such interviews have a conversational quality to 
it and answers can go in different directions. Relevant and intelligent questions need 
to be asked at the right moment, which is particularly difficult in a foreign language. 
The interviews for this study were led in English, French and German. All French and 
German interviews were later translated into English. 
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1.4 The structure of this thesis  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a review of 
the Europeanisation literature. In its first part, the chapter explores the origins of the 
concept, its various definitions, and the problems related to its vagueness and diffuse 
meaning. In its second part, it examines how the concept has been applied to party 
politics in general and party organisation in particular. The third and final part of this 
chapter will present a definition of Europeanisation as it is understood in this 
dissertation. It will then discuss the process of party organisational Europeanisation 
and present an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party organisation following 
Key’s (1964) tripartite framework, thereby examining the Europeanisation of the 
parties’ public face in the electoral arena; the Europeanisation of the parties in office; 
and as political organisations.  
Chapters 3 and 4 look at the electoral arena and examine the public political 
environment in which the Labour Party, PS and SPD operate. Chapter 3 compares the 
Europeanisation of the British, French and German party systems and the effect this 
has had on Labour, the PS, the SPD and vice versa. In this context, a Europeanised 
party system is one where EU membership has led to the emergence of new parties or 
has changed the mechanisms of party competition. It is argued that within a 
Europeanised party system, parties have an incentive to Europeanise their 
organisations. After all, if EU policy is a cleavage, parties can be expected to 
prioritise it during election campaigns and internal debates. However, this chapter not 
only analyses EU policy divisions between parties, but also within parties.  
Chapter 4 addresses the Europeanisation of public opinion and links this to the 
Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD. European integration has become 
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increasingly contested since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and elites have 
found their autonomy curtailed. In this context, the interaction between voters and 
political parties has arguably become more important for the future of European 
integration. On the one hand, national parties can be expected to listen to the public’s 
opinions. After all, parties seeking election and office are expected to represent their 
voters’ policy preferences. On the other hand, parties are expected to influence the 
voters through their policies. Chapter 4 therefore applies a bi-directional model of 
mass-elite linkage to the Labour Party, PS and SPD. This model, developed by 
Steenbergen et al. (2007) is most helpful in explaining the way parties and voters 
influence each other and demonstrates that the strength of those linkages is contingent 
on factors such as the electoral system or national EU referenda. 
In the next two chapters, the Europeanisation of the three parties in the 
governmental arena is explored. The governmental arena is divided into central 
government and parliament. Chapter 5 analyses the Europeanisation of central 
government in Britain, France and Germany and investigates how Europeanisation 
has affected the behaviour of party elites in government. After all, when a party is in 
government, the leadership (in particular the prime minister and senior cabinet 
ministers) are involved in EU-level policy-making. This experience is expected to 
lead to a more pro-European outlook. In return, party elites can actively Europeanise 
central government and parliament.  
Chapter 6 analyses the degree of Europeanisation of the British, French and 
German parliament. It focuses on the three directly-elected lower chambers that 
determine government formation. As national parliaments are increasingly involved in 
EU policy-making, MPs need to pass EU legislation, be it in European scrutiny 
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committees or other expert committees. This requires both expertise and efficient 
working structures and should therefore have a Europeanising effect on the 
parliamentary party.  
Chapters 7 and 8 shed light on how the Labour Party, PS and SPD have 
Europeanised as political organisations.  Two of a party’s key activities are policy-
making and election campaigning, and both activities will be examined regarding 
their level of Europeanisation. Chapter 7 analyses and compares the three parties’ 
European policy-making processes. The Europeanisation of party organisation can 
only be grasped if we understand which actors or networks of actors are involved in 
the formulation of European policy. Both the formal channels of policy-making (party 
conferences, policy forums etc.) and the informal ones are taken into consideration.  
Chapter 8 analyses the Europeanisation of the 2009 European parliamentary 
election campaigns, a period when parties could be expected to display their degree of 
Europeanisation and prioritise their European policies. An ideal model of 
Europeanisation is applied to this campaign. It is argued that in a Europeanised 
campaign, the Labour Party, PS and SPD would have: (1) provided an adequate 
amount of funding; (2) used national manifestoes and campaign material alongside 
those provided by the Party of European Socialists; (3) discussed European themes, 
and (4) appointed a common top candidate for the presidency of the European 
Commission.  
Chapter 9 brings together the evidence presented in the six empirical chapters. 
By applying the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party as introduced in Chapter 2, 
it discusses to what extent Labour, the PS and SPD have Europeanised in the electoral 
arena, in government and as organisations.  
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 Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and highlights the findings of the 
study and the implications for social democratic parties in the EU.  
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Chapter 2: Europeanisation, political parties and party systems 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of Europeanisation and to apply it 
to political parties. The first part provides a critical discussion of the Europeanisation 
literature of the past two decades, presenting the strengths and weaknesses of the 
concept. The second part examines the body of literature dealing with the 
Europeanisation of party politics. The third and final part of this chapter will present a 
definition of Europeanisation as it is understood in this dissertation. It will then 
discuss the process of party organisational Europeanisation and present an ideal 
model of a Europeanised party organisation examining the Europeanisation of the 
parties’ public face; the Europeanisation of the parties in office; and as political 
organisations. The overall aim of this dissertation is to find out whether the Labour 
Party, PS and SPD comply with this ideal type and can be characterised as strongly 
Europeanised party organisations.  
 ‘Europeanisation’ is a popular yet contested concept which has become 
fashionable amongst scholars as a way to describe and analyse domestic change 
emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership. For decades, researchers had 
focused mainly on explaining the major institution-building steps in the EU project, 
and whether the construction of the EU followed from clear national interests, some 
more path-dependent process of ‘spillover’, or supranational entrepreneurship 
(Parsons, 2007: 1135). During the mid 1990s, however, attention shifted from 
explaining European institutions towards analysing institutional adaptation within 
member states to EU membership (Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Kassim, Peter and 
Wright, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 
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2001). This process received increased scholarly attention because the emergence of a 
consolidated system of European governance made evident that traditional theories of 
integration were inadequate to describe or explain change within that system. In 
particular, new approaches were needed to explain change and adaptation in member 
states.  
It has become conventional to trace and analyse the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation along three major dimensions: policies, politics and polity (Börzel 
and Risse, 2000). Some aspects of domestic government have received considerably 
more attention than others. For example, recent years have seen a growing interest in 
the processes by which European integration affects domestic policies and polities in 
the form of institutions. Numerous studies deal with the EU impact on governmental 
administration aspects and the substance and processes of public policy making. The 
European impact on domestic politics – such as political cleavages, voters, elections, 
parties, party competition, party systems and patterns of democratic legitimation - 
however, has received comparatively little attention (Hix and Goetz, 2001a). A reason 
for this research gap could be the difficulty in isolating the European effect on 
domestic politics from other effects, most notably globalisation. Another obstacle is 
the difficulty in measuring the Europeanisation of politics, which points again to the 
vagueness of the concept. It is also the case, as Hix and Goetz (2001a: 15) indicate, 
that ‘domestic polities and policies have been affected earlier and more profoundly by 
European integration than domestic politics.’ Indeed, as this thesis will demonstrate, 
EU policy continued to be a de-politicised item on the bottom of centre-left parties’ 
political agenda between 1997 and 2010.  
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2.1 Defining Europeanisation 
An increasing number of writers use the term Europeanisation but the term lacks a 
precise meaning. Much of the literature remains vague. Furthermore, a shared 
definition of the term has not yet emerged, turning Europeanisation into an elusive 
concept. Featherstone (2003, 3) points out that this ‘faddish use of “Europeanization” 
in different contexts can easily obscure its substantive meaning.’ Europeanisation was 
initially viewed as a top-down process whereby European institution building caused 
changes at the domestic level. Robert Ladrech (1994: 69) provided one of the first and 
still widely cited definitions. He sees Europeanisation as an ‘incremental process re-
orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy-making’. By ‘organizational logic’, he means the ‘adaptive processes of 
organizations to a changed or changing environment (1994:71).’ Ladrech underlines 
the process of adaptation, policy learning and change. Inherent in this conception is 
the notion that actors redefine their interests and behaviours to meet the norms and 
logic of EU membership. Whilst this definition has the strength of incorporating both 
‘politics’ and ‘policy-making’, it remains a somewhat loose definition, as 
Featherstone (2003, 12) points out. Moreover, this definition neglects the fact that 
national political actors, before adapting to EU political and economic dynamics, are 
often involved in the shaping and making of European politics in the first place. 
 A very different approach is taken by Green-Cowles, Risse and Caporaso 
(2001) who define Europeanisation as ‘the emergence and the development at the 
European level of distinct features of governance, that is, of political, legal and social 
institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalizes interactions 
among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative 
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rules.’ This definition diverges from the others because it does not relate to the 
process of adaptation at the domestic level. It also looks very similar to concepts such 
as European integration and Communitarisation, as opposed to an analytically distinct 
process triggered by European integration (Vink, 2003: 3, Bomberg and Peterson, 
2000: 3-4). Radaelli (2000: 3) provides a more encompassing definition, viewing 
Europeanisation as: 
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies.  
However, Radaelli’s definition does not emphasise the multi-directional 
character of the Europeanisation process. To understand and analyse the complexity 
of European transformations, Europeanisation was gradually interpreted as a two-
way-process, whereby actors at national level were not only subjected to change, but 
would also actively shape European politics. ‘European integration also elicits active 
responses or the “projection” of national priorities or practices into the mix of forces 
that determine the trajectory of the European project and its resultant policies’, as 
Bomberg and Peterson (2000: 6) stress.  Börzel (2002) has introduced the notion of 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ to describe this complex two-way-notion of 
Europeanisation. She argues that EU member states (and other actors) may seek to 
‘upload’ their policy preferences to the EU level in order to maximise the benefits and 
minimise the costs of European policies. According to Börzel, uploading reduces the 
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need for legal and administrative adaptation in downloading, that is: incorporating 
European policies into national policy structures (Börzel, 2002: 196).  
 In this thesis, Europeanisation is interpreted as an ongoing process, which is 
‘circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one off’ (Goetz, 2002: 4, 
quoted by Bache and Jordan, 2006: 22). Bulmer and Radaelli (2004, 3) share this 
view, stressing that ‘neither the EU nor the member states are static, so 
Europeanisation is a matter of reciprocity between moving features’. Hence a key 
asset of Europeanisation is that it grasps the ongoing, dynamic exchange between 
different levels of governance.  
Europeanisation research has become more refined over the past decade, yet one 
of its most obvious shortcomings remains: its failure to relate to traditional European 
integration theories (Vink, 2003: 7). Many studies focus on individual case studies of 
domestic adaptation, while they do not attempt to generalise and view the greater 
picture of European integration. However, as this body of literature becomes more 
sophisticated, Europeanisation is often couched within longer-established theoretical 
frameworks - such as ‘new institutionalism’, ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’, ‘multi-
level governance’, or ‘policy networks’ - with Europeanisation as a loose epithet 
(Featherstone, 2003: 12). The comparison of definitions and approaches shows that 
the scope of the concept is very vast and that in different contexts Europeanisation can 
have divergent meanings. J.P. Olsen’s (2002) typology of the different processes 
understood as Europeanisation shows how vast the concept has become. Olsen 
demonstrates that the different conceptions of Europeanisation complement, rather 
than exclude each other. The result is a conception that seems too broad and vague. 
Olsen names five possible uses of Europeanisation:  
 43 
(1) As changes in external territorial boundaries;  
(2) As the development of institutions of governance at the EU level; 
(3) As central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance;  
(4) As exporting forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and 
distinct for Europe beyond the European territory;  
(5) As a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.  
It then becomes clear that the Europeanisation agenda was broad a decade ago and has 
broadened even further. Most notably, it has been extended to include the 
Europeanisation of national politics. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004: 109) write 
that ‘because research interests extend to different dimensions and embrace divergent 
theoretical approaches it is not surprising that Europeanization remains a fuzzy 
concept.’ Europeanisation research therefore runs the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ 
because it does not set boundaries (Radaelli, 2000: 1). Ill defined concepts lead to 
confusion and elusive language, and they ‘obfuscate the relations between genus and 
species. Concepts without negation are universal: they point to everything.’ (Sartori, 
1970: 1042, quoted by Radaelli, 2000: 3) A solution to the problem could be to 
‘unpack the concept and to distinguish between Europeanisation and other terms, thus 
showing what Europeanization is not’, as Radaelli (2000: 4) suggests. He then argues 
that Europeanisation should not be confused with convergence, harmonisation, or 
political integration, emphasising that ‘Europeanization is not convergence. The latter 
can be a consequence of Europeanizsation. Convergence is not Europeanization 
because there is a difference between a process and its consequences’ (Radaelli, 2000: 
4.). In addition, Europeanisation should not be confounded with the harmonisation of 
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national policies. After all, Europeanisation has a different impact on polities and 
policies across the EU, as empirical research suggests (Héritier et al., 2001). Finally, 
Radaelli (2000, 5) argues that Europeanisation is not political integration: 
Europeanization would not exist without European integration. But the 
latter concept belongs to the ontological stage of research, that is, the 
understanding of a process in which countries pool sovereignty, whereas 
the former is post-ontological, being concerned with what happens once 
EU institutions are in place and produce their effects. 
To sum up, Europeanisation research has become an increasingly popular 
concept over the past two decades. It remains contested as a growing number of often 
divergent definitions exist in parallel, making it difficult to determine what 
Europeanisation actually is. Moreover, many studies still fail to link Europeanisation 
to existing integration theories and do not attempt to present the greater picture of 
European integration, and therefore remain limited in their focus. Undoubtedly, 
though, the concept has contributed to the study of European integration, as it allows 
us to identify and understand processes of domestic change in relation to European 
integration which previously were difficult to grasp. Europeanisation has been a 
particularly useful tool to analyse the domestic implementation of European policies 
(Héritier et al., 2001; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) and study transformations in the 
national polity. Only recently, Europeanisation has been applied to national politics.  
Taking everything into account, Elizabeth Bomberg’s definition of 
Europeanisation seems most useful. She used it to analyse the Europeanisation of 
green parties. Bomberg (2002: 32) defines Europeanisation as:  
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A shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this 
case, parties) adapt to, also seek to shape, the trajectory of European 
integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular. 
To improve the definition’s utility, a transnational dimension of 
Europeanisation needs to be added. For instance, parties from across the EU can 
‘Europeanise’ each other, as it was the case in the context of EU Eastern enlargement, 
when central and eastern European parties learned from their western sister parties. In 
general, bilateral relations between sister parties at different levels of the party 
organisation (party leader meetings resulting in common declarations, parliamentary 
exchanges, campaign exchanges at local level etc.) could also have a Europeanising 
effect on parties, as will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.  
2.2 The Europeanisation of party politics  
Until relatively recently, the Europeanisation of national party politics has been 
neglected by students of political parties. Robert Ladrech (2002), one of the first 
scholars to work on this topic, has suggested a basic framework for analysing this 
process. He identifies five potential areas of investigation: programmatic change, 
patterns of party competition, party-government relations, and relations beyond the 
national party system, and organisational change. We can utilise this framework to 
explore the literature more fully.  
2.2.1The Europeanisation of party programmes   
Programmatic change that has resulted from European integration has been measured 
quantitatively by Dorussen and Nanou (2006). Using manifesto data for 1951–2001, 
they examine the convergence of party programmes across Western Europe, showing 
that European integration has increasingly constrained the range of policy platforms. 
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Paul Pennings (2006) compares national party manifestoes in the period between 
1960 and 2003 according to phases of integration and policy sectors. He comes to the 
conclusion that ‘manifestos do not reveal the “real” degree of Europeanization of 
policy sectors (…). Europe is being deliberately underemphasized’ (Pennings, 2006: 
268). Yet manifestoes are only one way of measuring programmatic change. Changes 
in what parties do and say in between elections can also be taken as an indicator of 
programmatic Europeanisation. In this way, there has been a growing interest in the 
European policies of individual political parties in EU member states. Among the 
three parties examined in this thesis, the British Labour Party has received most 
attention, more than the PS and SPD, probably due to the complicated relationship the 
Labour Party has had with the EU in the past. For instance, numerous studies have 
analysed the European policy of the Blair government by comparing Blair’s discourse 
with actual outcomes (Smith, 2005; Wallace, 2005; Bulmer and Burch, 2005). The 
EU is often examined as part of foreign policy. Only a few studies focus exclusively 
on European policy (Fella, 2002; Holden, 2002; Wanninger, 2007). There have also 
been few studies of Labour’s European policy under Gordon Brown, notable 
exceptions being Whitman and O’Donnell (2007) and Daddow (2011).    
The SPD’s European policy has been analysed comprehensively by Stroh 
(2004), Lamatsch (2004) and Sloam (2004). Yet, in Germany, coalition governments 
are the norm and as a consequence, European policy is always a compromise between 
two parties. Perhaps for this reason, many publications do not explicitly refer to the 
SPD’s European policy (as it is the case in Britain with the Labour Party) but rather as 
‘German European policy’ (Harnisch and Schieder, 2006; Göler and Jopp, 2007; 
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al., 2010), ‘red-green European policy’ (Ostheim, 2007) 
or the European policy of the Grand Coalition (Marhold, 2006). Also, the SPD’s 
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European policy is analysed in the bigger framework of foreign policy (Risse, 2004). 
Future comprehensive studies analysing the SPD’s role in European policy-making in 
different coalition governments from 1998 until 2009 would certainly be useful.   
The nature of French politics has made it even more difficult for scholars to 
identify a PS European policy. Like the SPD, the PS formed a coalition government, 
but with four other left-wing parties (gauche plurielle) between 1997 and 2002. 
Moreover, this left government served in office with a centre-right President, a 
constellation the French have labelled ‘cohabitation’. Both Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin and President Jacques Chirac were involved in European policy-making and 
frequently appeared shoulder to shoulder at European Council meetings. It might be 
due to this complicated constellation that only very few publications explicitly deal 
with the European policy of the PS in the most recent period of cohabitation. An 
exception is Leuffen’s (2007) well-researched study, in which he chose three case 
studies (the European Councils of Amsterdam and Nice, and Agenda 2002) to analyse 
the complex interplay within the French executive. However, a comprehensive and 
systematic overview of the European policy of the Jospin government is still lacking. 
More recent accounts of French European policy in general are written by Axt (1999) 
and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2004 and 2005), yet they do not focus exclusively on 
the PS’ European policy. Because the PS has been in opposition since 2002, little 
scholarly attention has been paid to its European policy. One notable exception, 
however, is the 2004 internal referendum on the EU constitution which divided the 
party and received much attention in the national media. Markus Wagner (2008) 
presents a thorough analysis of the different views expressed by PS leaders in public 
statements, while Crespy (2008) examines the political opportunity structures that 
caused intra-party dissent. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning one recent study 
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comparing the European policies of Labour, the PS and SPD. In his published 
doctoral thesis, Christian Krell (2009) provides a useful if broad overview of the three 
parties’ European policies. However, this study is somewhat descriptive and neglects 
party organisation at the EU level.  
2.2.2 The Europeanisation of party competition 
Ladrech’s second area of analysis is party competition, which relates to how parties 
compete with each other on EU policy within a party system. Here, there have been a 
few studies investigating the nature and impact of Europeanisation. Peter Mair (2000 
and 2007), who has probably done most to enhance our knowledge in this field,  
suggests there are two dimensions structuring the Europeanisation of party systems: 
first, the impact of EU integration on the format of the party system (the number of 
relevant parties in contention in national arenas); and second, the mechanics of party 
systems (the way in which parties interact with each other at the national level, either 
by modifying the ideological distance separating the relevant parties, or by 
encouraging the emergence of wholly new European-centred dimensions of 
competition). Mair argues that Europeanisation has very little direct impact on the 
format of national party systems. After all, very few parties have been established 
with the explicit and primary intention of mobilising support for or against the EU (an 
exception being UKIP, the UK Independence Party). Likewise, apart from a few 
exceptions, Europeanisation has had little direct impact on the mechanisms of party 
competition. ‘To be sure, a pro- vs. anti-European divide can sometimes be discerned; 
but given the character of the parties involved, Europe as such appears neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for that divide’, as Mair (2000: 35) states. 
Nevertheless, indirect effects of Europeanisation on national party systems cannot be 
denied. Mair argues that since European integration increasingly constrains the 
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national governments’ scope for action, it encourages a ‘hollowing out’ of 
competition among those parties with a governing aspiration by limiting their policy 
space.  Furthermore, ‘by taking Europe out of national competition and by working 
within a supranational structure that clearly lacks democratic accountability, party and 
political leaderships do little to counteract the notion of the irrelevance of 
conventional politics’ (Mair, 2000: 48-49). Relying on Mair’s framework, 
Niedermayer (2003) and Poguntke (2007) conclude that one cannot speak of a 
Europeanisation of the German party system in the sense of a considerable impact of 
the European integration process on its development.  
2.2.3 The Europeanisation of party-government relations 
Ladrech’s third potential research area is the Europeanisation of party-government 
relations. He writes that ‘inter-governmental bargaining – either in an inter-
governmental conference, European Council, or Council of Ministers/COREPER – 
may distance the government/party leader from party programmatic positions in an 
unintended fashion’ (2001: 10). In 2002, Tapio Raunio wrote that not a single study 
on the impact of European integration on power relations within parties had been 
published so far. He went on to argue that EU integration had the effect of 
consolidating the centralisation of decision-making through strengthening the agenda-
setting powers of party leaders. He noted that intergovernmental bargaining provided 
the party leadership with an arena where the party organisation exercised little if any 
control over its representatives, since in most EU Member States, the scrutiny of 
European affairs by national parliaments was very weak (Raunio, 2002: 410-411). 
Since Raunio’s seminal article, parliamentary EU scrutiny across the EU has been 
researched more systematically and comprehensively (see, for example: Auel, 2005; 
O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007; Holzacker, 2008). Moreover, Carter and Poguntke 
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(2010) found out through surveys with parties’ EU experts that party elites receive 
only modest levels of instructions when they are involved in EU-level decision-
making.  
2.2.4 The Europeanisation of ‘relations beyond the national party system’  
Ladrech identifies the Europeanisation of ‘relations beyond the national party system’ 
as a potential area for research, arguing that Europeanisation could result in increased 
transnational co-operation among parties across the EU. In practice, there have been 
three distinct modes of transnational co-operation, each with its own literature. 
The first mode centres on the activities of Europarties. The relevant literature 
has examined their historical background and organisational development. 
Europarties attracted scholarly attention even more so after their constitutional 
recognition in the Treaty of Maastricht (see Hix and Lord 1997; Jansen 1998; Diez 
2000; Hix and Lesse 2002; Day 2005). However, early studies of Europarties do not 
draw on Europeanisation as a framework and they do not identify a strong link 
between the Europarties and their member parties.  This is not surprising because the 
link was very weak when the Europarties were created. Nevertheless, as they have 
become institutionalised and better resourced in the past five years, more attention has 
been paid to this link and the Europarties’ emancipation from the party groups in the 
European Parliament (Lightfoot, 2005 and 2006; Hertner, 2011). For example, van 
Hecke (2009) analyses the Europeanisation of the Spanish People’s Party through its 
links to the European People’s Party.  In another, ongoing research project, Poguntke 
and van Deth (n.d.) are analysing the influence of Europarties on their member parties 
and party systems in Eastern Europe. Europarties are still relatively young 
organisations. As the European Parliament has become more powerful and politics at 
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European level become increasingly politicised, the roles and functions of Europarties 
certainly deserve further attention.         
The second mode of transnational co-operation takes place within certain party 
families. The relevant literature has examined co-operation across the EU and at the 
EU level between green parties (Bomberg, 2002; Hine, 2003; Bomberg and Carter, 
2006), Christian Democratic parties (Hanley, 2002) socialist or social democratic 
parties (Ladrech, 2000; Lightfoot, 2005), left parties in general (Holmes and 
Lightfoot, 2007) and Ethnoregionalist parties (de Winter and Gomez-Reino 
Cachafeiro, 2002). All contributions have shed light on how different party families 
and their members adapt and shape European integration, and they are valuable 
contributions to an under-researched topic. However, they use different models 
(definitions) of Europeanisation and examine different aspects of party change, which 
makes a systematic comparison between party families difficult. A quantitative and 
qualitative study comparing the Europeanisation of the main party families across the 
EU 27 would be a challenging, but highly interesting project for further research (see 
table 3 which is explained below).         
The third mode of co-operation evolves around bilateral relations amongst 
sister parties within the broader European context. Tanja Wielgoß (2002), for 
example, presents a thorough analysis of interactions between the SPD and the PS 
from 1989 until 2001. In the same vein, Joey-David Ovey (2001) examines the 
relations between the Labour Party and the SPD within the PES in the European 
Parliament between 1994 and 1999, framing bilateral relations in a supranational 
context. These kinds of studies, linking the national and European level of party 
activities, remain rare. Finally, in the context of EU Eastern enlargement in 2004, 
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policy transfer from western European parties to central and Eastern European parties 
has received scholarly attention (Pridham, 1999; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; 
Paterson and Sloam, 2005; Sloam, 2005). Not surprisingly, a growing number of 
scholars are interested in how national parties from the twelve newest EU Member 
States deal with Europeanisation (Katsourides, 2003; Brusis, 2004; Baun et al., 2006; 
Ishiyama, 2006; Octavian, 2008; Hloušek and Pšeja, 2009; Whitefield and 
Rohrschneider, 2009). There has even been some interest in the Europeanisation of 
parties in candidate countries (Komar and Vujović, 2007) and countries belonging to 
the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
(Timuş, 2009).         
2.2.5 The Europeanisation of party organisation  
In a cross-national study, Poguntke et al. (2007a and 2007b) compare the impact of 
European integration on the organisation of political parties in six Member States of 
the European Union: Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden. This 
study provides new, valuable insight into the topic. The main findings reveal that the 
impact of Europeanisation on national party organisation remains limited. However, 
the study also shows that party elites in general have become relatively more powerful 
within their parties, at the expense of the lower levels of the organisation, such as the 
members and activists. The study moreover shows that national-level EU specialists 
have not, as a rule, seen a perceptible increase in their intra-party standing. The 
exception seems to be the British Labour Party, where EU specialists, especially 
MEPs, have increased their influence over time. The authors (2007b: 206-207) 
conclude that:  
Change induced by European integration has been limited and patchy. Not 
too much has really changed for national political parties, at least in terms 
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of EU specialists’ presence and influence. The power of party elites, on 
the other hand, does seem to have enhanced – even if only really in often 
governing parties.  
We thus know more about the (limited) Europeanisation of party organisations in 
general. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the growing literature dealing with the 
Europeanisation of party politics, breaking down the studies on the basis of whether 
they focus on one party or multiple parties, and whether they focus on a single 
country or multiple countries. The first cell refers to single-party in a single country 
studies, such as Ladrech’s (2001b) and Cole’s (2001) studies on the Europeanisation 
of the PS, Heffernan’s (2001) study of the Labour Party. The second cell lists studies 
focusing on multiple parties within one country. Examples are Geddes (2006) and 
Niedermeyer (2003) who examine the Europeanisation of British and German party 
politics respectively. The third cell refers to studies focusing on parties from one 
family across different member states, for instance Ishiyama’s study of the 
Europeanisation of communist successor parties. The fourth and last cell lists 
publications comparing multiple parties in multiple countries, such as Kritzinger and 
Michalowitz’ (2005) comparison of the Europeanisation of Austrian, Finnish and 
Swedish parties.  
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Table 2.1: Illustrative list of publications on the Europeanisation of political 
parties by focus (up to July 2011) 
Single-country studies focusing on 
single party 
Single-country studies focusing on 
multiple parties  
French Socialist Party (Cole 2001) 
French Socialist Party (Ladrech 2001)  
Irish Labour Party (Holmes 2009)  
Spanish People’s Party (Van Hecke 
2009) 
UK Labour Party (Daniels 1998) 
UK Labour Party (Heffernan 2001) 
UK Scottish National Party (Dardanelli 
2003) 
UK [Northern Irish] SDLP (McLoughlin 
2009) 
 
Bulgaria (Stoychev 2008)  
Czech Republic (Baun et al. 2006)  
Czech Republic (Hloušek and Pšeja 
2009) 
Germany (Niedermayer 2003)  
Ireland (Hayward and Murphy 2010) 
Malta (Cini 2001)  
Montenegro (Komar and Vujović 2007) 
Poland (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2006)  
Serbia (Orlović 2007) 
Slovenia (Deželan 2007)  
UK (Geddes 2006)  
 
Comparative studies focusing on one 
‘party family’ 
Comparative studies focusing on 
multiple parties 
Communist successor parties (Ishiyama 
2006)  
Far-right parties (Taşkin 2011) 
Green parties (Bomberg 2000)  
Green parties (Hines 2003) 
Left parties (Holmes and Lightfoot 2007) 
Left parties (Lightfoot 2005) 
Left parties (Hertner 2011)  
 
 
Austria, Finland and Sweden (Kritzinger 
and Michalowitz 2005) 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary (Brusis 2004)  
Central and Eastern Europe (Pridham 
1999) 
Central and Eastern Europe (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2002)  
Central and Eastern Europe (Walecki 
2007) 
Central and Eastern Europe (Whitefield 
and Rohrschneider 2009) 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (Fink-
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Hafner 2007)  
Europe wide (Ladrech 2002)   
Europe wide (Pennings 2006) 
Europe wide (Conti 2007) 
Europe wide (Mair 2007)  
Europe wide (Poguntke et al. 2007)  
Europe wide (Hanley 2009) 
Slovenia and Bosnia (Lajh and Krašovec 
2007) 
Slovakia and Romania (Octavian 2008)  
Europe wide (Caramani 2010)  
Note: This list includes journal articles, books, book chapters in edited 
volumes and working papers. For a publication to be listed here it had to contain in its 
title the term ‘Europeanisation’ (or the adjective ‘Europeanised’) plus the word 
‘party’ or ‘parties’. Instead of ‘party’ the name of a party or party family (e.g. Social 
Democracy, Greens) was also permitted. In the case of some of the publications listed 
here, ‘Europeanisation’ in mentioned in the book title but not in the title of the 
chapter. This list is limited to studies published in English. Hayward and Murphy’s 
2010 study it italicised since it covers the whole of the island of Ireland, North and 
South.  
 
As Table 2.1 illustrates, the literature focusing on the Europeanisation of 
political parties is growing, and this thesis aims to contribute to the analysis of the 
Europeanisation of parties within one family, focussing on the party organisation. 
However, the other research areas identified by Ladrech (programmatic change; party 
competition; party-government relations; and relations beyond the national party 
system) will also be analysed.  
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2.3 The Europeanisation of social democratic party organisation 
In this last part of the chapter, an ideal model of a Europeanised party organisation 
will be developed. This model will then be used to provide a conceptual framework, 
which will be used to explore changes in the Labour Party, PS and SPD.  
The Europeanisation of national political parties is often understood as ‘a 
shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) 
adapt to, also seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU 
policies and processes in particular (Bomberg, 2002: 32). This is a rather broad 
definition relating to all party-related activities, including organisational and 
programmatic change. We need to be more specific and draw on the work of Carter et 
al. (2007: 5) who view Europeanisation as ‘intra-organizational change in national 
political parties that is induced by the ongoing process of European integration’. This 
definition is more useful since it emphasises the organisational aspect of 
Europeanisation. Furthermore, given the importance of bilateral contacts between 
social democratic sister parties we need to add a ‘horizontal’ notion of 
Europeanisation to the definitions given above. Horizontal Europeanisation can take 
place when sister parties across the EU meet to discuss their European policies, 
publish common statements, formulate common proposals at the European level, or 
campaign together. Taken together, these features help us to understand the 
Europeanisation of party organisations as a complex, multi-directional process in 
which parties change their organisations as a response to the process of European 
integration. This thesis adapts Carter et al.’s (2007) definition of Europeanisation, 
viewing it as a process of intra-organisational change in national political parties, 
including the development of inter-organisational cooperation between sister parties 
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in different member states, that is driven by the broader process of European 
integration.  
 
2.3.1 Europeanistaion: one process amongst many 
This definition interprets Europeanisation as a distinct and ongoing process, 
and not an end result. Europeanisation can be viewed from the level of the EU or the 
national political parties, and a full appreciation of the process needs to be understood 
from both levels. It is a process of change between moving features because neither 
the political system of the EU nor political parties are static. This first paragraph looks 
at the level of the EU; the next paragraph at the level of domestic parties.  
The European system of policy-making is undergoing constant change and is 
reformed with every new EU treaty. A steadily increasing amount of policies are now 
made at the European level, leaving national parties in government a limited room for 
manoeuvre (Schmidt, 2006). We would expect national parties to react and adapt to 
this development by employing EU experts to monitor the EU legislative process and 
build up networks at the European level.  For example, and as it will be discussed in 
chapter 8 of this thesis, the Party of European Socialists has become a more 
institutionalised organisation over the past decade and could have a Europeanising 
impact on its member parties.  Moreover, the way policy is made at the European 
level has changed over the past decades. Highly relevant for national party 
organisations, the powers of the European Parliament have been increased 
significantly since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (Hix and Høyland, 
2011: 52-53; Judge and Earnshaw, 2008). Together with the Council of the European 
Union, the European Parliament has become the co-legislator. Hix et al. (2007:3) even 
argue that the European Parliament is now ‘one of the most powerful elected 
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assemblies in the world.’ It is the only EU institution that is directly elected, and 
national parties select candidates to compete in its elections and organise the election 
campaigns. As the European Parliament has become more powerful, we would expect 
parties to empower their MEPs and make use of their EU expertise. In this sense, 
Europeanisation can be understood as a top-down process in which an increasingly 
powerful system of European governance puts pressures on national political parties 
to adapt their organisations.  
At the same time, parties themselves change. Scholars of historical 
institutionalism argue that institutions (such as political parties) tend to be ‘sticky’, or 
resistant to change for extended periods of time, even if there are demands or 
pressures for change (Bell, 2011). Historical institutionalists see the adaptation 
process of both formal and informal institutions to a changing environment as an 
incremental one. Both internal and external pressures can lead institutions to change 
at ‘critical junctures’ in time. Thus, despite institutional stickiness, party organisations 
have changed significantly over the years. For example, two important aspects of 
change have been a decrease in members and the centralisation and 
professionalization of party organisations. To begin with, most parties across Western 
Europe have lost hundreds of thousands of members in the past decades (Van Biezen 
et al., 2012). The Labour Party lost 43 per cent of its members between 2000 and 
2010, and the SPD lost 32 per cent during that time. An exception to the rule appears 
is the PS, which gained 35 per cent of members between 2000 and 2010 (Schlote, 
2011). Van Biezen et al. (2012) demonstrate that today’s party members are no longer 
representative of the population in terms of age, sex, and occupation. As a 
consequence, many Western European parties have opened up to the wider electorate, 
for example by letting them participate in party leader elections and referenda 
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(Scarrow et al. 2000: 149). This has important implications on intra-party democracy. 
However, not only have parties lost members; they have also become more 
centralised and professionalised (Farrell and Webb, 2000). For example, they invest 
more money into election campaigning as they hire specialist agencies and 
consultants. This development has led to more professional campaigns. Parties have 
also become more responsive to citizens’ opinions, as Farrell and Webb argue. An 
example for this development is the Labour Party who used focus groups, made up of 
voters, in order to track public opinion. This goes to show that despite institutional 
stickiness parties have changed their organisational structures in recent years, 
responding to social trends and the new media environment. These changes however 
do not directly relate to EU membership. How can we trace organisational change 
back to EU membership? In other words, how do we know that Europeanisation has 
taken place? As Haverland (2006: 137) points out, other inter-linked developments 
have taken place in recent years, such as Globalisation, the spread of neo-liberal ideas, 
new public management, new information and communication technologies.  In 
particular, how can the effects of Europeanisation and Globalisation be distinguished 
from each other? Globalisation has become a catch-all concept to describe the 
accelerated movement of goods, capital, services, technologies, people, and ideas 
across borders (Meunier, 2004: 126).  The primary consequences of this movement 
are ‘a transformation in the structures and practices of the world economy and a 
dilemma for established forms of authority such as national governments (Rosamond, 
2000: 262). Europeanisation is often portrayed as a West European response to 
economic Globalisation (Wallace, 1996: 16). More specifically, the creation of the 
European Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union is often understood 
to have been caused by global economic pressures (Verdun, 2000; Stone Sweet and 
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Sandholtz, 1998). However, this perspective underestimates the agency of the EU and 
its member states as one of the driving forces behind Globalisation. As Meunier 
(2004: 130) argues, ‘Europeanization has not only been a vector of globalization, it 
has also amplified its effects’. After all, European integration has reduced the margin 
of manoeuvre of national governments in vital areas such as monetary policy and 
competition policy. The EU therefore plays an active role in the liberalisation of the 
markets, and national governments have pushed for and agreed to this process. 
Separating the effects of Europeanisation on a particular policy area from the effects 
of Globalisation can therefore be impossible.  
However, measuring the Europeanising effect on institutions such as party 
organisations is a more straightforward task: we can focus on the roles played by the 
parties’ EU experts such as MEPs, MPs and party officials with a EU brief. Thus, we 
can find out whether parties have increased the number of EU experts and whether 
they have empowered them formally in the policy-making process (for example by 
giving them seats on executive committees) or informally – (for example by 
consulting them on a regular basis). This empowerment is understood as 
Europeanisation, as it implies that parties have recognised the importance of European 
integration and adapted their organisations accordingly.  
 
2.3.2 Critical junctures in the process of Europeanisation 
 If we identify Europeanisation as a particular process of party change, how 
can we identify the ‘critical junctures’ in time when parties Europeanise their 
organisations? Historical institutionalists view critical junctures as moments of 
pressure for change. Pressure for parties to Europeanise can be bottom-up and top-
down. Bottom-up pressure can emanate from the public and the party organisation. 
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Parties operate in a dynamic domestic environment. In the words of Crotty (2006: 
499) ‘the demands of society change, and the parties change to meet them’. Public 
attitudes towards European integration is measured regularly in surveys such as the 
European Commission’s Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, national 
election studies etc. Party elites are therefore very much aware of what the public 
thinks about the EU, and we know that public opinion can influence party policy 
(Gabel, 2000; Carubba, 2001; Tillman, 2004; Bartle and Clements, 2009). Indirectly, 
changes in public opinion can also lead to party organisational change. For example, a 
very pro-European public could send an encouraging signal to a party to tighten its 
links with the PES and social democratic sister parties, from other EU member states. 
It could also encourage parties to hire more EU experts or to empower existing ones.  
Moreover, pressures to Europeanise can come from within the broader party 
organisation: at critical junctures in time, grass roots activists can put pressure on the 
leadership to Europeanise the organisation. For example, after the French voted 
against the EU constitutional Treaty in a referendum in 2005 and the PS leadership 
was deeply divided over the issue, pro-EU-integrationist activists of the PS set up 
numerous PES activist groups across the country to showcase their Pro-Europeanness. 
The PES activist groups were then formally integrated into the party organisation.  
Within the party, pressure to Europeanisation can also come from the very top. 
For example, a newly elected party leader might prioritise EU policy (as it has been 
the case with Tony Blair when he took over the Labour Party) and empower EU 
experts such as MEPs, MPs or party officials with a EU brief. As a consequence party 
statutes can be changed so that EU experts become part of the party leadership ex 
officio (e.g. members of the national executive committee) and EU experts can 
become more involved into the party’s policy-making process.  
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Top-down pressures for parties to Europeanise can take different shapes. Most 
obviously, EU accession is a critical juncture exerting external pressure on parties to 
Europeanise their organisations. Even before joining the EU, parties in candidate 
countries need EU experts in the party headquarters, in parliament and (possibly) in 
government. For the Labour Party, PS and SPD, EU accession happened decades ago. 
All three parties have seen the European Union growing in size and importance, so for 
them, Europeanisation has been a much slower process of adaptation than for the 
parties of the Central and Eastern European countries that joined in 2004 and 2007, 
when the EU was a much more developed organisation with far more competences 
than in the 1950s or even the 1970s. As a response to EU treaty change (and in 
particular the Maastricht Treaty) national parliaments like the Bundestag have set up 
EU scrutiny committees. Parties have created new posts for EU experts in their 
headquarters and set up EU committees and working groups at different levels of the 
party organisation.     
Furthermore, entering government can be a critical juncture for a party’s 
Europeanisation: EU expertise is needed in the party headquarters, in cabinet and 
parliament. A newly elected party no longer needs to just scrutinise the government’s 
European policy; its cabinet ministers now participate in the Council of the European 
Union meetings, and the prime minister (or in the French case, the president) now 
participates in the European Council where the EU’s political guidelines are set. The 
government (and parliament) also translates EU legislation into national legislation. In 
brief, when a party enters government, the leadership will automatically be involved 
in the process of European policy-making, and EU expertise is required. The 
experience of being in government is thus expected to rub off on the highest levels of 
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the party organisation and should contribute to the Europeanisation of the party 
organisation. 
A key asset of the concept of Europeanisation is that it can grasp this ongoing 
process of organisational change, triggered by bottom-up and top-down pressures. Yet 
we need to keep in mind that any study into Europeanisation is always a snapshot 
taken at a particular moment in time. As the EU evolves, party organisational 
Europeanisation can take different shapes. It could even be reversed if, for example, 
public opinion changes drastically or a Eurosceptical party leadership takes over and 
shifts European policy to the bottom of the political agenda. So far this has not 
happened in the case of Labour, the PS and SPD, but the possibility cannot be 
excluded. Furthermore, financial pressures could lead a party to reduce the money it 
spends on Europeanisation. For example, being in opposition often means that less 
funding is available to employ party officials, as the example of the PS between 2002 
and 2012 will demonstrate.  
As we analyse and compare the Europeanisation of three centre-left party 
organisations we need to bear in mind that Europeanisation is not to be confounded 
with harmonisation or convergence (Radaelli, 2000). Historical institutionalists have 
found that institutions change following their own patterns and traditions. We can 
therefore expect parties to Europeanise following their individual, organically grown 
organisational structures. As a result, a Europeanised Labour Party, PS and SPD will 
not look the same. Instead, they are expected to integrate the EU dimension into their 
pre-existing structures.  
 
 64 
2.3.3 What would a Europeanised party organisation look like? 
Having outlined the process of party organisational Europeanisation as it is 
understood in this study, we can finally identify the indicators and establish an ideal 
model of a strongly Europeanised party organisation. As outlined in the introduction, 
this thesis adapts Key’s (1964) tripartite framework and examines the Europeanisation 
of the party’s public face; of the party in office; and as political a organisation. The 
focus of this study lies on the party organisation, but we need to keep in mind that the 
Europeanisation of the party organisation is driven by the Europeanisation of the party 
in government and the Europeanisation of the party’s public face and vice versa. 
Europeanisation is therefore understood as an interlinked, triangular process: 
Europeanisation in one arena drives Europeanisation in another arena. The arrows in 
figure 2.1 (below) depict this interconnectedness. For example, a party that has 
experienced strong organisational Europeanisation will drive forward the 
Europeanisation of the party in government and its public face and vice versa.  
 
Figure 2.1 Europeanisation: an interlinked process in three arenas 
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The following section will also outline what a party organisation looks like 
that has experienced weak Europeanisation. Contrasting weak and strong 
Europeanisation in the three arenas will allow us to be more differentiated in our 
overall assessment of the three parties’ response to European integration. If the degree 
of Europeanisation is at neither end of the extremes, it is referred to as ‘intermediate’.  
 
A party with a strongly Europeanised public face is one that does not shy away 
from communicating its EU policy. Party leaderships regularly give speeches and 
interviews in domestic forums outlining the party’s EU policies. This would help to 
make European policy a more salient issue and increase the EU awareness and 
knowledge of the public. In contrast, a party leadership that avoids giving high-profile 
speeches and interviews about the EU has experienced weak Europeanisation. 
Next, a strongly Europeanised party would make its European policy easily 
available on its website to those voters and party members who are interested to learn 
more. In practice, it means that there would be a separate, clearly visible section 
presenting the party’s general views on the purpose and future of European 
integration. In addition, more detailed information would be made available on 
particular aspects of EU policy. This could be done through authoritative policy 
documents such as national and European election manifestoes; press declarations, 
party leaderships’ interviews and podcasts on European policy. A party that has 
experienced weak Europeanisation in the electorate would make very little 
information on its EU policy available. Their website would focus on domestic 
politics, and if there was a small section covering the EU it would be part of the 
party’s broader international agenda.   
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A party that has fully Europeanised its public face would treat European 
policy as domestic policy, acknowledging that an increasing amount of formerly 
domestic policies have become Europeanised. The party would be open about the 
division of policy authority between the EU and the member states. It would explain 
that certain policies are now exclusively made at the European level, such as trade or 
competition policy; that some policy areas are the sole responsibility of the member 
states, such as defence, education, or health; and that in most policy areas the EU and 
member states share competences, for example in agriculture, consumer protection, 
energy or environment policy. This approach would be reflected in party manifestoes 
where the party would refer to the EU in each policy area. For example, when 
presenting its environmental policies the party would refer to the EU’s impact on this 
policy area and the policies it would support in the Council of the European Union 
and the European Parliament.  Furthermore, there would be a separate section in the 
manifesto where the party outlines its general views on the process and future of 
European integration. This section would be separate from foreign policy if the party 
has experienced strong Europeanisation and treats European policy as domestic 
policy. In contrast, a weakly Europeanised party would treat EU policy as part of 
foreign policy in its manifestoes. There would be a small EU section, which would be 
part of foreign policy. Little or no reference would be made to the EU in the other 
policy areas. Table 2.2 below contrasts indicators of weak and strong Europeanisation 
of a party in the electorate.  
Table 2.2 The public face of the party: Indicators of Europeanisation 
Indicators of strong Europeanisation Indicators of weak Europeanisation  
The party leadership regularly gives 
speeches and interviews explaining and 
defending the party’s EU policies.  
The party leadership avoids speaking 
about EU policies in public. 
European policy is easily available on the 
party’s website. 
There is little to no information on the 
party’s EU policy on the website.  
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In manifestoes, European policy is treated 
as domestic policy. In addition, there is a 
separate section on the party’s general 
stance towards European integration.  
In manifestoes, there is little to no 
reference to the EU. European policy is 
dealt with together with foreign policy in 
one short section. 
 
Next, we need to identify the indicators of a strongly Europeanised party in the 
governmental arena. This refers to the party in central government and parliament. 
The leadership of a strongly Europeanised party would first of all drive forward 
institutional adaptation, making sure that central government and parliament are 
equipped to make EU policy. This is necessary if a government wants to ‘upload’ its 
policies to the European level and ‘download’ the policies made at the EU level to the 
domestic level.  A strongly Europeanised party leadership in government would make 
sure that parliament is kept informed about upcoming EU legislation so it can 
scrutinise it effectively. It would also encourage plenary debates on EU policy in 
order to enhance the EU’s visibility in parliament and public. Last but not least, a 
strongly Europeanised party leadership would empower EU experts in government 
and parliament.  For example, powerful positions in parliament (such as the position 
of the party group leader) would go to an MP with an EU brief, such as the chair of 
the EU scrutiny committee or the party’s spokesperson on EU affairs. This person 
would also be a statutory member of the party’s executive committee where she or he 
could bring in EU expertise.  
In contrast, the leadership of a weakly Europeanised party would not put any 
efforts into the institutional adaptation of central government and parliament to the 
EU. It would try to make parliamentary EU scrutiny more difficult, for example by 
delaying information. It would also avoid plenary EU debates, fearing opposition to 
its policies and the politicisation of European policy in parliament. It would not 
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empower EU experts in government and parliament because European expertise 
would not be recognised as very important inside the party.  
Table 2.3 below contrasts indicators of weak and strong Europeanisation of a party in 
government. 
 
Table 2.3 The party in government: Indicators of Europeanisation 
Indicators of strong Europeanisation Indicators of weak Europeanisation  
The party leadership in government 
drives forward institutional adaptation of 
central government to the EU. 
Institutional adaptation of central 
government and parliament to the EU is 
neglected. 
Party leadership in government facilitates 
effective EU scrutiny in parliament 
Party leadership in government tries to 
prevent parliamentary EU scrutiny (e.g. 
by delaying important information). 
Party leadership empowers EU experts in 
government and parliament. 
EU experts have junior-level positions in 
the executive or parliament without 
decision-making power.  
 
 
Last but not least we turn our attention to the party as an organisation. In a 
strongly Europeanised party organisation a broad range of actors would be involved in 
a democratic process of EU policy-making. This would involve the party leadership, 
but also official bodies such as the party conference and policy forums who would set 
long-term EU policy guidelines. We know that the party leadership plays a crucial 
role in the policy-making process. In recent decades, parties have become more 
centralised. Centralisation ‘describes the extent to which decisions are made by a 
single group or decision body’ (Scarrow, 2005: 6). Many parties have given members 
(and non-members) a greater say over the selection of candidates and the election of 
leaders. Policy-making remains however highly centralized and the party leadership 
retains strong control over policy, especially when a party is in government (Scarrow 
et al., 2002: 146). A strongly Europeanised party leadership would however involve 
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the broader organisation in the formulation of EU policy in order to increase EU 
awareness and knowledge across the party. The membership would also be involved 
in EU policy-making through referenda on important decisions on the future of 
European integration (e.g. new EU treaties or EU enlargement). This could encourage 
EU debates at all levels of the party organisation. Furthermore, EU working groups, 
committees or movements would be set up at the local, regional and national levels of 
the party organisation where views and expertise can be shared. Last but not least, a 
strongly Europeanised party organisation would engage actively with the Party of 
European Socialists in order to create pan-European networks and lead Europeanised 
election campaigns that focus on European issues. It would also encourage exchanges 
with sister parties from across the European Union at all levels of the party 
organisation. Table 2.4 below contrasts the indicators of a strongly and weakly 
Europeanised party organisation. 
 
Table 2.4 The party as an organisation: Indicators of Europeanisation 
Indicators of strong Europeanisation Indicators of weak Europeanisation  
A wide range of party actors, including 
formal policy-making bodies, are 
involved in European policy-making. 
European policy is made by a narrow 
circle of party elites. 
Party leadership involves membership in 
EU policy-making. 
Membership is excluded from European 
policy-making. 
Party leads Europeanised European 
parliamentary election campaigns and 
interacts with the Party of European 
Socialists.  
During European election campaigns the 
party focuses on national issues and does 
not make use of the Party of European 
Socialists. 
Party has close links with sister parties 
across the EU at all levels of the party 
organisation. 
Party shows little or no interest in sister 
parties from other EU member states.  
 
In sum, a fully Europeanised party would be one that ‘thinks European’ and 
actively engages with the public and other parties at the domestic and European level. 
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In all three arenas – as the public face, in government, and as organisations - it would 
treat European policy as domestic policy.  
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2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Europeanisation literature. It has 
discussed the merits and weaknesses of the increasingly popular concept, arguing that 
despite its vagueness and fuziness, Europeanisation can help us to better understand 
and analyse member states’ response to the process of European integration. 
Secondly, this chapter has focused on the literature dealing with the Europeanisation 
of national parties with a focus on five areas of investigation identified by Ladrech 
(2002): programmatic change, patterns of party competition, party-government 
relations, relations beyond the national party system, and organisational change. The 
last part of this chapter has introduced the process of party organisational 
Europeanisation as it is understood in this study: an ongoing, multidirectional process 
of adaptation. Finally, an ideal model of a Europeanised party in the electorate, in 
government, and as an organisation was presented. The following six empirical 
chapters will examine the Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD in these three 
arenas. Chapter 9 will pull together the empirical findings and assess the extent to 
which Labour, the PS and SPD have experienced strong, weak, or intermediate 
Europeanisation in the past decade.  
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Chapter 3: The Europeanisation of party systems  
This chapter examines the Europeanisation of the British, French and German party 
systems. The party system forms part of the electoral arena in which the Labour Party, 
the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) operate. If we 
want to understand how the three parties have Europeanised their organisations, we 
need to examine their interactions with other parties.  
There exist many competing definitions of ‘party system’. For the purpose of 
this chapter, Giovanni Sartori’s (2005: 39) definition seems most helpful as it stresses 
the element of competition between parties: 
Parties make for a ‘system’, then, only when they are parts (in the plural); 
and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from 
inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the 
relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the 
mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or 
otherwise, to the other parties.  
As noted in the introduction, Europeanisation refers to the impact of European 
integration on the number of relevant parties within the national party system and the 
mechanisms of party competition (Mair 2000; 2007). In a strongly Europeanised party 
system, new parties have emerged as a direct response to European integration. Their 
attitudes can be either pro-European or Eurosceptical. European integration has 
become a political cleavage, meaning that EU policy issues are contested within and 
between parties, and parties actively shift them on the political agenda. In a strongly 
Europeanised party system, parties can be expected to Europeanise their organisations 
and lead EU debates at different levels of the organisation, organise internal EU 
referendums, and lead Europeanised election campaigns. Europeanisation is expected 
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to be a two-way process between individual parties and the system they are part of. 
Parties can be agents and make EU policy salient during and outside of elections and 
thereby pressurise other parties to react and define their EU policies. They thereby 
contribute to the Europeanisation of the structure, which is the party system. In return, 
if the structure - the party system as a whole - is Europeanised, individual parties, 
whether they are old or new, can be expected to have Europeanised their policies and 
organisations.  
Peter Mair (2000) was the first to research systematically the impact of EU 
membership on national party systems, and much of the relevant literature builds on 
his findings. He argues that there is very little evidence of any direct impact on the 
format and mechanics of party systems. The party systems of many EU member states 
have become more fragmented over the past two decades. Party system change is a 
continuous process in which the number of relevant parties and patterns of party 
interaction change. However, radical party system change takes place very rarely, and 
the number of new parties which can be linked directly to the issue of European 
integration is very small (Mair, 2006: 63). To be sure, the EU has generated a number 
of new parties, particularly Eurosceptical ones. However, most of them have confined 
themselves to contesting only in elections to the European Parliament.  
The impact of European integration on the mechanics of party systems is 
perhaps less easily discernible. In the past two decades, party-based Euroscepticism 
has increased across the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). However, many of these 
Eurosceptical parties are anti-establishment parties, and regardless of their EU 
attitudes, these parties would still remain outside the mainstream, as Mair (2006) 
points out. Detecting elements of Euroscepticism in mainstream parties is more 
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complicated; especially because parties are more likely to Europeanise when they 
become involved in EU-level politics. A current exception to this pattern is the British 
Conservative Party, which is a deeply Eurosceptical mainstream party. This chapter 
will demonstrate that the British, French and German party systems vary significantly 
in their degrees of Europeanisation, both in terms of format and mechanics.  
3.1 The Europeanisation of the British Party System 
The British party system has been dominated for over a century by two major parties 
(though not always the same two), with smaller parties playing only a minor role 
(Birch, 1998: 58). Until 1918, the two main parties were the Conservative and Liberal 
Parties, but the latter was displaced by the Labour Party in 1922, when it was 
recognised as the main opposition party in Parliament. During the twentieth century, 
the Conservative Party has tended to be the governing party, with the Labour Party as 
its challenger (Seldon, 1994). The British party system has thus been described as a 
two-party system. However, Ingle (2008: 18-21) challenges this concept arguing that 
the two-party system of the 1950s and 1960s was not as ‘fixed, permanent and 
rational’ as it is often assumed. The end of the twentieth century saw a notable 
increase in the parliamentary representation of the Liberal Democrat Party, which in 
2010 entered a government coalition as the junior partner of the Conservative Party. It 
seems that the British party system moves from being a typical two-party system to a 
two-and-a-half system: in addition to the two large parties, there is a considerably 
smaller party but one that may have coalition potential and that plays a significant role 
(Lijphart, 1999: 67). However, due to the first-past-the-post electoral system where 
the candidate with the majority vote wins, smaller parties find it difficult to win seats 
in Parliament.  
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Even though the EU issue has caused serious intra- and inter-party conflict, 
none of the relevant parties represented in Parliament were founded as a response to 
British EU membership. Their origins go back to the 19
th
 century. However, there 
exist small but growing Eurosceptical parties at the fringe of the party system who 
tend to perform well in local and European elections, due to proportional 
representation. Taggart (1998) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000; 2002; 2008) 
distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as 
a ‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen 
in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose 
policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of 
European integration as it is currently conceived’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 4). 
Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is ‘where there is not a principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of 
policy areas leads to the expression qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a 
sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’ (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2002: 4). This categorisation is very useful as it helps structuring public 
and party attitudes towards the EU.  
Since the beginnings of the 1990s, The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has 
been the most Eurosceptical party in Britain. Its primary objective is withdrawing the 
UK from the European Union. UKIP is a conservative, nationalist, populist anti-
establishment party. Its status as a single-issue party for whom all policy preferences 
circle around withdrawal from the EU marks it out as something of an anomaly in 
British politics (Usherwood, 2008: 255). UKIP is represented in the European 
Parliament since 1999 and came third during the European elections in 2004 and 
second in 2009, when it beat the Labour Party and won for a second time 12 seats. For 
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a relatively small party, UKIP has an impressive campaign budget. During the 2009 
EP election campaign it spent £1,270,855 (with the highest share of this amount going 
into advertising and publicity material) as against £2,482,536 spent by the 
Conservatives and £2,302,244 by Labour (Electoral Commission 2009). UKIP also 
ran for the 2010 general elections of 2010 and polled 3.1% of the votes. It was the 
party with the largest percentage of votes to win no seats in the House of Commons 
(BBC News, Election 2010). According to Usherwood (2008) the most obvious 
environmental factor for UKIP’s electoral success has been the British electoral 
system: the difference between First-Past-the-Post and Proportional Representation 
since 1999 has had a clear impact on UKIP’s strategy. Whilst the party aims to contest 
all elections at national level, it places more emphasis on EP elections, where its 
chances of election are higher. UKIP puts all mainstream parties under pressure, but 
in particular the Conservatives and Labour. After all, many of its members were 
previously members of the Conservative Party but left the party as an expression of 
their frustration over European policy. In order to keep a distinct profile, UKIP tries to 
highlight the differences between itself and the Conservatives, and party leader Nigel 
Farage has accused the Conservatives of not being ‘sufficiently Eurosceptic’ (The 
Independent, 01/06/2009). Yet, Labour has also lost some of its politicians to UKIP: 
former MEP Robert Kilroy-Silk and John Bufton (MEP) were previsouly members of 
the Labour Party. In the 2009 European parliamentary elections, the Labour Party lost 
a fair share of votes and a parliamentary seat (West Midlands) to UKIP.  
It is also important to mention the far-right, anti-immigration, racist, populist 
and Eurosceptical British National Party (BNP). No BNP candidate has ever won a 
seat in the House of Commons. However, the party won two seats in the 2009 
European parliamentary elections, taking long-standing Labour MEP Richard 
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Corbett’s seat. Therefore, the BNP should not be ignored in the debate on the 
Europeanisation of the British party system.  The BNP claims it ‘loves Europe, but 
hates the European Union’, describing the EU as a ‘danger’ to British sovereignty and 
‘threat’ to British democracy (BNP, 2010). The BNP demands an ‘immediate 
withdrawal from the European Union, which is an organisation dedicated to usurping 
British sovereignty and to destroying our nationhood and national identity’ (BNP, 
2010). However, the BNP‘s position on Europe may be seen as secondary to other 
concerns. It seems unlikely that voters for such parties are voting on the basis of their 
European policies, as Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 6) explain.  
The presence of these deeply Eurosceptic parties has certainly contributed to 
the deepening of the EU cleavage in British politics. Unlike in Germany or France, 
general election campaigns in Britain have been fought on EU issues, for example by 
the Conservatives in 2001. Two-party systems tend to be one-dimensional, meaning 
that programmes and policies of the main parties differ from each other mainly with 
regard to just one dimension, that of economic issues (Lijphart, 1999). In Britain 
however, membership of the EU has frequently been a source of division both 
between and within the Labour and Conservative parties.  
The most consistently pro-European party are the Liberal Democrats 
(LibDems). In their 2009 European elections manifesto, they write that joining the 
Euro would be in Britain’s long-term interest. ‘But Britain should join when the 
economic conditions are right, and with the present economic turbulence and 
volatility, they are not at the moment. If the government were to recommend joining 
the euro, Liberal Democrats believe this should only take place if that decision were 
supported by the people of Britain in a referendum’ (Liberal Democrats, 2009). 
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Furthermore, the LibDems were in favour of the European Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty. Le Monde (25/04/2010) hence labelled party leader Nick Clegg a 
‘Euroenthusiast’. The LibDems’ senior partner in government is the Conservative 
Party whose Eurosceptic wing has time and again constrained party leaders from 
Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron (Budge et al., 2004). According to Norton 
(2001: 256) there are essentially four groupings within the Conservative party that can 
be identified on the issue of Europe: the anti-Europeans who oppose British EU-
membership (Taggart and Szczerbiak would label them hard Eurosceptics); the 
Eurosceptics who support EU membership for the purpose of free trade, but are 
against political integration (‘soft’ Eurosceptics); the Euroagnostics who have no 
ingrained ideological stance on the issue; the Europhiles who are committed to 
European integration and campaigned for Britain to join the euro. The share of 
Europhiles seems to have dramatically decreased in the past two decades. The official 
conservative line is against the adoption of the Euro and the party also opposed the 
Constitutional Treaty and its successor, the Lisbon Treaty. Under pressure from the 
deeply Eurosceptical party group, David Cameron decided to leave the EPP-ED group 
in the European Parliament and found a new group together with a number of 
Eurosceptical Eastern European parties. In a survey conducted by Conservative 
politician Tim Montgomery in August 2010 (Conservativehome, 05/08/2010), 
members of the Conservative Party were asked to rate the greatest threats to the 
Conservative-LibDem coalition. ‘Anger from Tory MPs and conservative-supporting 
newspapers at Coalition policies on prisons, immigration and Europe’ came third. 
This survey cannot claim to be representative, but it indicates a certain mood amongst 
party members.  
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Like the Conservative Party, the Labour Party has been divided over issues of 
European integration in the past. Given Labour’s diverse ideological traditions and its 
constitutional complexity, its politics have always been prone to factionalism and 
infighting – especially within the party group (Peele, 2004: 289-290). In the 1950s, 
neither Labour nor the Conservatives wanted the UK to join the EU. Labour only 
changed its attitude during the 1960s. It was the Conservative government of Edward 
Heath that took Britain into the EU in 1973 whilst the left wing of the Labour Party 
had gradually become more influential and increasingly hostile towards membership. 
This was partly the result of President de Gaulle’s vetoing British membership. In the 
1975 referendum on EU membership, intra-party divisions worsened. The Labour 
leader supported British membership whilst a number of cabinet ministers, the 
majority of MPs and party members were against it. It led the party into a kind of civil 
war (Geddes, 2004: 186). At the beginnings of the 1980s the party called for 
withdrawal from the EU, and this attitude made the pro-European moderates break 
away and form the Social Democratic Party in 1981. Only after a devastating electoral 
defeat in 1983 were anti-European views gradually sidelined, and from 1987 onwards, 
the party leadership began to be more pro-European (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 59). 
During the period between the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, 
Labour moved from anti- to pro-EU, whilst the Conservatives shifted in the opposite 
direction. This reversal in position was linked to the development of the EU’s social 
and regional policies, which provided new opportunities for the Labour Party 
(Geddes, 2006: 121). Throughout Major’s Premiership (1990-1997) the Labour 
leadership saw an advantage in exposing the divisions within the Conservative party 
and presented itself as both more united over Europe and as progressively more pro-
European (Carter and Ladrech, 2007). The Blair government pursued this cautious 
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pro-Europeanism. Under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, Britain’s 
EU membership was no longer contested. Nevertheless, different views existed on 
issues such as the Euro, the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. There was a 
controversy over the content of both treaties as well as the question of whether they 
should be put to a referendum or not. Long-standing MP Gisela Stuart who was a 
member of the Convention setting up the Constitutional Treaty, voiced her criticism 
against the treaty and the unwillingness of the leadership to hold a referendum which 
had been promised by Tony Blair (BBC News, 12/12/2007). When the Conservatives 
presented a proposal to Parliament to hold a UK-wide referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty, they were supported by 29 Labour MPs (BBC News, 05/03/2008).  
European policy is thus heavily contested in the British party system, both at 
the centre and the far right margin. Labour was Eurosceptical during the 1970s and 
1980s, but has drastically changed its EU attitude and become very Euro-friendly. The 
Conservatives, on the contrary, have become increasingly Eurosceptical since the 
1990s whilst they were very pro-integrationist during the previous two decades. Only 
the LibDems have continuosly been pro-European. Figure 3.1 (below) illustrates the 
support for the EU in British legislative elections since 1945 on the basis of 
Comparative Project (CMP) data. The CMP seeks to establish estimates of manifesto 
content according to a pre-determined set of policy-related categories. The whole 
approach is predicated on the concept of saliency theory, which is essentially the idea 
that the more importance a party attaches to a given policy, the more likely they are to 
mention it repeatedly (Budge et al., 2001: 78-85). The content analysis relies on the 
manual coding of manifestoes: Texts are broken down into ‘quasi sentences’, which 
are then coded on the basis of the pre-determined categories. To measure parties’ 
support for European integration, two coding categories were used: positive and 
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negative references to the EU. In all cases, the latter score (reported as a percentage of 
all quasi-sentences in the manifesto) was subtracted from the former (also reported as 
a percentage of all quasi-sentences). The result, which is illustrated by Figure 3.1, was 
a measure of ‘net’ support for Europe. 
Figure 3.1: British parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data) 
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Note: The data span legislative elections for which CMP data were readily available. 
Elections between 1945 and 2002 were obtained from CMP publications (Budge et 
al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). Data for the 2005 British and German elections 
were obtained directly from Judith Bara and Andrea Volkens. 
3.2 The Europeanisation of the French Party System  
The French party system is not a particularly rigid structure. It has been destabilised 
by frequent changes to the electoral rules, changing patterns of voting behaviour, and 
changing constituent parties over the last twenty years (Clift, 2003: 42). The party 
system is highly fragmented (with currently 12 parties in the Assemblée Nationale) 
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and most parties have split at least once, and some have merged over the past decades. 
Except the Communists (PCF) all parties have changed their name at least once. The 
classification of the French party system is therefore a challenge: ‘At times, indeed, 
and especially since the 1980s, observers have come close to detecting a new party 
system with each election’ (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 253).  
After an initial phase of confusion from 1958 until 1962 linked to the 
consolidation of de Gaulle’s leadership, the French party system became simplified 
between the 1960s and early 1980s on account of the bipolarisation process, 
streamlining parties into two rival coalitions of the left and the right. In the 1978 
elections, the structure of the party systems was that of a bipolar quadrille: four 
parties of roughly equal political strength together obtained over 90 percent of the 
vote and divided voter preferences evenly between the PCF and the PS in the left 
coalition, and the neo-Gaullist RPR and the liberal conservative UDF on the right. 
Since the mid 1980s, however, the structure of the French party system has become 
less balanced (Cole, 2003: 13-14). The bipolar structure has been challenged by the 
emergence of new political issues, such as immigration, security and the environment, 
and the difficulties experienced by the mainstream parties in articulating them (Cole, 
2003.). According to Cole (2003) the three main developments in the past two 
decades have been: (1) the emergence or breakthrough of small but significant parties 
such as the Greens (Les Verts) and Workers’ Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière, LO) on the 
left, and the National Front (FN) on the far right; (2) the changing dynamics of 
factional and coalition politics, most clearly demonstrated in the decline of the 
Communist Party (PCF) and the emergence of the PS as the dominant party of the 
left; and (3) growing electoral instability, such as increased electoral volatility and a 
voter’s disaffection towards traditional politics, as demonstrated in higher abstention 
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rates and the weakening of the mainstream parties. However, despite fragmentation, 
the left/right axis is still in place. 
The most significant of these new parties is the Front National (FN), which at 
times could claim to be the second formation of the French right. In the first round of 
the 2002 presidential election, FN party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen polled 16.86%, 
outpolling the Socialist Candidate Lionel Jospin. The FN has forced issues such as 
immigration and security onto the political agenda, exploiting the weakness of the 
mainstream parties who failed to address those issues. The FN calls for an end of free 
movement within the Schengen area and the re-nationalisation of asylum and 
immigration policies (Front National 2010). As a response, the UMP has shifted 
under Nicolas Sarkozy to the right in certain policy areas, such as immigration and 
integration. Perhaps as a consequence of the UMP’s shift to the right, but also due to 
internal divisions, the FN could not repeat its 2002 success in the 2007 general 
elections, and due to the majoritarian electoral system did not win any seats.  
Controversy over the direction of European integration has contributed to a 
number of minor shifts in the French party system. For example, the secessionist No 
campaigns by Gaullists Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin in the 1992 referendum 
on the Maastricht Treaty, or Philippe de Villiers’ split from the centrist Union pour la 
démocratie française (UDF), and the salience of the former Socialist minister Jean-
Pierre Chevènement’s Mouvement des Citoyens were all in direct response to 
Maastricht (Evans, 2007: 1100). However, none of these mouvements and parties was 
as successful as UKIP in electoral terms. Hence, European integration has not 
generated new parties, and with regards to its format, the French party system has 
therefore not Europeanised.  
 84 
However, European integration has a visible impact on the mechanics of the 
French party system. Mainstream political parties in France have not been as critical 
towards the EU as their British counterparts; at least, EU membership has never been 
put into question. However, since the mid 1980s, with the ratification of the SEA and 
the Treaty of Maastricht, the European issue has become increasingly contested 
amongst parties at the centre and the left and right margins of the party system. The 
extension of EU competences in economic and social policy stimulated a public 
debate on whether the EU should develop into a large free market or whether it should 
be more regulatory and protectionist. Other controversial issues on the agenda were 
European security and EU enlargement. Moreover, during the 1990s, the parties had 
different views on the EU’s institutional design: while the PS supported greater 
powers for the European Parliament and an extension of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in the Council of Ministers, the Gaullists favoured a more intergovernmental 
approach (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 79). The adoption of a new EU Treaty has often 
divided parties. In particular, President Mitterrand’s decision to put the Maastricht 
Treaty to a national referendum in September 1992 has led to an intense level of 
conflict both within and amongst the parties.  
CMP data (see Figure 3.2 below) reveals that the PS has been the most pro-
European party. The degree of pro-Europeanness however varies significantly. The 
net support for European integration peaked when the PS had won the elections and 
entered government in 1997. Figure 3.2 also shows that among the relevant parties, 
the Communists have traditionally been the most critical towards the EU. However, 
when they entered government with the PS in 1997, they suddenly became highly 
supportive of the EU which points to a certain Europeanisation of parties in 
government. In contrast to Labour, thus, the PS did not have to interact with 
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Eurosceptical opponents when it was in government, and could therefore pursue its 
pro-ingrationist agenda.  
 
Figure 3.2: French parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data) 
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Note: The diagram relies on François Petry and Paul Pennings (2006), the leading 
experts on French party manifestoes, to determine which parties were Gaullist and 
which were Centre-right at any given election. 
 
Yet it needs to be mentioned that Euroscepticism finds its expression in anti-
globalisation movements like Attac with which many PS members sympathise, as will 
be explained below. The PS’ biggest enemy, however, is its own factionalism. It has 
led to deep divisions over the party’s European policy.  
In general, internal factionalism plays an important role in almost all French 
parties. Parties are divided because of personal rivalries, political strategy and policy 
differences. Whilst the Gaullists have been divided over EU issues during the 1990s, 
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ultra-conservative EU-critics have become silent under Sarkozy’s presidency. For the 
PS, the situation is bleaker. The party was reconstructed after 1971 as an explicitly 
factional party. The right to free expression of factions (courants) was anchored in the 
party’s constitution. Before each party congress, different courants present policy 
motions that are voted on in party federation meetings, and each motion with more 
than 5 per cent support receives representation in the national executive. Membership 
of a courant is generally necessary if one wants to achieve any kind of political post 
within the PS (Desmeuliers, 2005). Factionalism might entail certain advantages, such 
as institutional flexibility, which can be important in France where different electoral 
systems are in place at different levels of government. Factionalism can moreover 
encourage lively debates within the party and foster new ideas. However, Angelo 
Panebianco (1988) points to factionalism as the main criterion for institutional 
weakness of political parties. Panebianco argues that as a consequence of its lack of 
organisational and ideological cohesion, a party is not able to dominate its own 
environment and its dominant coalition of elites running the party. In the case of the 
PS, extreme factionalism has weakened the party, and some factions have behaved 
like parties within a party during the 1980s. Ever since the 1950s, different left-wing 
factions within the PS have rebelled against the party leadership’s pro EU Single 
Market position, and every party leader had to accommodate these views. Even Lionel 
Jospin could not successfully handle the tensions between the ‘party doctrinal identity 
and its official pro-European line’ (Crespy, 2008: 26). After Jospin’s electoral defeat 
in the 2002 presidential elections, a new courant was founded (Nouveau Parti 
Socialiste) by EU-critics J.L. Mélenchon and H. Emmanuelli.  
In 2004, with the approaching presidential elections in mind, former Prime 
Minister Laurent Fabius decided to challenge the party leadership surrounding 
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François Hollande by voicing his opposition to the EU Constitutional Treaty. He 
argued that the Constitution was promoting economic liberalism, was too pro-market, 
and promoted free trade rather than the French social model (Der Spiegel, 
13/06/2005). At the time, Fabius stroke a chord, because numerous PS activists were 
flirting with the anti-Globalisation movement around organisations like Attac, which 
accuse the EU for being a Trojan horse of Globalisation. The yes-camp, on the other 
hand, focussed on non-economic arguments, stressing that the Constitution would 
bring positive changes for EU foreign policy as well as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Fabius - a former prime minister, secretary of state, and MEP - was by no 
means a Eurosceptic, nor did he belong to the minority left wing of the PS. His move 
can be best understood as an attempt to become the PS’ leading presidential candidate 
for 2007.  
The 2004 debate over the EU Constitutional Treaty thus split the PS into three 
camps: the left-wing minority factions, the opponents of the Treaty within the 
majority courant (such as Laurent Fabius), and the supporters of the Treaty, such as 
party leader François Hollande (Wagner, 2008: 262). The party leadership, unable to 
discipline the courants, decided to put the Treaty to an internal referendum, which 
took place on 1 December 2004. 83.2 per cent of party members participated and a 
majority of 58.6 per cent voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty (BBC News 
02/12/2004). However, this referendum did not settle the tensions within the PS. 
Despite of the pro-Constitution majority, the no-camp continued their campaign until 
the national referendum took place on 29 May 2005. The message sent by the PS to 
the French voters was thus very confusing. The party was once again divided over the 
Lisbon Treaty. The French Constitution had to be changed before the Lisbon Treaty 
could be adopted, and even though the PS leadership had recommended abstention, 
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only 142 socialist parliamentarians followed this advice, while 121 voted against and 
32 in favour of the constitutional revision (Wagner, 2008: 272). Wagner (2008) 
concludes that elements of soft Euroscepticim can be found in the party leadership’s 
statements on the Constitution. Henri Nallet, a former minister and the party’s 
international secretary under Jospin (interviewed on 30/06/2009) states: 
No, the PS is not a Europeanised party. I would even go so far as to say 
that – paradoxically – it is less Europeanised today than it was in the past. 
I believe that EU issues were recently instrumentalised for internal power-
seeking.  
To sum up, the French party system has experienced weak Europeanisation: The EU 
has not generated new parties, and EU policy is not heavily contested amongst the 
mainstream parties. Hence, no Eurosceptical opposition has attacked the PS. It is the 
party’s very own courants that have put the pro-European leadership under pressure.  
3.3 The Europeanisation of the German Party System 
The German party system has changed significantly since the 1980s. However, these 
changes cannot be attributed directly to the process of European integration. West 
Germany’s relatively stable ‘two-and-a-half party system’ of the 1960s and 1970s 
(Blondel, 1968) – dominated by the SPD and CDU/CSU, the two ‘catch-all parties’ 
(Kirchheimer, 1990) and with the liberal FDP, acting as the kingmaker – has 
developed into a fluid five party-system (Niedermayer, 2008). However, this 
triangular dynamic of party competition was undermined by the arrival of two new 
parties. First, in 1983, the post-materialist Greens entered the Bundestag, and second, 
after German reunification, the socialist PDS. In 2005 the PDS entered an electoral 
alliance with the West German WASG (Electoral Alliance for Labour and Social 
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Justice), and in 2007 the two groupings merged to form the Left Party (Die Linke). 
The German party system has thus become more fragmented over the past three 
decades, but neither the Greens nor the Left Party was founded as a direct response to 
European integration. In the period between 1965 and 1998, three new political 
parties explicitly referring to the EU integration process have taken part in national 
elections
3
, but none of these parties gained seats in the Bundestag or the European 
Parliament, and they disappeared quickly. In terms of its format, the German party 
system has not Europeanised.  
Have the mechanics of the German party system been Europeanised? 
Unsurprisingly, the five parties do not agree on all EU issues. However, there is no 
real conflict within the German party system over European integration (Poguntke, 
2007). There is disagreement on Turkey’s EU accession and more recently, on 
Chancellor Merkel’s handeling of the Eurocrisis. However, both major parties, the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD are pro-integrationist. The CDU even calls itself Germany’s 
‘European Party’ (Europapartei). The CMP data in Figure 3.3 (below) shows that the 
CDU has been the most supportive of European integration under the leadership of 
Chancellor Kohl during the late 1980s when the Single European Act was ratified. 
The CDU’s EU support has however decreased significantly since the mid-1990s. The 
same applies to the Social Democrats, who have always been pro- integrationist, 
albeit not to the same degree as the CDU.  
 
                                                          
3
 The decidedly pro-European Europäische Föderalistische Partei in the 1960s, and the Eurosceptical 
Bund freier Bürger – Offensive für Deutschland (BfB) and the Initiative Pro D-Mark- Neue Liberale 
Partei  (Pro-DM) in the 1990s. 
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Figure 3.3: German parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data) 
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Figure 3.3 also shows that in Germany, none of the relevant parties have been 
Eurosceptical. Even the Greens, like most Green parties across the EU, have become 
increasingly EU-friendly in recent years. The Green’s involvement in the coalition 
government with the SPD (1998-2005) has had little direct impact on the wider 
party’s attitude to the EU, as Bomberg and Carter (2006) argue. The party was already 
very pro-integrationist before and is commonly regarded as one of the most Europhile 
Green parties, even if their support is conditioned by sharp criticism for certain 
processes and procedures (Bomberg and Carter, 2006). Even the Left Party, a strong 
critic of the current market-oriented EU and a proponent of a more social Europe, is 
generally supportive of European integration. Amongst German parties, EU policy is 
simply not contested.  
If anything, lines of conflict over European policy have existed between the 
parties at the federal level and the parties at the regional level. Some Länder have a 
more particularist view of European integration, and have on occasion – as in the case 
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of Bavaria under Edmund Stoiber (Minister-President from 1993-2007) – become 
vocal critics of the loss of powers to Brussels. However, the strong role of cooperative 
federalism with its pressures to achieve compromise between the two legislative 
chambers, and the fact that Germany is usually governed by a coalition of at least two 
parties, creates a powerful constitutional logic for consensual politics. These factors 
have acted as important constraints against Eurosceptical mobilisation in the German 
party system (Poguntke, 2007). Thus, in terms of party competition, ‘almost nothing 
points to the pro- vs. anti-European conflict line becoming a relevant cleavage 
dimension’, as Niedermayer (2003: 129) stresses. Elections have never been fought 
on European issues, and the EU issue has generally low salience in Germany. This 
situation seems to change; after all, the SPD and the Greens have voiced their critique 
against Chancellor Merkel’s EU policy and in particular her role in the management 
of the financial crisis since 2008. So far, however, real competition over EU policy 
has not taken place in Germany.  
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3.4 Conclusions 
Of the three party systems examined in this chapter, the British has Europeanised the 
most, both with regards to its format and mechanics. With the emergence of UKIP, 
the format of the party system has changed. UKIP not only competes in European 
parliamentary elections, but also in local and general elections. EU policy is heavily 
contested in Britain amongst mainstream parties and at the right fringe of the party 
system. Major parties with a Eurosceptic outlook have not yet emerged in either 
France or Germany. In France, European integration has been contested since the 
1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. However, EU membership is not 
contested amongst the mainstream parties, and hard Euroscepticism can only be found 
at the left and right margin of the party system. In Germany, up to now, European 
policy-making has taken place in a very consensual environment. Inter- and intra-
party dissent on EU issues has been rather low and confined to a limited amount of 
topics such as EU enlargement. As a consequence, the German party system is the 
least Europeanised, both in terms of its format and its mechanics. Table 3.1 (below) 
summarises the findings. What are the implications of these findings for Labour, the 
PS and SPD? Whilst the SPD has never been in the position to justify its pro-
Europeanness, the PS and Labour’s EU policies are closely scrutinised by 
Eurosceptical parties, social movements and, in the case of Labour, the press. This 
environment is expected to affect how the three parties make EU policy and lead 
European parliamentary campaigns, both of which will be examined later on.  
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Table 3.1: The Europeanisation of the British, French and German party 
systems  
Indicators of Europeanisation 
of the party system  
Britain  France  Germany 
Format (number of parties) Moderate  Weak Weak 
Mechanics (patterns of party 
competition)  
Strong  Moderate  Weak  
Overall Europeanisation  Moderate To 
Strong 
Weak To 
Moderate  
Weak  
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Chapter 4: The Europeanisation of public opinion  
This chapter examines the Europeanisation of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party 
(PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) vis-à-vis the public. Parties 
perform a number of vital functions in linking individuals to the democratic process. 
Two of their most crucial functions are interest articulation and aggregation: Parties 
not only express the views of their supporters in the governing process; they also 
aggregate them by bringing the views of various groups together to form a 
comprehensive programme for government (Dalton and Watternberg, 2000). Parties 
are therefore thought to respond to public opinion. A Europeanised public, it is 
argued, could be an incentive for parties to Europeanise their policies and 
organisations. A Europeanised public would be one with a high level of knowledge of 
the functioning of the EU. It would be well-informed about basic facts such as the 
current number of EU member states, or the basic functioning of the EU’s political 
system (e.g. the role played by the European Commission, Parliament, and Council of 
Ministers). Various studies demonstrate that high levels of formal education – which 
are most likely to go hand in hand with high levels of EU knowledge – tend to be  
associated with positive attitudes towards European integration (Caplanova et al., 
2004; Kritzinger, 2003; Munro, 2007; White et al., 2002). Hence, a Europeanised 
public is more likely to be pro-integrationist than Eurosceptic. This however does not 
deny the existence of highly educated Eurosceptics. 
The Europeanisation of parties vis-a-vis the public is a bi-directional process. 
In a bottom-up process, a Europeanised public is expected to exert pressure on parties 
to speak about the EU. Yet, in order to speak knowledgably about the EU, parties 
need EU expertise and adapt their organisational structures accordingly. In turn, party 
elites are expected to influence public opinion. They can shift EU policy issues on the 
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political agenda and Europeanise the electorate through policies, speeches and other 
statements. 
Public opinion in respect of European integration has become increasingly 
important for national governments. For many years, European integration was almost 
entirely an elite-driven process in which citizens’ attitudes were neglected by national 
governments. Many scholars therefore viewed public opinion as being almost 
irrelevant to the integration process (Hellström, 2008a). However, voters seem to have 
become more sceptical about the EU - both integration and enlargement - and the 
‘permissive consensus’ (Lindbergh and Scheingold, 1970) that existed amongst 
European citizens in favour of European integration during the 1950s and 1960s is no 
longer present. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that the EU has changed significantly 
over the past decades and affects the citizens’ day-to-day lifes more strongly than it 
did during the 1950s and 1960s. It is often argued that since the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), European integration has become a contested issue in EU Member States, and 
that the strictly elite-driven process has come to an end (Hellström, 2008a; 
Steenbergen et al., 2007; Hix, 2005). In this political context, the interaction between 
voters and political parties is becoming increasingly important for the future of 
European integration. This trend is reflected in the growing body of literature which 
examines the multidirectional links between public opinion and party positions 
regarding EU matters. Many studies measuring public opinion towards the EU draw 
on the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys, whilst the attitudes of 
political elites have been measured through surveys by scholars such as Leonard Ray 
(1999) and Liesbeth Hooghe (2001). Party positions, as explained in the previous 
chapter, have been mapped by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; 
Klingemann et al., 2006).  
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One of the key questions recent research addresses is whether political parties 
are representing voters’ preferences towards the EU. Studies analysing public opinion 
on European integration show that although the public is generally badly informed 
and shows little interest, many voters do have opinions towards the EU (Gabel and 
Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).  
First, this chapter will provide an overview of the literature on mass-elite 
linkages with regards to issues of European integration. Second, it will examine the 
Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany on the basis of 
Eurobarometer data. In the third part, mass-elite linkages in the three countries will 
be analysed on the basis of the countries’ electoral systems and EU referenda.  
 
4.1 A brief literature review: European integration and the mass-elite linkage 
There are three basic models of mass-elite linkages, all of which can be applied to the 
issue of EU integration: the bottom-up, top-down and bi-directional models. The first 
of these models, the bottom-up perspective, argues that political elites primarily 
respond to public opinion towards EU integration. For political parties, strategic 
positioning is assumed to become more important as European integration becomes 
more contested in domestic politics (Clements and Bartle, 2009). From this 
perspective, voters are expected to prefer parties that best represent their own policy 
positions, and parties position themselves accordingly to maximise their votes 
(Downs, 1957). Authors like Gabel (2000) and Tillman (2004) have demonstrated that 
voters’ attitudes towards the EU influence their voting behaviour in national elections. 
Carubba (2001) compares party positions - using the data of the Manifesto Research 
Group - with voters’ opinions as expressed in Eurobarometer surveys. He claims that 
‘politicians seem to anticipate public preferences and, thus, those preferences are 
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respected even when they are not overtly expressed’ (Carubba, 2001: 156). This 
perspective is questioned by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) who argue that since a 
large part of the electorate has views on EU issues that are not represented by their 
respective parties, they cannot choose a party on the basis of its EU position while at 
the same time choosing on the basis of its left/right position. Hix (2005: 170-171) 
argues along similar lines. With reference to Eurobarometer survey 51 (spring 1999), 
he shows that the ‘EU political market’ is fragmented. While intra-class alliances such 
as those between manual workers and skilled workers, or between white collar-
workers and professionals, may hold together on left-right issues, these alliances are 
likely to break down whenever the issue of Europe becomes salient in domestic 
politics. For social democratic parties, this feature of public opinion presents 
problems: their traditional constituency (manual and skilled workers) has declined and 
they have built new alliances with groups that are close to them on the left-right 
dimension, such as white-collar employees, students and members of the liberal 
professions (Kitschelt, 1994, quoted by Hix, 2005: 170). However, because of the 
different attitudes of these groups towards European integration, the cross-class 
alliance often breaks down over Europe. As a result, Hix (2005) argues that parties 
pursue one of two strategies to ensure that there is no party competition on EU 
politics: they either refuse to differentiate themselves from each other on this 
dimension, or they play down the differences between them by refusing to address the 
question of European integration.  
In a similar vein, Mattila and Raunio (2006), drawing on data from the 2004 
European Election Study survey, show that parties are closer to their supporters’ 
preferences on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension. However, the data 
reveal significant cross-national variation. On attitudes towards EU integration, the 
 98 
biggest gap between parties and voters can be found in Britain. Moreover, the authors 
show that parties are more supportive of European integration than their voters. 
Britain is amongst the group of member states where parties are far more pro-
European than voters. It is also the case that parties in government tend to occupy 
more positive positions towards European integration than do opposition parties, 
which could point to a Europeanising effect of being in government. Party size is also 
related to responsiveness with larger parties being, on average, further away from 
their voters on the EU dimension than smaller parties (Mattila and Raunio, 2006: 
444). The Labour Party, SPD and PS are all large mainstream parties with experience 
of governing that seek to appeal to a broad electorate. Perhaps not surpringly, they are 
further away from their voters on issues of European integration than many smaller 
parties, such as the Greens in Germany and Britain. At this point it is also worth 
mentioning a study by Liesbeth Hooghe (2003) that draws on surveys and 
Eurobarometer data to demonstrate that elites are indeed more Euro-enthusiastic than 
the citizens. However, she also discovers that the degree of enthusiasm is less 
univocal when one poses the practical question of how, in particular policy areas, 
authority should be distributed between the EU and national governments. Whereas 
national and European political elites support a competitive European Single Market, 
citizens prefer ‘regulated capitalism’ as promoted by EU policies in the areas of 
agriculture, regional policy and social inclusion (Hooghe, 2003: 284). Interestingly 
even though the SPD and PS tried to focus their 2009 European election campaigns 
on ‘Social Europe’ and a stricter regulation of the financial markets, the elections 
were won by conservative and liberal parties.  
A second general model of mass-elite linkages adopts a top-down perspective. 
It essentially argues that voters’ attitudes towards the EU are shaped by political 
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parties and, more broadly, political elites. Hellström (2008a), for example, draws on 
Eurobarometer surveys CMP and finds that voters’ opinions generally exert little or 
no influence on party positions. Conversely, he finds a unidirectional ‘causality’ from 
political parties to voters, meaning that political parties are to some extent able to 
influence public opinion. He writes that ‘parties do not seem to have responded to 
shifts in voter opinions by modifying their positions’ (Hellström, 2008a: 1128). Ray 
(2003) also demonstrates that party positions influence public opinion towards 
European integration. However, he shows that the influence that parties exert on 
voters depends on: the level of disagreement among parties; party unity; issue 
salience; and party attachment. Unsurprisingly, Ray finds that a party that emphasises 
EU matters will find its supporters increasingly interested in the topic. Secondly, a 
party that is united over EU policy is more persuasive. Thirdly, Ray demonstrates that 
the effect of party positions on their supporters is greater when there is EU 
contestation between political parties at national level. Moreover, the closer 
individuals feel to the party they support, the more they will be affected by the 
positions taken by the party. The elite-driven perspective on European integration 
provides plausible arguments. After all, political elites have more resources and 
expertise to understand the complex system of EU governance than the public.  
The third and last general model of mass-elite linkages argues that causality 
runs in both directions simultaneously, meaning that voters’ attitudes are part cause, 
part consequence of party positions (Carubba, 2001; Ray, 2003; Schmitt and 
Thomassen, 2000; Steenbergen et al., 2007). For example, Steenbergen et al (2007) 
estimate the strength of a reciprocal relationship between parties and voters, using 
expert surveys and Eurobarometer data. They find a relatively strong effect of the 
voters’ EU opinions on the party elites, and a small but not insignificant effect of 
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party elite positions on voters. The strength of those linkages is contingent on several 
factors, however, and two of them will be examined in part three: electoral systems 
and national EU referenda. The next section will take a brief look at the 
Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France, and Germany.  
4.2 The Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany 
Various factors can determine citizens’ attitude towards European integration, for 
example: economic considerations (Hooghe and Marks, 2005); ideology (placement 
along the left/right axis, Hooghe and Marks, 2005); interest in and knowledge of the 
EU (which is related to educational background, Kritzinger, 2003); nationality (some 
nationalities have more trust in the EU than others, Kritzinger, 2003); and national 
identity (Vössing, 2005; Carey, 2002).  
Since 1973 Eurobarometer has mapped citizens’ attitudes towards EU 
membership. The trend lines in Figure 4.1 (below) show the percentage of 
respondents in Britain, France and Germany who answered that EU membership was 
‘a good thing’. They suggest that overall the British public is the least enthusiastic 
about EU membership. It also shows that in all three countries, enthusiasm for the EU 
peaked at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s when the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht Treaty pushed for the acceleration of the integration process. 
Afterwards – presumably when the effects of the European Single Market started to 
kick in – levels of enthusiasm decreased continuously.  Overall, the figure shows that 
British, French and German citizens are no Euroenthusiasts. 
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Figure 4.1: % Agreeing that membership of the European Community/Union is 
a good thing 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
Britain
France
Germany
 
Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys conducted between September 1973 and 
June 2010. The question was: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) 
membership of the European Community (Common Market/European Union) is ...?’ 
See Eurobarometer interactive search system, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en. 
 
Table 4.1 (below) provides further evidence in line with these findings. 
Between November 2003 and October 2005, citizens in the three countries were asked 
about their feelings towards the EU. In France and Germany, the percentage of 
respondents saying that the EU gave them a feeling of hope was relatively high (on 
average 43 and 46 per cent respectively). On average, only 26 per cent of British 
respondents said that the EU gave them a feeling of hope, whilst the same share of 
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people (26 per cent) stated that they felt mistrustful towards the EU. However, the 
majority of British respondents (32 per cent) said they felt indifferent about the EU. 
Usherwood (2002: 216) explains that in Britain, public attitude towards European 
integration ‘can be argued to be one marked not by two peaks of pro and anti, but 
rather by widespread indifference or uncertainty’. Yet, although the French and 
Germans generally felt more hopeful about the EU, there was also a high share of 
respondents (33 and 30 per cent respectively) who said that the EU gave them a 
feeling of anxiety. Can we speak of a Europeanised public in countries where one 
third of respondents feels anxious about the EU, and where 21 per cent (of Germans) 
and 31 per cent (of French) say they mistrust the EU? 
A Europeanised public would also show interest in EU politics. Between 1973 
and 1995, Eurobarometer has measured citizens’ interest in EU politics. The trend 
lines in Figure 4.2 show combined responses of ‘a great deal’ and ‘to some extent’ to 
the question: ‘And as far as European politics are concerned, that is matters related to 
the European Community, to what extent would you say that you are interested in 
them?’ In all three countries, interest in EU politics was greatest during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, thus at the same period of time when Euroenthusiasm peaked (see 
Figure 4.1). From 1995 onwards, citizens’ general interest in EU politics was no 
longer mapped by Eurobarometer. However, on the basis of the low rates of 
Euroenthusiasm we can assume that in general, interest in EU politics has decreased 
in Britain, France and Germany.  
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Table 4.1: Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of...?  
 Enthusiasm Hope Trust Indifference Anxiety Mistrust Rejecting it Don’t know 
Britain         
November 2003 7 24 7 34 18 26 12 10 
October 2004 9 29 10 32 14 26 10 8 
June 2005 8 27 8 28 15 26 12 8 
October 2005 7 26 8 33 14 26 9 6 
Average 8 26 8 32 15 26 11 8 
France         
November 2003 8 36 19 19 31 27 4 3 
October 2004 8 47 24 13 28 28 4 2 
June 2005 7 44 19 10 37 36 4 1 
October 2005 6 44 18 14 36 34 5 1 
Average 7 43 20 14 33 31 4 2 
Germany         
November 2003 2 39 16 17 25 20 7 7 
October 2004 4 50 25 17 29 21 7 1 
June 2005 3 46 21 17 32 21 9 2 
October 2005 3 48 24 15 35 24 8 1 
Average 3 46 21 16 30 21 8 3 
Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys. The tables report the percentage of respondents in Britain, France and Germany who selected each 
response category when asked: ‘Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of...?’ See Eurobarometer interactive search system, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en. 
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Figure 4.2: % Interested in the European Community? 
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Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys conducted between September 1973 and 
December 1994. See: Eurobarometer interactive search system, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en. 
 
Interest in politics is generally linked to political knowledge, which can be 
defined as ‘the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and 
understands what he or she has encountered’ (Zaller, 1992: 32, emphasis original). A 
Europeanised public would display a high level of EU knowledge. It would, for 
example, be aware of the EU’s political institutions and know basic facts about the 
EU, for example the number of member states. Through Eurobaromter standard 
surveys, citizens are regularly asked whether they have heard of the European 
Parliament, Commission, Council, etc. Figure 4.3 shows the number of British, 
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French and German respondents who have heard of the European Parliament. The 
pronounced dip in May 2002 is difficult to explain and is probably a result of some 
idiosyncrasy of that month’s Eurobarometer. Overall, the European Parliament seems 
to be relatively well-known by citizens in the three countries, and the share of people 
who says they have heard of the EP is relatively constant.  
 
Figure 4.3: % Heard of the European Parliament? 
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Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys conducted between April 1999 and 
November 2010. See: Eurobarometer interactive search system, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en. 
 
Surprisingly, the line does not go up during European parliamentary election 
years. But then, a Eurobarometer survey from 2007 shows that less than half of the 
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population in the three countries was aware of the fact that the EP is elected directly 
by EU citizens (Britain: 46 per cent, France: 41 per cent, and Germany: 42 per cent). 
Thus, whilst the majority of people have heard of the EP and other EU institutions, 
they know very little about their functioning. Basic levels of EU knowledge are also 
fairly low. For example, in 2008, Eurobarometer asked citizens whether they knew 
how many member states the EU had. 26 per cent of British, 18 per cent of French, 
and 28 per cent of German respondents got the answer wrong. These numbers are 
only snapshots as Eurobarometer has only recently started to test public EU 
knowledge, and long-term trends cannot be identified yet.  
Overall, low levels of interest in and knowledge of EU politics show that the 
British, French and German publics have not Europeanised. Moreover, the number of 
citizens stating that EU membership is a good thing is also decreasing since the early 
1990s. The least Europeanised public is the British, where levels of mistrust and 
indifference towards the EU have been higher than in France and Germany. 
 
4.3. The mass-elite linkage in Britain, France and Germany  
Steenbergen et al. (2007) find a relatively strong effect of the electorate’s EU 
preferences on party elites, and vice versa. However, they notice that both the mass-
driven and elite-driven connections were particularly significant in countries with 
proportional representation systems – such as Germany - in non-election years and in 
situations where parties were unified in their EU attitude. The next sections will 
examine the impact of the electoral system and referendums on the mass-elite linkage 
in Britain, France and Germany.  
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An electoral system is defined as ‘a set of procedures for translating votes 
received by candidates into shares of Parliamentary seats’ (Budge et al., 2004: 371). 
In accordance with Wessels (1999) Steenbergen et al. (2007.) argue that party elites in 
proportional representation (PR) systems focus on representing the party median, 
whereas parties in plurality systems are more concerned with the median voter. They 
find that both bottom-up and top-down linkages between party elites and supporters 
are stronger in PR systems. Likewise, the effect of party elites on supporters is 
stronger in PR systems than in plurality systems (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 26).  
It has been argued that the British electoral system (first-past-the-post, FPTP) 
decisively shapes parties’ EU policies (Aspinwall, 2000). The FPTP system counts 
votes into seats by awarding each seat to the candidate who gets most votes inside a 
small constituency. Aspinwall’s argument goes as follows: since FPTP penalises 
small parties, a person considering running for Parliament in the UK has a strong 
incentive to join one of the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives. As a 
consequence, ruling parties need to accommodate both pro-European and 
Eurosceptical views. For the leaders of British parties in government, this implies a 
constant balancing act as they try to manage the wings of their party. For example, the 
Labour Party has had to balance a centrist opinion against leftist, anti-market, anti-
integration opinion in the past (Aspinwall, 2000: 433).  According to Usherwood 
(2002) this situation leaves managers of British parties with two options: They can 
either try to ‘actively manage policy outcomes’ or they can ‘fudge’ them. In most 
parties’ policy-making there are elements of both active management and fudging 
(Usherwood, 2002: 220-221). By ‘active management’ Usherwood means a number 
of techniques party managers can use, such as: 
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 organising parliamentary time so as to avoid an election taking place at the 
same time as a relatively important EU policy development; 
 offering inducements in other policies to MPs with Eurosceptical positions in 
exchange for a moderation of their position on EU integration; 
 threatening MPs with extreme positions with exclusion from the party if they 
do not moderate their opinions (this is a very extreme option, as Usherwoods 
acknowledges).  
Active management can be dangerous in a Eurosceptical political environment, and 
fudging might appear to be a more attractive option. The idea is that party policy 
becomes flexible enough to accommodate most of the members’ and citizens’ 
opinions. Fudging measures include: 
 formulating vague EU policy commitments in manifestoes; 
 masking contentious decisions in Parliament by timing them to coincide with 
other policy initiatives or events; 
 in the run-up to elections, party leaders can modify their positions when 
addressing different audiences; 
 parties can avoid the issue completely by not producing any EU position at all 
– which would be the most extreme form of fudging. 
Usherwood argues that neither strategy can result in a complete and persistent 
representation of all the positions on EU affairs, and that tensions remain. As a 
consequence, British parties have externalised the debate on EU integration in the 
past, leaving it to groups, movements and organisations that bring together elements 
of political parties and the general public. Since the 1960s there have been anti-
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European non-party groups in the UK, such as Keep Britain out or the Campaign for 
an Independent Britain or Business for Sterling (Usherwood, 2002: 223).  
The French electoral system has been changed several times. Currently, MPs 
are elected by direct, universal suffrage using a uninominal majority system in two 
rounds. In order to be elected in the first round, a candidate must obtain an absolute 
majority (i.e. more than half the votes cast) and a number of ballots equal at least to 
one quarter of the voters enrolled. If no candidate is elected, a second round is 
required. Only those candidates, who have obtained a number of ballots in the first 
round equal at least to 12.5 per cent of the voters enrolled, may stand in this second 
round, which requires a relative majority for election. Thus the candidate with the 
highest number of votes is elected (Assemblée Nationale, 2010). These rules present a 
hurdle to smaller parties and unleash incentives for larger parties, in the second ballot, 
to gain votes transferred from those eliminated in the first round (Clift, 2003: 43). 
Knapp and Wright (2006: 474) argue that it appears that there is ‘a more or less 
perfect fit between voter attitudes and the behaviour of mainstream French politicians 
in relation to European integration – grandiloquently warm towards the principle, 
deeply cautious about the material implications’. The authors also highlight the fact 
that French politicians treat European elections ‘as a beauty contest for political 
parties and personalities rather than as a process designed to give some 700 MEPs a 
democratic mandate to legislate’. As the political elites generally do not stress the 
importance of EU-level decisions, voters do not consider EU issues equally important 
as national issues. The two-ballot voting system for general elections in France 
benefits the two major parties, the PS and UMP. Unlike in Britain, however, none of 
these have to accommodate hard Eurosceptical views amongst their leadership and 
members. Hard Euroscepticism is found only at the left and right margins of the party 
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system. Hence, both centre-left and centre-right voters with Eurosceptical views are 
not represented by the mainstream parties.  
The current electoral system used for elections to the Bundestag is based on 
the principle of proportional representation. Each voter is given two votes and is 
hence able to vote for a person - that is, an individual constituency candidate - and a 
political party. The first vote is cast for a constituency candidate to represent the voter 
in the area where he or she lives. The winner is chosen on a simple majority, or first-
past-the-post system as in Britain. The second vote is cast for a political party on a 
party list. The electoral system was designed to be a proportional one in terms of ‘fair’ 
representation. In general terms, that aim was achieved, because the electoral system 
today is still based on PR: if 40 per cent of those who vote in a particular Land voted 
for a particular party, then that party is allocated 40 per cent of the Bundestag seats 
available in that Land (James, 2003: 19). It needs to be added that only parties which 
gain at least 5 per cent of the valid second votes are eligible for parliamentary seats. 
Ever since the first federal elections of 1953 half the seats in the Bundestag have been 
distributed via the direct first-vote constituency results, and the other half via the 
second-vote party list results (James, 2003: 19). Many voters split their votes and by 
doing so cast their ballot in favour of a coalition government.  
In no other large EU member state has the elite consensus on European 
integration been as stable as in Germany, with a pro-European media and public 
(Lees, 2002). According to Teschner (2000), however, growing disparity between the 
masses and the political elites regarding the EU integration has been visible since the 
mid-1990s. However, Chancellor Kohl sticked to his pro-Europeanism even in the 
face of a sustained drop in public support for the EU, and in particular the Euro. 
Gerhard Schröder’s more critical stances towards European integration seemed to 
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reflect more accurately the current mood of the German population. Schröder was less 
willing to act in the European interest and was more concerned about domestic factors 
(Hyde-Price and Jefferey, 2001). As explained in Chapter 3, there is still a pro-
European consensus in German politics which encompasses all of the mainstream 
parties in the Bundestag. Recently, Die Linke has become Eurosceptic. Many 
disillusioned SPD-members have joined Die Linke, not primarily motivated by 
Euroscepticism, but as a consequence of the Schröder government’s labour market 
and welfare state reforms. Thus, for the SPD in government between 1998 and 2009, 
Eurosceptic members or voters were no major issue. This is partly due to the fact that 
Germany’s party system displays strong centralising tendencies: Polity-wide parties 
control almost all of the seats in the two chambers and exert a high degree of party 
discipline over their members (Lees, 2002: 253). Moreover, the German public does 
not show great interest in issues of European integration. EU issue voting effects for 
German parties are rather small, as de Vries (2010: 107-108) shows. Thus, in contrast 
to Britain, German mainstream parties do not (yet) compete on the EU issue, and it 
plays a marginal role during election campaigns.  
Steenbergen et al. (2007) also argue that referendums strengthen the bottom-
up linkage between parties and their supporters. They provide strong incentives for 
parties to align their policy stances with the positions of their voters. The negative 
outcomes of the French, Dutch and Irish referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty 
show that party elites cannot count on their members and voters for blind support. 
Instead, parties may want to know what their supporters think before deciding which 
side to take in the referendum campaign. This puts supporters in an important position 
vis-à-vis the party elite. Moreover, if party elites know that EU treaty changes have to 
go through a referendum, they have a strong incentive to discuss the treaty with their 
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voters and persuade them – which strengthens the top-down linkage, as Steenbergen 
et al. (2007: 19) argue.  
Hobolt (2009) differentiates between three types of EU referendums: those 
focusing on (1) EU membership; (2) treaty ratification; or (3) single policy issues. Her 
central argument is that political information plays a crucial role in mediating the 
importance of these factors. Political information concerns not only the type of 
information and elite cues that are available to the voters (supply of information), but 
also the handling of this information by individual voters (processing of information). 
Both processes can crucially determine the salience of European integration and the 
centrality of EU attitudes and moreover influence individuals' reception of elite cues 
and consequently their vote choice. Hobolt shows that intense campaigns (such as the 
one organised against the EU Constitutional Treaty in France in 2004/2005) will lead 
to more issue-voting, and reduce the importance of domestic politics. Not 
surprisingly, politicised voters are less dependent on the recommendations of 
politicians and instead rely more on their own opinions on European integration.  
It is argued here that referendums on EU membership can contribute to the 
Europeanisation of the public: Parties campaign for their cause and discuss EU issues 
in public and with their members, and thereby raise EU awareness. Voters know 
where the party stands and can make up their mind and vote according to their 
convictions. However, if parties are deeply divided, they leave voters confused. 
Moreover – and this aspect is neglected by Steenbergen et al.: EU referendums are not 
necessarily about the EU. Other issues are at stake, such as the popularity of national 
governments. Governments and heads of state are aware of this and have used EU 
referendums as plebiscites. Maybe then, the potential of EU referendums to 
Europeanise the public should not be overestimated.  Moreover, they rarely take 
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place. The German Basic Law does not provide for national referenda. German 
citizens have therefore no direct impact on EU treaty reform or other EU policy 
issues. Instead, both chambers of the Parliament, Bundestag and Bundesrat, share the 
power to ratify EU treaties and EU legislation. In Britain, only two national 
referendums have ever taken place, and the only one related to the EU was the United 
Kingdom European Communities Membership Referendum in 1975. It was held two 
years after the UK’s EU accession in order to gauge support for continued 
membership and keep the Labour Party from splitting. In its October 1974 manifesto, 
Labour under Prime Minister Wilson had promised a referendum on EEC 
membership (The Labour Party, 1974).  On a 65 per cent turnout, 67 per cent of the 
voters were in favour of Britain’s EU membership and 32.8 per cent against. The 
Labour cabinet under Wilson was split and campaigned for both membership and 
withdrawal, which was only possible because Wilson suspended the constitutional 
convention of cabinet collective responsibility. The cabinet’s internal divisions did 
not come as a surprise; after all the party had been divided over EU membership ever 
since the topic was on the political agenda.   
The Blair government promised two EU referendums: one on the Euro and the 
other on the EU Constitutional Treaty, yet none of them took place. After the French 
and Dutch citizens had rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Blair decided to 
postpone the referendum. It was a tactical decision, as he did not want the EU issue to 
jeopardise his re-election in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty, which includes most of the 
reforms proposed by the Constitution, was never put to a referendum. Gordon Brown, 
who had just taken over the government, was too scared of the Eurosceptic public and 
opposition. In his role as Chancellor he also opposed the introduction of the Euro.  
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In France, there is no legal requirement in the Constitution for the country to 
hold a referendum on EU treaties. However, the electorate may be consulted by the 
President (usually in accordance with government and parliament, articles 11; 88-5 
and 89 of the French Constitution). There have been ten referendums since June 1958, 
five of them under de Gaulle’s leadership. Out of these ten, three were related to the 
EC/EU: the first one was about EEC enlargement to Britain, Ireland and Denmark 
(1972), the second on the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the third on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty (2005). President Mitterrand put the Maastricht Treaty to a 
national referendum on 20 September 1992, which led to conflicts both within and 
amongst the parties. His key motivation was to ‘expose divisions on the right over the 
issue of further integration and to bolster his own standing’ (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 
80). In France, referenda are often associated with the plebiscite tradition created by 
Napoleon the Third and enhanced by President de Gaulle. 
For the first time in France, the EU was politicised during the campaign for 
the Maastricht referendum. The yes-camp, led by Mitterrand, won with a waver thin 
majority of 51 to 49 per cent of the votes. The fact that Mitterrand was very unpopular 
at that point in time partly explains the extremely narrow victory (Franklin, Marsh and 
Mclaren, 1994: 467-468). Of socialist voters, 76 per cent voted in favour of the 
Maastricht Treaty and 24 per cent against (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 517). Thus, as 
‘good Europeans’ and loyal presidential backers, four out of five PS voters voted Yes 
in 1992 (Hainsworth, 2006: 106). Whether the referendum has strengthened the 
linkage between voters and party elites remains unclear; it was above all a (weak) 
confirmation of Mitterrand’s leadership. The third EU referendum took place on 29 
May 2005. The reasons behind President Chirac’s decision to put the EU 
Constitutional Treaty to a referendum were multiple. The pressure emanating from the 
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increasingly critical public and his party, the UMP, was high. Moreover, the 
referendum on Maastricht had created an obvious precedent. Most importantly, 
however, President Chirac hoped to use the device of the referendum to ‘boost his 
popular approval ratings’ (Hainsworth, 2006: 99) – a miscalculation at a time when 
the government was very unpopular. Chirac and the entire yes-camp lost the 
campaign when the majority of French citizens (54.5 per cent) voted against the treaty 
on a relatively high turnout of 69.74 per cent. This time, 59 per cent of Socialist 
voters voted against the Treaty, with 41 per cent in favour (Hainsworth, 2006). In 
terms of its political mobilisation, the 2005 referendum can be compared to the one on 
the Maastricht Treaty. A significant difference, however, was that PS supporters 
switched from the yes to the no-camp, reflecting the split within the party rank and 
file. The PS leadership was deeply divided and therefore sent conflicting messages to 
the electorate. This referendum could hardly strengthen the linkage between PS elite 
and the public.  
To sum up, EU referendums could potentially strengthen the linkage between 
party elites and voters. However, for this to happen, these referendums would have to 
be about the EU, and not about the popularity of the government or president. 
Moreover, the party leadership would have to send out a clear message to the 
electorate if it wanted to influence them. Last but not least, the electorate would have 
to be mobilised in a high-profile referendum campaign. In neither Britain nor France 
were all of these conditions fulfilled, and it remains doubtful whether they ever will.  
The German electorate has never been allowed to vote on EU issues. In contrast to 
France, there was no major public debate on the EU constitution which could have 
strengthened the EU linkage between the political elite and voters.  
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4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that neither the British, French, nor German 
public has Europeanised with regards to their EU knowledge and level of pro-
Europeanness. The mass-elite linkage is bi-directional but remains weak with regards 
to EU policy, regardless of the electoral system and EU referendums. Bottom-up 
Europeanisation pressures on Labour, the PS and SPD have therefore been very low. 
Party elites are more pro-European than the public and would be expected to give 
more importance to the EU in their speeches and programmes. However, the three 
parties did little to Europeanise the wider public and their supporters. This strategy 
can be in the parties’ short term interest. After all, as Hix (2005: 170) demonstrates, 
the cross-class alliance of centre-left supporters breaks down over Europe, and it is 
easier for parties to either refuse to differentiate themselves from each other on this 
dimension, or to play down the differences between them by refusing to address the 
question of European integration. In the long term, however, if Labour the PS and 
SPD do not address the lack of EU knowledge and enthusiasm, their supporters and 
the wider public might become more critical towards the EU, as Eurobarometer 
surveys for Britain, France and Germany indicate.  
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Chapter 5: The Europeanisation of central government  
 
National political parties and their internal workings can only be understood in their 
political context. This chapter and the next examine parties is their institutional and 
governmental context. This chapter in particular focuses on parties in central 
government. After all, the executive is probably the single most important branch of 
government, and it is therefore crucial to understand how European integration affects 
parties in government. This chapter explores the ways in which the Labour Party, the 
Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have 
Europeanised during their time in government in recent years. Since only the party 
leadership (the prime minister, cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials) is part of 
the executive, this chapter focuses on this group of people. For the party leadership in 
government, Europeanisation is a two-way process. Britain, France and Germany 
have been EU members for decades, and therefore central government in the three 
countries is expected to have Europeanised. A Europeanised central government is 
understood as one that has adapted gradually to the process of European integration. 
In other words, it continually incorporates EU policies into its structures. In return, it 
is also a government that seeks to shape the EU by uploading national institutional 
models and policy preferences to the European level. In this process, national 
executives have all given up a certain level of national autonomy in exchange for the 
shared authority and control of the EU (Schmidt, 2006a). Hence, the Europeanisation 
of central government is not perceived as a zero-sum game: loss at national level 
meets gain at European level. A Europeanised government is expected to have rubbed 
off onto the leadership of the three parties whilst they were in government between 
1997 and 2009. Admittedly, the notion of a Europeanised party leadership is vague. It 
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could best be defined as a group of politicians who recognises the importance of the 
EU and communicates it to the party and the wider electorate. A Europeanised party 
leadership would also initiate institutional reforms in order to make national processes 
of policy-making compatible with EU-level policy-making.  
The three parties were in office for different, partially overlapping periods of 
time (see Table 5.1, below, for details): The Labour Party between 1997 and 2010; the 
PS in a five-party coalition government from 1997 until 2002; and the SPD as a 
member of two very different coalitions between 1998 and 2009.  
Bulmer and Burch (2001) argue that the EU’s style of policy-making is fluid, 
with shifting agendas and networks; open, with the European Commission being very 
receptive to external thinking; network-based, with the need for national actors to 
forge contacts; and rule bound and sectorised; with poor coordination within the 
Commission and between the institutions. Policy-making at European level is thus a 
highly complex process and is expected to challenge the workings of domestic 
institutions such as central government. However, some aspects of member state 
structures and activities seem to have been more deeply affected by the EU than 
others, and some member states have been more prone to institutional ‘misfit’ than 
others (Risse et al., 2001). Therefore, Europeanisation is by no means uniform across 
the EU (Héritier, 2001).   
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Table 5.1: The Labour Party, PS and SPD in Government  
Party Type and duration of government Prime minister Party leader 
Labour Party Single party government  
(May 1997- June 2007) 
Tony Blair 
 
Tony Blair 
 
Single party government 
(June 2007 - May 2010) 
Gordon Brown  Gordon Brown  
PS Five party coalition government  
(June 1997 - May 2002) 
with: French Communist Party (PCF), 
The Greens, Radical Left Party (PRG), 
Citizens’ Movement (MDC)  
Lionel Jospin  
 
François Hollande  
SPD 1
st
 government  
(October 1998 – September 2002) 
Coalition government with the Greens  
Gerhard Schröder Oskar Lafontaine (November 1995 – March 1999) 
Gerhard Schröder (March 1999 – September 2002) 
2
nd
 government 
(October 2002 - October 2005) 
Coalition government with the Greens  
Gerhard Schröder Gerhard Schröder (September 2002 – March 2004) 
Franz Müntefering (March 2004 – October 2005) 
 Grand Coalition with the Christian 
Democrats. SPD is the junior partner.  
(October 2005 - October 2009) 
 
Angela Merkel Matthias Platzeck (November 2005 – April 2006) 
Kurt Beck (April 2006 – September 2009) 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier (September 2008 – 
October 2008) 
Franz Müntefering (October 2008 – November 
2009) 
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In the following pages, the Europeanisation of central government will be 
interpreted from a historical institutionalist perspective. Historical institutionalism is a 
useful concept that has been linked to Europeanisation because it analyses and 
explains institutional change over time. This chapter will first introduce the concept, 
and secondly, link and apply it to the Europeanisation of central government in 
Britain, France and Germany. This chapter will also analyse the coordination of 
European policy in the three countries. After all, a government can only upload its 
institutional model or policy preferences to the EU level if it has found an effective 
way of coordinating its European policy.   Last but not least, this chapter will 
investigate whether the Europeanisation of central government has rubbed off onto the 
leadership of the three parties whilst they were in government between 1997 and 
2010. 
5.1 Theorising institutional adaptation 
Within the Europeanisation literature, many studies seeking to explain domestic 
institutional change invoke one of the three variants of new institutionalism: rational 
choice, sociological or historical institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989). This 
chapter draws on historical institutionalism, an increasingly popular middle-range 
theory used to analyse institutional change over time. Institutionalists claim that 
institutions matter because they shape political outcomes (Rosamond, 2000: 113). 
Historical institutionalism focuses on the effects of institutions over time, and in 
particular the ways in which institutions, once they are established, can shape or 
constrain the behaviour, objectives and values of the actors who established them. 
Scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutionalist choices taken in the 
past can persist or become ‘locked in’, thereby shaping and constraining actors at later 
points in time (Pollack, 2004). Institutions, they claim, tend to be ‘sticky’, or resistant 
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to change for extended periods of time even if there are demands or pressures for 
change. This ‘path dependency’ means that ‘once a country or region has started 
down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but 
the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of 
the initial choice’ (Levi, 1997, quoted by Pierson, 2000: 252).  Paul Pierson (2000: 
252-259) explains that ‘we cannot understand the significance of a particular social 
variable without understanding “how it got there” – the path it took’. Historical 
institutionalists see the adaptation process of both formal and informal institutions to a 
changing environment as an incremental one. Traditional institutionalism focused on 
formal institutions, but the new institutionalisms have widened the focus to include 
processes and procedures, codes and guidelines, and the cultural dimension 
constructed around and within institutions (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 604). Some 
historical institutionalist studies examine particular moments in time when 
fundamental change occurs, when ‘periodic alterations, while not wholly breaking 
with the past, are sufficiently novel to be considered as significant’ (Bulmer and 
Burch, 1998: 605). In this context, internal or external factors can lead institutions to 
change. At ‘critical junctures’, institutional development moves on to a new path 
which is then followed until a new critical juncture follows and a new direction is 
taken (Bulmer and Burch, 1998). Could critical junctures at the EU level then lead to 
institutional change at the domestic level? EU membership is an external force putting 
pressure on national political institutions while at the same time opening windows of 
opportunity for reform. 
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How can the Europeanisation of central government be assessed in historical 
institutionalist terms? Bulmer and Burch (2001) suggest four levels for the analysis of 
institutional change: 
1) The systemic level, which refers to the constitutional framework of states and 
governments; 
2) The organisational level, which looks at key players involved in the 
government’s EU policy-making, their offices and networks, power positions; 
3) The regulatory level, which refers to institutional rules and guidelines; and 
4) The procedural level, which relates to the processes shaping how business is 
handled, including information systems and policy processes.  
All of the above processes overlap and include a cultural dimension which concerns 
norms and values prevalent within national institutions (Bulmer and Burch, 2001). 
Norms and values are expected to impact upon all aspects of institutional change – a 
point which in particular sociological institutionalists stress. The following sections 
will examine all four levels of institutional change identified by Bulmer and Burch. It 
will be demonstrated that the way in which the British, French and German 
governments respond to the policy-making challenges of EU membership follows no 
single pattern. It would therefore be difficult to say which of the three is the most 
Europeanised. European integration has been incorporated into existing institutional 
structures, and change has been incremental rather than radical.  The following three 
sections will analyse the ways in which the central governments in Britain, France and 
Germany have Europeanised, and how this affected the Labour, PS and SPD’s 
leaderships when the parties have been in government.  
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5.2 The Europeanisation of the British Central Government and Labour 
In the past decade, the adaptation of Britain’s central government to European 
integration has attracted much scholarly attention. This process of adaptation can be 
dated back to the Britain’s first application for EU membership in 1961, but was 
accelerated after the EU accession in 1973. From this perspective, EC accession was 
not a ‘big bang’ event for the British government because adjustment had already 
begun in the 1960s (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 861). The impact of European 
integration upon the British central government has developed slowly, but the overall 
effect of these changes has amounted to a substantial change in the pattern of UK 
government and policy-making, and Bulmer and Burch (2005: 862) label this 
transformation of the British government a ‘quiet revolution’. However, with the 
election of the Blair government in 1997, the Europeanisation of central government 
experienced a considerable shift in pace and direction. In a bottom-up process, the 
Labour leadership has accelerated the Europeanisation of central government.  
Most scholars agree that from the outset of EU accession, there were 
numerous aspects of EU governance that did not fit well with British traditions, such 
as the multi-level, quasi-federal nature of the EU which contrasts with the UK’s 
unitary state (Schmidt, 2006b) or the need for coalition-building amongst EU 
governments in the Council of Ministers, which contrasts the often confrontational 
Westminster style of policy-making by one-party governments. This would suggest 
‘systemic misfit’ between the EU and Britain. However, both Prime Ministers 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major did little to actively Europeanise central 
government in a bottom-up process. They prioritised the assimilation of EU business 
into the existing patterns of UK central government. Europeanisation, it has been 
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argued, was constrained by the Eurosceptical views of the government rather than 
institutional misfit (Bulmer and Burch, 2005).  
When the Labour Party came into office in 1997 a ‘step change’ in the British 
government’s approach to the EU took place. Part of this new approach was to 
improve and intensify the relationship with governments across the EU through an 
increased exchange of information, alliances on policy initiatives, and long-term 
coalition building. These initiatives were complemented by a project to Europeanise 
the UK’s public opinion by encouraging more dissemination of information on 
European politics, counteracting mis-information, and publicly campaigning on EU 
issues (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 878). Hence, government turnover in 1997 can be 
interpreted as a ‘critical juncture’: it opened a window of opportunity for the Labour 
leadership to push for stronger Europeanisation of central government.  
 
Successive British governments have used a model of decision-making on EU-
affairs ‘which is often envied by other member states and has been emulated by not a 
few’ according to Sir Stephen Wall (2008: 190), the former head of the government’s 
European Secretariat and Tony Blair’s Adviser on Europe. One of the key 
developments under the Blair government was a significant centralisation of EU 
policy-making: more resources and powers of direction were given to the ‘centre’ of 
government. There was a streamlining at the very top through the closer integration of 
the work of the Cabinet Office European Secretariat (COES) and Number 10 
Downing Street. The COES is located at the centre of the government’s EU network. 
It has a broad overview of all policy dossiers and fulfils four important roles: (1) 
recruiting departmental players on an issue-by issue basis; (2) ensuring that 
departmental negotiating positions are consistent with government policy; (3) 
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providing neutral interdepartmental arbitration; and (4) articulating the Prime 
Minister’s longer-term objectives on Europe (James, 2009: 608). The COES and 
Number 10 Downing Street are closely linked with each other, but the COES is highly 
dependent on 10 Downing Street (James, 2009: 661). This centralised, directive 
approach to EU policy-making reflects the style of Blair’s administration in general. It 
was a system based on the sharing of information across government departments and 
on coordination between officials, ministers and Members of the European 
Parliament.
4
 For example, before each week’s meeting of the European Commission, 
the cabinet of the respective British Commissioner received a written briefing from 
Britain’s Permanent Representation in Brussels on issues on the agenda that were of 
concern to the UK government. ‘Britain is not unique in doing this but is particularly 
assiduous in providing such briefings’ (Wall, 2008: 202). The same procedure applied 
to British MEPs, who were all, regardless of their party membership, entitled to, and 
received, written briefings prepared by the government in London.  
Unsurprisingly, one of the key players in Labour’s EU policy-making process 
was the prime minister. After all, he represents the UK in the European Council where 
the general political guidelines of the EU are defined. At national level, the prime 
minister has considerable influence over national, international and European policy. 
‘The job has come to embody the almost universal breakdown in the old distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs’ as King (1991: 33) remarks. In contrast to the 
German Chancellor or the French prime minister, the British prime minister is the 
leader of the strongest party in the House of Commons. As a consequence, ‘the prime 
ministership is a party job before it is a governmental or national job’ (King, 1991: 
                                                          
4 The EU policy-coordination between the Blair government and Members of the European Parliament 
is discussed in Chapter 7.  
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25). Senior foreign policy and EU advisors, based in the Cabinet Office, reported 
directly to Tony Blair, not to the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, something 
further expanding the prime minister’s reach within these policy areas (Heffernan, 
2006: 20). Instead of discussing European issues with the entire cabinet, Blair often 
preferred smaller circles of debate. British prime ministers might be very powerful, 
but they are highly dependent on the expertise of cabinet ministers and civil servants.  
Patrick Diamond, former head of Policy Planning in Number 10 Downing 
Street (interviewed on 16/03/2011) states:  
As a prime minister, Blair was dependent on other actors in his 
government, but in the British system, he is relatively independent, or 
interdependent of his party. He needs his party to be enthusiastic enough 
to campaign, and to do things in the election, but in most areas of policy 
he can secure his party’s support without having to acknowledge their 
dependency within the policy process.  
Tony Blair’s EU advisor Stephen Wall (2008: 201) argues that a determining 
factor in Whitehall’s approach to the EU is the views of the Prime Minister. Tony 
Blair certainly showed greater interest in European affairs than most of his 
predecessors. In a speech to the European Parliament on 23 June 2005 he stressed: ‘I 
am a passionate pro-European. I always have been’. However, whilst a positive 
attitude towards the EU cannot be denied, his government often lacked decisive 
action, and Labour’s overall achievement with regards to European policy is at best 
mixed (Smith, 2005). Alongside Blair, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor were 
amongst the most powerful players in the party’s European policy-making. In 
addition, Peter Mandelson played an important role, both as one of the architects of 
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New Labour, and as a cabinet minister and EU Commissioner for Trade. According to 
Roger Liddle, Blair’s EU adviser 1997-2004 (interviewed on 12/10/2009): 
The main actors with regard to EU policy-making are the government 
ministers with responsibility for European affairs. In our system, that’s 
predominantly the Prime Minister, followed by the Foreign Secretary. 
And I would say that they determine most aspects of EU policy. With 
important secondary roles played by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
particularly when you look at issues of financial regulation (...). And Peter 
Mandelson, when you’re looking at questions to do with industry, Single 
Market, the future of Lisbon. So I would say those people were by far the 
most important people in terms of shaping government policy towards 
Europe.  
Blair got involved in highly politicised issues, such as Britain’s membership of the 
Euro or decisions of historical importance, such as EU enlargement or treaty reform. 
These were discussed in the Cabinet Office, whilst day-to-day EU policy was 
formulated in the different ministries. One of these ministries was the Treasury. 
Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1997 and 2007 and prime 
minister from 2007 until 2010) was initially considered to be one of the more 
committed pro-Europeans of the Blair government. Nevertheless he successfully 
managed to veto British membership of the Euro. In his role as chancellor he was the 
cabinet minister responsible for all economic and financial matters. It has furthermore 
been argued that due to his complex and complicated relationship with Tony Blair, 
Gordon Brown exerted more influence on British EU policy-making when he was 
Chancellor than any of his predecessors (Wanninger, 2007). Brown’s ambitions to 
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become Blair’s successor were well-known and contributed to the rivalry between the 
two politicians.  
It was only when Blair and Brown came to their compromise on Britain’s policy 
towards euro membership that other members of the cabinet were consulted. Ministers 
were not permitted to directly influence the debate, let alone actually decide the 
matter collectively (Heffernan, 2006: 33). The relationship between Blair and Brown 
is crucial for understanding Labour’s approach towards the single currency and shows 
that the prime ministerial room for manoeuvre was strictly limited with regards to 
British membership of the Euro.  
When Gordon Brown took over the premiership from Tony Blair, EU issues 
were not on top of the political agenda. Scared about the Eurosceptical opposition, 
Brown did not prioritise the EU in his speeches. Other issues were more pressing, 
such as the question of whether there would be an early general election. The next 
dominant issue on the agenda was the financial crisis in 2008, for which Brown 
envisaged a global solution (through the G20) rather than a European one. Patrick 
Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) comments:  
I think in some ways Brown probably gave more autonomy to the 
ministers of his cabinet than Blair had done. Brown had his own priorities 
at the centre. And obviously, as the financial crisis took hold in 2008, his 
priorities tended to be very much focused on how to stabilise the banking 
system, the reform of the financial sector. So I think in that context he 
probably was sort of more willing to trust other ministers in key areas of 
policy than Blair had been. There were particular periods where in 
foreign, European and security policy, Downing Street was probably less 
interested in a day-to-day settlement than it had been under Blair. But I 
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think the fundamentals remain the same. I don’t think that under Brown, 
for example, there was any fundamental shift towards giving the party a 
stronger voice in the policy-making process. To be honest, in a sense that 
this is a structural issue in the British system, when the party is in power, 
when it’s in government, the parliamentary and governmental leadership 
is fairly free to assert its will as it sees fit with very few constraints or veto 
points. 
 
In Britain, France and Germany, the foreign secretary is one of the key players in the 
process of EU policy-making. The person holding the post represents his/her country 
in the ‘general affairs’ configuration of the Council of Ministers where the general 
work of the Council is coordinated. Under Labour, the foreign secretary introduced 
European issues into the cabinet and chaired the ministerial sub-committee on 
European issues in which differences of view among ministers were thrashed out 
(Wall, 2008: 190). The foreign secretary and the prime minister had the COES at their 
disposal, which was part of the Cabinet Office. The European Secretariat consisted of 
more than thirty members of staff under the leadership of a permanent secretary who 
is also the prime minister’s EU adviser. Under the chairmanship of the European 
Secretariat, committees of officials across the whole government meet regularly, 
covering all EU policy issues. Officials from the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels participate via video conference.  
Which role did Labour’s Foreign Secretaries play in the party’s EU policy-
making process? The answer is not a simple one, as the impact of the Foreign 
Secretary on European policy depends on a variety of factors: on the prime minister 
and his or her own views, ambitions and priorities when it comes to European policy; 
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on the views and ambitions of the Foreign Secretary; on the influence of other key 
players within and outside of cabinet (such as European advisers); and on political 
events. Jonathan Powell (2010: 244-245), who was Tony Blair’s chief of staff, writes:  
 
The Foreign Office has a perennial worry that Europe will be removed 
from its purview. When he was Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook 
complained to me in May 1998 that Peter Mandelson, at that time 
Minister without Portfolio, was trying to turn the Cabinet Office into the 
Ministry of Europe. (...). Robin’s successor, Jack Straw, asked in 2004 if 
he could run the referendum campaign on the European Constitution from 
the Foreign Office. Tony said he could not and that it needed to be run 
from the Cabinet Office.  
 
Powell’s quote suggests that, under Tony Blair, highly politicised EU policy matters 
(such as the Euro or the Constitutional Treaty) were discussed and planned by Cabinet 
Office civil servants and advisers, and not the Foreign Office. However, in day-to-day 
EU policy-making, the Foreign Office still played a crucial role. This has been 
confirmed by Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) who argues that ‘in fact, 
90 or 95 per cent of the policy is being determined in the usual way, with almost no 
interference from the centre [10 Downing Street]’.  
For both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, political advisors played an important 
role in EU policy-making. ‘A good deal of the high-level policymaking and 
politicking in Europe is conducted among the network of European-affairs advisers’, 
Jonathan Powell (2010) notes.  Helms (2005: 84) mentions, ‘the exceptionally large 
number of special advisers, and their unprecedented influence at the very heart of the 
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governing machine marked another, indeed for many the hallmark of the Blair 
administration’. Increasing the number of EU advisors has arguably strengthened 
Tony Blair’s influence on European policy-making. He has often overridden and by-
passed the advice of the Foreign Office (Heffernan and Webb, 2005: 35; Powell, 
2010: 244-245) – not to mention his full cabinet and the party organisation – when it 
came to key EU issues. Yet, whilst EU advisers did play a crucial role in the 
government’s overall European strategy, they had to interest in undermining the 
Foreign Office. As Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) explains: 
 
Stephen Wall was only able to give personal advice to the Prime Minister 
about the overall direction of European policy. Both he and also the Prime 
Minister were reliant on the Foreign Office for all sorts of advice and 
expertise and knowledge of different areas of European affairs. I think it 
would be quite wrong to suggest that somehow the Foreign Office was no 
longer a kind of relevant actor. It remained clearly very powerful in 
European policy, even if it was less powerful than it had been perhaps 
under previous Prime Ministers.  
Another minister who could be expected to play a key role in Labour’s EU policy-
making is the minister for Europe. The British government introduced the position 
after EU accession. Under both Blair and Brown, the Minister for Europe held a 
junior position, and the job was sometimes given to politicians without any significant 
European profile, and replaced every so often. There were eight incumbents under 
Blair, and four under Brown, so altogether twelve ministers for Europe in thirteen 
years (see Table 5.2 for more details).   
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Table 5.2 Labour’s Ministers for Europe between 1997 and 2010  
Minister for Europe Time in Office Prime Minister  
Doug Henderson  5 May 1997 – 28 July 1998 Tony Blair  
Joyce Quin 28 July 1998 – 28 July 1999 Tony Blair 
Geoff Hoon  28 July 1999 – 11 October 1999 Tony Blair 
Keith Vaz 11 October 1999 – 11 June 2000 Tony Blair 
Peter Hain  11 June 2000 – 24 October 2002 Tony Blair 
Denis MacShane  28 October 2002 – 11 May 2005 Tony Blair 
Douglas Alexander  11 May 2005 – 8 May 2006 Tony Blair 
Geoff Hoon  8 May 2006 – 27 June 2007 Tony Blair 
Jim Murphy  28 June 2007 – 3 October 2008 Gordon Brown  
Caroline Flint 3 October 2008 – 5 June 2009 Gordon Brown 
Baroness Kinnock of 
Holyhead  
5 June 2009 – 13 October 2009 Gordon Brown 
Chris Bryant 13 October 2009 – 12 May 2010  Gordon Brown 
 
Blair periodically attempted to exploit the position of minister for Europe 
more effectively. However their ill-defined role, a lack of resources and the high 
turnover prevented them from having a strong impact on EU policy (James, 2009).  
Roger Liddle (interviewed on 12/10/2010) confirms:  
 
I don’t think our ministers for Europe have played a very dominant role in 
European policy-making. They have been important in implementing the 
policies and going to lots of meetings, making lots of speeches, but it’s 
never been a role... Because it’s a number two role in the Foreign Office. 
You have got an influence there, but you’re not a key player.  
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In other words, when Labour was in office between 1997 and 2010, the Minister for 
Europe held a junior position and played no key role in the process of European 
policy-making. 
The British central government has thus Europeanised over the years, and this 
has rubbed off onto the Labour Party leadership. In a bottom-up and top-down 
process, a pro-active and pro-European party leadership has pushed for institutional 
and strategic adaptation. In return, a Europeanised central government has put 
pressure on the party leadership to Europeanise. The more European norms and ideas 
become imbedded in central government, the more they affect politicians.  
 
5.3 The Europeanisation of the French Central Government and the PS  
Up-to-date, systematic, theoretically and empirically informed research on the 
Europeanisation of the French polity is still in short supply, as compared to Britain 
and Germany.
5
 Some authors argue that the development of the EU has been one of 
the most important influences on the functioning of the French political process over 
the last decades (Elgie and Griggs, 2000). In return, since the beginnings of European 
integration, French governments have played a key role in shaping EU institutions, 
policy processes and policies.  
For the time being, all French leaders have rejected the vision of a federal 
Europe. The country has a long history as a unitary state, beginning in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, and remains until today a largely centralised 
state, despite decentralisation reforms that started in the 1980s. Nevertheless, France 
                                                          
5
 Notable exceptions are: Grossman (2007); Parsons (2007); Schmidt (2006); Smith (2005); Cole and 
Drake (2000); Guyomarch et al. (1998).  
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has not been spared the federalising effects of the EU (Schmidt, 2006: 77). Like its 
British and German counterparts, the French executive has given up a significant 
amount of autonomy to the EU in a wide range of policy areas such as economic and 
monetary policies (Smith, 2005; Howarth, 2007). As Schmidt (2007: 994) argues, the 
EU’s ‘lack of “fit”’ with French institutions poses a significant challenge to France’s 
traditional institutional order and disperses the concentration of authority in the 
French executive. This view is challenged by Szulaka (2003) who claims that while 
the French model of governance can still be considered state-centric or state-
corporatist there have taken place major political and institutional changes since the 
ratification of the Single European Act. Hence, even though the French polity suffered 
and still suffers from ‘enormous system stress’, tensions have ceased to play a more 
important role in France than they do in other EU member states, according to 
Szulaka. 
The political elite in France have used the EU to solve domestic conflicts and 
push through unpopular structural reforms without taking full responsibility 
(Howarth, 2007). In particular, since the end of the 1980s, EU integration has 
regularly been used to impose or accompany liberalisation in areas such as financial 
services, transport and most public utilities (Cole and Drake, 2000: 30). However, as 
the number of actors monitoring EU affairs increased, the government’s strategy of 
striking bargains and package deals behind closed doors became more problematic as 
the workings of the EU institutions became increasingly transparent (Grossman, 2007: 
987). Smith (2005) claims that the basic administrative structure of the French state 
has largely remained untouched by Europeanisation. Mainly because of ‘the strength 
of administrative corps within the civil service, the weakness of party cohesion and a 
paucity of inter-ministerial bodies, divisions between ministries remain as strong as 
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ever’ (Smith (2005: 106). In the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, many ministries began 
to Europeanise by setting up specialised EU units, charged with liaising directly with 
France’s Permanent Representation in Brussels (Smith, 2005: 107). However, since 
the 1987 Single European Act, in most ministries responsibility for EU matters is now 
distributed throughout each administration and there is less pressure to centralise 
information flows through one single unit (Smith, 2005: 107). Within all French 
ministries, adaptations have been made to deal with the growing volume of EU 
legislation. In general, four kinds of changes have been made in the ministries 
(Guyomarch et al., 1998: 54): the creation of specialist European services; the 
designation of experts to participate in working parties in Brussels; the training of 
civil servants to deal with EU question; and the secondment of officials to the staffs of 
the Commission, the Council, or the Permanent Representation. Most ministries have 
established units to co-ordinate activities of the main ‘divisions’ which deal with EU 
affairs.  
French civil servants are trained and their careers are made within individual 
ministries. Hence, EU issues are looked at primarily from the angle of such 
organisations ‘without even paying lip service to the notion, currently so in vogue in 
Britain, of “joined-up government”’, as Smith (2005: 108) highlights. In order to 
overcome the sectoral organisation of French ministries, the Secrétariat Général de 
Coopération Interministerielle (SGCI) was set up in 1948 as a bureaucratic agency of 
more than 175 elite civil servants (Schmidt, 2006: 78)
6
. When the PS was in 
government, the SGCI was the nodal point where French EU policy was formulated 
and the coordination between administrative bodies, the government and the EU 
                                                          
6
 In 2005 the SGCI has been reformed and renamed 'Secrétariat général des affairs européennes' 
(SGAE).  
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institutions took place. However, the SGCI was not highly efficient in overcoming 
intersectoral differences. Most officials working in the SGCI were specialised civil 
servants sent from ministries as watchdogs to protect sectoral interests (Schmidt, 
2006: 109). France’s Permanent Representation in Brussels seems to face the same 
problem, as most of its officials are seconded from ministries in Paris and remain 
loyal to them (Smith, 2005: 109). When the PS was in office, the SGCI was 
subordinated to the prime minister and the ministry for finance. Hence, Jospin 
oversaw the day-to-day process of European policy-making. Yet, like his British and 
German counterparts, the French Prime Minister got only involved in highly 
politicised issues whilst the day-to-day European legislative matters were dealt with 
by the SGCI (Menon, 2000). Hence, like his British and German counterparts, Jospin 
relied heavily on the expertise of civil servants and advisors in the process of 
European policy making. This was a certain advantage for the government: it had 
more staff at its disposal than President Chirac in the Elysée Palace.  
Is the French central government Europeanised? Despite initial institutional 
misfit between the highly centralised state and European multi-level governance, the 
French executive has Europeanised. However, the 1997 government turnover does not 
appear to have accelerated the Europeanisation process. This cannot only be blamed 
on intersectoral differences, but also on divided government, as will be discussed 
below.  
When the PS was in government, the key players in European policy-making 
were the prime minister, the foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, and, to a lesser extent, 
the minister for Europe, Pierre Moscovici (Krell, 2009: 357.) In the case of the PS 
(and the SPD), party leadership and premiership do not always overlap.  Thus, 
whenever a Socialist became prime minister or president, he yielded the party 
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leadership to somebody else, usually a loyal colleague with a weak profile whom he 
could control. This was the case in 1997, when Lionel Jospin became prime minister 
and left the party leadership to his dauphin François Hollande (Clift, 2005: 226). No 
longer being the party leader gives the prime minister a certain degree of 
independence from the party organisation. At the same time, however, he can become 
more vulnerable to criticism from different party wings and the more radical party 
activists.  
The role of the French prime minister in the formulation of European policy 
depends on a number of factors, such as his views on European integration; the views 
of other cabinet ministers and possible coalition partners; and political events. Most 
crucial however is the power constellation: is the excutive unified, meaning that prime 
minister and president are from the same political party, or is it didvided, a 
constellation that the French have labelled cohabitation? In the field of European 
policy, cohabitation imposes a form of ‘co-management’ (Cole, 2001: 19). The 
president retains an important role on account of his treaty-signing power, his function 
as chair of the Council of Ministers, and his status as directly elected head of state 
which guarantees his primacy in European and international summits.  
During the 1997-2002 period of cohabitation, ‘competitive summitry’ (Clift, 
2005: 240) took place, with both Jospin and Chirac attempting to speak with the 
authoritative voice of France.  Cole and Drake (2000: 32) take a different approach to 
the topic, arguing that the 1997-2002 period of cohabitation has left France’s polity 
surprisingly well equipped to manage Europeanisation as it has fostered a 
fragmentation and multiplication of actors in the French EU policy-making process, 
leaving greater scope to the Prime Minister and the SGCI. Jospin’s foreign minister, 
Hubert Védrine, has publicly stated that where EU policy is concerned he takes 
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responsibility, acting on the prime minister’s authority, with the assistance of the 
minister delegate of European Affairs (Pierre Moscovici) and with president Chirac’s 
agreement (Védrine, 1997, quoted by Cole and Drake, 2000: 35). Under cohabitation, 
considerable administrative and institutional resources are at the disposal of the prime 
minister. Whereas when the executive is united, the President tends to ‘borrow’ 
prime-ministerial resources (Elgie and Machin, 1991: 62). Prime Minister Jospin 
certainly made most out of his power resources with regards to European policy-
making. Nevertheless, he was also limited by his ‘plural left’ coalition (gauche 
plurielle), made up of a motley crew of five parties. Jospin managed to contain 
divisions over Europe within his government but had to make certain concessions. For 
example, ‘the desire to placate the Communist coalition partner strengthened Jospin’s 
determination to postpone liberalizing electricity markets in 1999 and to defend the 
state electricity conglomerate EDF-GDF’ (Cole, 2001: 25).  
In France like in Britain, the minister for Europe is a junior position in the 
Foreign Ministry, and it is usually filled by a party politician. During Jospin’s five-
year premiership, Pierre Moscovici filled the post, who was a close confidant of 
Lionel Jospin. He had considerable EU expertise and was one of the longest serving 
ministers for Europe.
7
 Moscovici was mainly involved in working-level coordination 
of EU policy with the relevant ministries. It was the Foreign Minister, Hubert 
Védrine, who represented France in the Council of Ministers, and Jospin who 
attended EU summits alongside President Chirac. Jospin was not known to be 
                                                          
7
 His sucessors filled the post for a very short time. Between 2002 and 2010 there were nine ministers 
for Europe, as Rozenberg (2011) reminds us.  
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particularly passionate about the EU. Henri Nallet, the PS’ international secretary 
under Jospin (interviewed on 30/06/2009) explains: 
Jospin is an Européen de raison. He very much mistrusts the European 
Union because the European Union is not democratic. I remember very 
well our tensions between 1995 and 1997 when we prepared the election 
manifesto, in particular the section on the single currency and the stability 
pact. Jospin is much more reserved when it comes to the stability pact. We 
have had long discussions before bringing the topic up in the national 
bureau. Jospin asked me to see him at his place where we had long 
discussions.  He asked me: “in the end, what is it about, this stability pact? 
Who created it?” I said: the European Council. And Jospin tells me: 
“When was it decided? And in particular, the three percent, the 
conditions…?” You and I. We were in government [Nallet replies]. “And 
when was it discussed?” [Jospin asks]. “Never”.’ 
 
Neither Jospin nor party leader François Hollande was Européen de coeur. Nallet 
states:  
When I was international secretary of the PS, François Hollande asked me 
to speak about EU affairs every three months at the national bureau. So 
every three months I delivered a report on European policy. They asked 
me to speak at the end of the meeting. There was general indifference. 
The majority of the party leadership showed very little interest in 
European and international policies. Those who were interested in those 
issues were the ministers - Hubert Védrine, Élisabeth Guigou, Pierre 
Moscovici.  
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In 1997, under the leadership of Jospin, the PS leadership was unified in its 
views on European integration whilst party activists wanted European policy to be 
more radical and were not always in line with the compromises negotiated by the 
Jospin government at EU level. At the EU summit meeting in Amsterdam on 2
nd
 
October 1997, Jospin was confronted with an ‘intransigent Anglo/German axis’ and 
Chirac’s urge to sign the treaty (Clift, 2003: 180). Jospin’s coalition was in no 
position to either renegotiate the single currency or to change the terms of engagement 
(Cole, 2001: 28). Nevertheless, Jospin secured the creation of a committee of 
Eurozone finance ministers to monitor the work of the European Central Bank. The 
second priority for the PS at national and European level was employment policy. 
However, the idea of establishing the 35-hours working week at EU level was 
contested and Jospin found himself isolated. Not even his social democratic 
colleagues, amongst them Tony Blair, supported the idea. Jospin did however achieve 
the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty which led to the 
European employment pact (finally adopted under German EU presidency in Cologne 
in 1999). The latter was disappointing from the PS’ perspective as it did not involve 
additional spending or intervention commitments at EU level in line with Jospin’s 
employment agenda. In the meantime, and just before the European elections in 1999, 
Schröder and Blair had published their common statement called ‘The Third 
Way/Neue Mitte’ calling for a modernisation of social democracy. It caused 
controversy within the SPD’s left wing. Jospin also distanced himself from the 
Schröder-Blair-paper, as it had called - amongst other things - for the workforce to be 
more flexible, which did not match the 35-hours-week introduced by the Jospin 
government.  
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To summarise, central government in France has Europeanised. However, the 
process of European policy-making is less centralised than in Britain and as a 
consequence, France does not always speak with one voice in Brussels. The PS was 
more restricted in its actions than Labour because it governed in a five-party coalition 
and shared the responsibility for EU policy with President Chirac. Moreover, whilst 
Lionel Jospin and François Hollande were generally pro-European, they were less 
pro-active than the Labour leadership under Tony Blair. Top-down pressures to 
Europeanise were weaker.  
 
5.4 The Europeanisation of the German Central Government and the SPD 
It is often argued that European integration has not seriously challenged the defining 
principles of the German federal system. On the contrary, it has been claimed that 
‘integration has tended to support, and, in some instances, reinforce those defining 
characteristics’ (Goetz, 1995: 93). After examining central government in Britain and 
France, Germany offers a rather distinct case study
8
. When analysing the 
Europeanisation of the German central government from a historical institutionalist 
perspective, ‘critical junctures’ leading to institutional change are: the outset of 
European integration, EU Treaty change and government turnover. The study of the 
impact of European integration on the federal executive goes back until the early 
1970s (Goetz, 2003). Within the literature, the German case has been debated 
controversially, with three different hypotheses evolving. One group of scholars 
                                                          
8 This chapter focuses – for the sake of comparison - on the federal executive. It would also 
go beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 16 Länder executives.  
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argues that the German system of EU policy-coordination is inefficient as a 
consequence of the segmentation of Germany’s political system and the incapacity to 
deliver a well-tuned, timely position on policy issues (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 
2000; Sturm and Pehle, 2001). Segmentation refers to the system of power 
distribution, which refers to Germany’s compound, federal political system and power 
sharing, thus the fact that Germany is governed by coalition governments.  
A second group of scholars argues that Germany is effective in uploading its 
structural and institutional preferences to the European level (Maurer and Wessels, 
2001b). The latter hypothesis underlines the compatibility of the compound multi-
level-governance of the EU and Germany, the ‘goodness of fit’ between Germany and 
the EU in constitutional order, norms and conventions, governance and policy goals 
(Bulmer, 1997). As Beichelt (2007: 422) points out, the two approaches are not 
antipodal. They can co-exist, because efficiency and effectiveness are to be seen as 
related but not identical phenomena: whilst EU policy-coordination might be 
considered inefficient, the outcome can still be effective, and vice versa.  
Beichelt (2007) presents a third approach and argues that German EU policy 
coordination is ‘over-efficient’ and completely functional to the needs of the German 
system. However, he stresses that the growing efficiency of German EU coordination 
has been achieved by circumventing the public, political parties, and the Bundestag 
despite the ever-growing importance of the EU level. This hypothesis will be 
discussed in more detail at the end of this section. 
Since the beginnings of EU integration in the 1950s, the basic set-up of 
German EU policy coordination has remained similar, although it has undergone 
incremental change. It is much less centralised than in Britain or France, and no 
‘German interest’ is ever defined by a central agency like the SGCI. One of the 
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ministries has traditionally been in charge of coordinating the German position on a 
given piece of EU legislation. This departmental autonomy (Ressortprinzip), which is 
a constitutional principle (Article 65 GG), leaves much independence to the ministry 
in charge. Like in France, sectorisation is strong in German European policy-making. 
Unlike in Britain, collective cabinet government and information-sharing are weak, 
and departmental norms prevail over collective ones (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 88).
 From the Treaty of Paris to the Treaty of Amsterdam, German EU policy-
coordination was concentrated in the Ministry of Economics which had a big 
European affairs unit. The Maastricht Treaty, a critical juncture in Germany’s 
adaptation to the EU, induced change. It was seen as an opportunity by the Länder 
governments to ‘strike back’ (Jefferey, 1994) and reclaim some of the powers which 
they had conceded to the Federal Government in the process of Europeanisation. In 
Germany, the Länder implement the vast majority of European policies, thus bearing 
the ‘lion share of implementation costs’, whereas before Maastricht they could not 
participate in the formulation and decision-making at the European level (Börzel, 
1999: 582-583).  Due to the Länder’s pressure on the Federal Government, the Basic 
Law was amended (largely the new Article 23), giving the Länder comprehensive, 
legally-binding co-determination powers in EU policy-making. The transfer of both 
national and regional competences to the EU now require the consent of the 
Bundesrat; a two thirds majority of Bundestag and Bundesrat has to ratify EU Treaty 
changes, and when Länder interests are affected by an EU decision, the federal 
government has to take their opinion into account. The Länder have won greater 
rights of input into EU decision making than any other subnational governmental 
authority in the EU, apart from the Belgian regions (Bulmer, Jefferey and Paterson, 
2000: 35).  
 144 
When in 1998, after 16 years of Christian Democratic and Liberal rule, the 
SPD and Greens took over government, further changes were made. The EU policy-
coordination system underwent further fragmentation when one coordination unit was 
transferred from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Finance, and a second 
one was set up in the Foreign Ministry. On the eve of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), the centre of economic policy coordination seemed to be shifting 
towards the Finance Ministry (Dyson, 2003). On top of these functional arguments for 
institutional change, political ones came into play. A change of coalition partners is a 
critical moment in the handling of EU policy (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 88). Before 
the 2002 federal elections, Chancellor Schröder had mooted the creation of a Ministry 
of European Affairs, with the Minister based in Chancellery (Goetz, 2003: 67). After 
the elections, however, the plan was dropped as Foreign Minister Fischer strongly 
opposed it, fearing a loss of influence on EU policy.  
This basic setup of EU policy coordination continued to hold until 2009, with 
the exception of a fall-back of economic coordination to the European division of the 
Economics ministry in 2005/2006. This decision, according to Beichelt (2007) 
supports the importance of coalition politics to the coordination system: in the 2005 
Grand Coalition the Finance and Economics ministry were split between the CDU and 
SPD, whilst the Foreign Office was held by the SPD. Consequently, ‘leaving 
economic EU coordination in the Finance ministry would have meant leaving all EU 
policy coordination out of the chancellor’s reach’ (Beichelt, 2007: 424). Another 
feature of incremental reform dates from 2002. Until then, the high-level Committee 
of European Affairs State Secretaries (EStS) from the different ministries had been 
alternately chaired by state secretaries from the Finance and Foreign Ministries. As a 
consequence, the grip on this committee was rather weak, and alongside France, 
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Germany was one of the low performers in EU directive compliance. After the re-
election of the red-green coalition government in 2002, the chair of the EStS was 
given to the Foreign Ministry and to a parliamentary state secretary in order to better 
include parliament into EU policy-coordination (Beichelt, 2007). This attempt failed, 
as in the case of conflicts, MPs got in contact directly with the cabinet (through their 
party group leader) rather than with an administrative committee headed by a 
parliamentary secretary of state (Beichelt, 2007). 
Beichelt (2007.) argues that this institutional triangle, even though it looks 
complex, is functional. Conflicts between the different ministries do occasionally 
arise; however, they are solved at the bureaucratic level. Beichelt concludes that even 
though neither interest groups nor parliament are formally and legally excluded from 
the coordination system, German EU policy coordination is steered by non-elected 
bureaucrats who circumvent the public. It has to be added, though, that in Germany 
there traditionally exists a close linkage between the political-governmental and the 
administrative spheres of the executive. Unlike in Britain, there is little concern about 
the demarcation between politics and administration in the executive, and the 
boundaries between them are fuzzy (Goetz, 2003: 63).  
The German central government has thus Europeanised over the past decades, 
yet the question is whether this has affected the SPD leadership. Stroh (2004) and 
Lamatsch (2004) argue that in Germany, European policy is government policy. 
Historically, the German Chancellor has played a key role in the formulation of 
European policy. This is due to constitutional competences, but also to the strong 
interest of all Chancellors in Germany’s integration into Western Europe. After all, as 
Paterson (2011: 60) remarks: 
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Participation in supranational institutions allowed West Germany to 
modify its subject status, to resume access to export markets and to 
strengthen its impaired and weak state identity.  
 
In terms of constitutional competences, the Basic Law spells out the Chancellor’s 
power to define the ‘general guidelines of policies’ (Richtlinienkompetenz). This 
constitutional privilege is rarely explicitly invoked, ‘but it underpins the Chancellor’s 
position as the paramount figure within the government’ (Goetz, 2003: 32). Yet, the 
Richtlinienkompetenz can hardly be taken at its face value, as Smith (1991: 49) notes. 
‘It is directly juxtaposed by the entirely different principle of ministerial autonomy’, 
the Ressortprinzip; that is, ministers conduct the policy of their own departments on 
their own responsibility with a minimum of control as long as they don’t depart from 
overall government policy’ (Smith, 1991: 49.). However, it has been argued that 
foreign and European policies are ‘untypical’ in the sense that in both policy areas, the 
federal government plays a very strong role, and the Chancellor, with her or his 
closest advisers, is in a dominant position (Patterson, 1994; Schmidt, 2007: 311). The 
Chancellor disposes of his/her office, which is an important institutional resource 
(Goetz 2003; 33). Gerhard Schröder was the first Chancellor to create a division 
within the Chancellor’s Office devoted exclusively to monitoring European policy 
(‘Abteilung 5’, under the direction of Rainer Silberberg). Overall, however, this 
division remained rather small. It mainly followed what was happening in the 
ministries rather than steering European policy, except for subjects of special 
relevance to the Chancellor. For Schröder, most relevant and thus highly politicised 
issues were relating to the EU internal market (Lamatsch, 2004: 40). Hence, the role 
of the Chancellor’s Office also depends on whether the Chancellor places high 
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priority on EU policy, which Gerhard Schröder did not, at least not during his first 
term in office, 1998-2002. Schröder shared the responsibility for EU policy with his 
coalition partner, the Greens. Between 1998 and 2005, the SPD governed in a 
coalition with the Greens, with Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor and Joschka Fischer 
as Foreign Minister (and Vice Chancellor). Fischer was, according to Helms (2005: 
119) the ‘true number one minister in Schröder’s squad’. He has been described as a 
‘classical pro- integrationist’ (Harnisch and Schieder, 2003: 66) who did not hold 
back his ambitious views on a federal Europe
9
.  In speeches and interviews, Gerhard 
Schröder stressed that his government would put Germany’s national interest first, for 
example when it came to the negotiation the EU budget. In the end, however, his 
provocative rhetoric did not match his European policy. As Harnisch and Schieder 
(2003) argue, Schröder underwent a ‘learning process’: constrained by the Franco-
German friendship, Schröder accepted in 2000 that Germany’s contribution to the 
EU’s 2000-2006 budget would not be lowered. 
A closer look at Schröder’s leadership also reveals that his involvement in the 
more detailed, day-to-day aspects of EU policy remained rather modest, which also 
applied to most other policy areas (Helms, 2005: 119). In this regard, Schröder 
differed very much from Blair, who from the beginning onwards showed a strong 
interest in European policy. The majority of key decisions in German foreign policy 
were made ‘at least as much in the Foreign Ministry as in the Chancellery’, as Helms 
(2005: 120) states.  
After the 2005 general elections, the SPD lost the chancellorship and became 
the junior partner in a grand coalition with the CDU/CSU. Angela Merkel (CDU) 
                                                          
9
 These are well documented in Fischer’s speeches to the European Parliament on 12 January 1999 and 
at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin on 12 May 2002.  
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became Chancellor, while the SPD still controlled the key ministries involved in EU 
policy, such as the Foreign Ministry (under Frank-Walter Steinmeier) the Ministry of 
Work and Social Affairs (under Franz Müntefering until November 2007, when Olaf 
Scholz took over) and the Ministry of Finance (under Peer Steinbrück). The SPD 
leaders were thus in a strong position to co-determine European policy alongside the 
Chancellor’s Office, and the Willy-Brandt-Haus and party group in the Bundestag 
could still rely on early information on EU legislation and expertise from the 
government where its European policy continued to be formulated. Dr. Eva Högl, 
MdB and former government official (interviewed on 20/07/2009) shares her 
impressions of Franz Müntefering, who was Minister for Work and Social Affairs at 
the time: 
He recognised that decisions are made at EU level. He recognised that he 
had to travel to Brussels, even though he didn’t like travelling at all and 
does not speak any foreign language. He realised that he had to travel 
there in order to win support for his plans: good working conditions, fair 
salaries, gender equality, the fight against child poverty etc. He learnt that 
these topics were on the EU’s agenda, or that they needed to be shifted 
there. That was fantastic. It was my best time in the Ministry ten years 
ago, when Müntefering became such a great European. Now he mentions 
Europe in every single speech – not only during the European election 
campaign.  
 
This statement points to a certain Europeanisation of SPD leaders in government. 
Some social democratic ministers were already Europeanised before they entered 
government, most notably Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who before becoming a 
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minister for economic cooperation and development had been an MEP and the SPD’s 
EU spokesperson in the Bundestag. The most visibly Europeanised member of 
Schröder’s government, however, was Green foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. The 
example of Gerhard Schröder shows that Europeanised Chancellors are no longer the 
rule. Since the post-war generation of politicians has retired, a more self-confident 
German European (and foreign) policy has been made.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD operated in Europeanised 
central governments. In all three cases, Europeanisation has been an incremental, 
ongoing process, triggered by external events such as EU treaty change, or internal 
events such as government turnover. European policy-making differed significantly 
between the three social democratic governments, which confirms the claim that 
Europeanisation does not led to a harmonisation of domestic policy-making processes.  
In general, the party leadership in office were Europeanised, although for the 
PS and SPD leaders, European policy was clearly no priority: Neither Lionel Jospin 
nor Gerhard Schröder was a Européen de coeur. Amongst the three, Tony Blair was 
the most pro-active Europeaniser, although Labour’s overall EU policy achievements 
have been characterised as a ‘missed opportunity’ (Smith, 2005). The EU views of the 
prime minister, or in the German case, the chancellor, are very important for the 
Europeanisation of central government and the party. It has been demonstrated that 
the EU policy network at the top of the three parties was very small. Only a few 
ministers were key players in the parties’ EU policy-making process. Moreover, the 
party leadership heavily relied on the civil service and personal EU advisers. These 
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findings suggest that the Europeanisation of the leadership in government does not 
necessarily rub off onto the lower levels of the party organisation. 
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Chapter 6: The Europeanisation of parliament 
 
The previous chapter examined the Europeanisation of central government and 
demonstrated how the party leaderships thereby become heavily involved in European 
policy-making. This chapter looks at another governmental arena in which political 
parties Europeanise: namely parliaments. 
Generally, national parliaments are involved in EU decision-making in three 
main ways: they monitor the behaviour of their governments in the Council and the 
European Council; they have certain duties emanating from the EU Treaties (e.g. the 
ratification of Treaty amendments); and they are, together with the executive, 
responsible for the implementation of EU directives (Raunio, 2005: 319-320). 
However, the only way for national parliaments to influence EU decision-making is 
through their governments. Members of parliament can scrutinise their government’s 
EU policies by (1) obtaining information on EU affairs, (2) processing and following 
up on this information, and (3) making use of their scrutiny rights vis-à-vis the 
government (Neuhold and De Ruiter, 2005: 58). In practice, those MPs who are 
interested in scrutinising the government’s EU policy can sit on European Affairs 
Committees (EACs) or become experts on other committees dealing with EU policy. 
Moreover, every MP can get in touch with Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs), MPs from other EU Member States or EU officials to become better 
informed about upcoming and ongoing EU legislation. 
 
This chapter investigates whether the House of Commons, National Assembly 
and Bundestag are arenas in which the parliamentary groups of a party Europeanises. 
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The focus lies on the lower houses since they are directly elected and determine 
government formation. In all three countries, the upper chambers do not. The basic 
assumption is that if national parliaments have Europeanised, MPs will perform 
Europeanised roles within the parliament, which, in turn, will frame their outlook on 
and knowledge of the EU and have party implications. Yet again, Europeanisation is a 
bi-directional process with a feedback loop: Europhile MPs can contribute to the 
institutional and strategic Europeanisation of parliament. Europeanised MPs are in a 
stronger position to scrutinise the government’s EU policy because they are well 
informed. In the long term, this can strengthen the position of national parliaments in 
the EU’s political system and reduce the democratic deficit. Moreover, Europeanised 
MPs can discuss current EU policy issues with members and activists in their 
constituencies, which can contribute to the Europeanisation of the parties at grassroots 
level. 
After giving a brief overview of the literature, the notion of parliamentary 
Europeanisation will be defined and applied to the three parliaments. In its last 
section, this chapter will discuss whether parliamentary Europeanisation has rubbed 
off onto the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic 
Party’s (SPD) party groups.  
 This chapter relies on academic literature and semi-structured interviews with 
MPs, party officials and a bureaucrat working for the Bundestag. Unfortunately, as is 
the case with other chapters, the data remain asymmetrical. For various reasons, a 
number of MPs from the Labour Party and PS did not agree to being interviewed. 
Therefore, more original data has been collected on the Europeanisation of the 
Bundestag than the House of Commons and National Assembly.  
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6.1 A brief literature review  
The Europeanisation of parliaments first caught scholarly attention in the mid-1990s. 
Studies have tended to focus on two core themes: firstly, the impact of European 
integration on the role of national parliaments (Auel, 2005); and secondly, the transfer 
of legislative power from the national to the EU level, and from the legislative to the 
executive (Raunio, 2002; Raunio and Hix, 2000). The first comparative studies 
portrayed domestic parliaments as largely ineffective and passive institutions, 
uninterested in scrutinising their governments in EU matters (Laursen and Pappas, 
1995). In the meantime, more sophisticated, comparative studies have been published, 
comparing the adaptation of national legislatures to the process of European 
integration (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a; Auel and Benz, 2005; O’Brennan and 
Raunio, 2007).  
While early studies focussed exclusively on formal institutional adaptation 
(such as the creation of European affairs committees in national legislatures), more 
recent publications have looked at the bigger picture, examining the established 
routines and ‘ways of doing things’ that structure MPs’ behaviour in national 
parliaments into account. Other recent studies have focused on explaining why certain 
national parliaments invest more resources in holding their governments accountable 
in EU affairs than others (Raunio, 2005). While all national parliaments in the EU 
have set up a European affairs committee (EAC), the roles and powers of these 
committees vary. Parliaments often share best practice regarding EU scrutiny, and 
through COSAC (which is the Conference of Community and European Affairs 
Committees of Parliaments of the European Union) they can share the findings of their 
enquiries. This has led to a certain institutional convergence: EACs across the EU 
have similar functions. However, their status, role and legal powers still vary 
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significantly (Raunio, 2009: 319). Raunio (2005) examines the impact of five 
independent variables to explain cross-national variation in parliamentary EU 
scrutiny. These independent variables are: the role of the parliament independent of 
integration; public opinion on EU membership; party positions on EU integration; the 
frequency of minority governments; and political culture. He comes to the conclusion 
that ‘having a strong parliament and a Eurosceptic public opinion increases the 
probability of the legislature subjecting the government to tighter scrutiny in EU 
affairs’ (Raunio, 2005: 336).  
Most scholars portray national and regional parliaments as passive institutions, 
exerting rather modest influence on government policy. After all, the technicality of 
most legislation, strong party government, the growing relevance of external pressures 
such as globalisation, and the delegation of policy-making authority to public or 
private agencies, all limit the influence parliaments exert today (Raunio and Wright, 
2006; Norton, 1998). By the same token, many researchers argue that Europeanisation 
has weakened parliaments and portray them as victims of EU integration. From a 
purely constitutional perspective, this argument seems straightforward: increasingly, 
the law-making powers of national and regional parliaments have shifted to the 
European level. After all, national parliaments have to translate EU directives into 
national law, which set political goals but leave the choice of means to the member 
states. This puts parliaments in the paradoxical situation of being unable to exert 
much influence on the directive but of ‘still being politically responsible for its 
content to the people’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002, quoted by Töller, 2006: 6). 
Additionally, in areas where national parliaments might normally take legislative 
action, the EU Treaty and secondary EU law impose substantial restrictions on 
national policies, particularly in areas touching upon the European Single Market 
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(Töller, 2006: 6). In addition, the use of qualified majority voting in the Council of the 
European Union makes it difficult for parliaments to force governments to make 
commitments before taking decisions at the EU level. The extensive involvement of 
national ministers and civil servants in drafting and implementing EU legislation 
effectively 'insulates or marginalises parliaments' (Raunio and Wright, 2006: 282). 
The resulting information deficit reduces the ability of MPs to control their 
governments, while the ‘true winners of European integration have arguably been 
bureaucrats and organized private interests at all levels of government’ (Raunio and 
Wright, 2006: 282).  
While national parliaments have certainly been late adapters to EU integration, 
they increasingly exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments over EU affairs 
(Holzacker, 2008). Since the Maastricht Treaty, parliaments across the EU have 
created new structures in order to control, influence and monitor better the decision-
making of national governments. Hence, the popular thesis of ‘deparliamentarisation’ 
which suggests that national parliaments are inevitably losing influence in the process 
of EU integration, may underestimate those recent reforms (Benz and Broschek, 
2010). The role of national parliaments in EU policy-making was one of the topics 
considered by the European Constitutional Convention (CONV353/02 on 
22/10/2002), and the Lisbon Treaty was the first EU Treaty to mention national 
parliaments in the main text. There is however broad scholarly consensus that the 
reforms included in the Treaty will not significantly enhance the role that national 
parliaments play in the EU.  
As the three case studies presented in this chapter demonstrate, parliamentary 
adaptation to EU integration has taken place, even if institutions like parliaments tend 
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to resist adaptational pressures (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 8). It can be expected that 
parliamentary adaptation is shaped by the constitutional position (or: strength) of the 
legislature as well as by procedural, ideological and cultural factors (Norton, 1996, 
quoted by Auel, 2005: 309). This chapter will focus on Töller’s (2006) three 
dimensions of parliamentary Europeanisation: (1) legislative, (2) institutional and (3) 
strategic Europeanisation. Legislative Europeanisation refers to the amount of 
legislation passed by national parliaments with EU origins. It is a crucial aspect of 
parliamentary Europeanisation, and national politicians regularly refer to the high 
share of Europeanised national legislation. Legislative Europeanisation affects parties 
because the higher the share of Europeanised legislation, the more MPs have to deal 
with EU legislation in their day-to-day work. Institutional Europeanisation covers the 
‘development of institutional and procedural provisions to organize and permit 
influence on the national government’s European policies’ (Töller, 2006). This refers 
to the constitutional powers of national parliaments as well as to the creation of 
European affairs committees and subcommittees, administrative bodies dealing with 
EU legislation, working groups etc. Being a member of a European affairs committee 
or EU spokesperson of an expert committee can Europeanise MPs. It makes them 
more aware of the importance of EU policy. Last but not least, strategic 
Europeanisation ‘consists in national MPs taking the European Union as a decision-
making center into account – but also as an addressee for their action – and in 
adjusting action patterns and routines accordingly’ (Töller, 2006: 5). Stategic 
Europeanisation therefore relates less to parliamentary Europeanisation, but more to 
the Europeanisation of MPs. Europeanised MPs are in direct contacts with MEPs, EU 
institutions or sister parties from across the EU in order to have earlier access to 
information.  
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As throughout this PhD, this chapter interprets Europeanisation as a 
multidirectional process. It is recognised that national parliaments have lost legislative 
competences, and their remaining legislative powers are often further restricted by 
European law. In this context, Auel (2006) refers to passive Europeanisation. To be 
sure, though, national parliaments are not mere objects or victims of Europeanisation. 
They have adapted to EU integration through institutional and strategic reforms. 
Moreover, MPs have become more aware of the EU and in some cases have asked for 
stronger scrutiny rights. This process can be labelled active or institutional 
Europeanisation (Auel, 2006: 249). In other words: from being objects national 
legislatures have turned into subjects of Europeanisation (Töller, 2006: 19). Parties 
can play an important role in this process: they can put pressure on the government to 
enhance parliamentary Europeanisation. 
In the following sections, the Europeanisation of the British, French and 
German Parliament will be examined and the impact of parliamentary 
Europeanisation on the Labour Party, PS and SPD will be analysed.  
 
6.2 The Europeanisation of the House of Commons, National Assembly and 
Bundestag  
In the ‘Westminster’ system of the United Kingdom, the parliamentary agenda is 
controlled by the government (Budge et al., 2004) and the de facto veto power of the 
House of Commons is minimal. When the Labour Party was in government (1997-
2010) there was a strong competition in a two-party system between Labour and the 
Conservative Party. This adversarial political culture is a product of one-party 
governments, which stems from the majoritarian electoral system. The House of 
Commons has been described as an ‘arena legislature’ as opposed to a ‘transformative 
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legislature’ such as the US Congress (Polsby, 1975). Arena legislatures serve as 
‘formalized settings for the interplay of significant political forces in the life of a 
political system’ (Polsby, 1975: 277). Committee work plays only a minor role in the 
House of Commons and it needs to be highlighted that the European scrutiny 
committee was one of the first permanent committee to be created. It has been 
strengthened since its creation in 1974. The House of Commons has experienced 
legislative, institutional, and – to a lesser extent – strategic Europeanisation over the 
past decades, as will be demonstrated below.  
Europeanisation has not substantially altered the workings of the French 
Parliament either, but has confirmed and reinforced existing trends. The French 
parliament has a weak place in the political system under the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic (1958) which transferred power from parliament to the executive. Grossman 
and Sauger (2007: 1118) therefore stress: ‘If there is no actual decline or 
“deparliamentarization”, it is mainly because the parliament is weakened from the 
outset’. France is also an example of a semi-presidential political system where the 
President has considerable powers, especially in the field of foreign policy. It is only 
in periods of Cohabitation that French parliamentary parties provide the foundation to 
the leadership of the country, as has been explained in the previous chapter. Hence, as 
Grossman and Sauger (2007) point out, EU scrutiny cannot be viewed as a chain of 
delegation from voters (via parliament) to government. The government cannot 
simply be perceived as an agent of parliament, negotiating France’s European policy 
at EU level, as it shares this role with the President who is elected directly by the 
people. Hence, Europeanisation has not fundamentally altered the working style of the 
National Assembly which from the outset was dominated by the executive.   
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In Germany, institutional reforms have confirmed the EU scrutiny powers of 
the Bundestag and have over the years improved the parliamentary infrastructure 
needed to apply these powers (Auel and Benz, 2005: 385). Compared to many other 
parliaments in the EU – and particularly the National Assembly - the Bundestag is 
considered a relatively strong legislature. It is much closer to what Polsby (1975: 277) 
labels a ‘transformative’ legislature, which possesses the ‘independent capacity, 
frequently exercised, to mould and transform proposals from whatever source into 
laws’. The Bundestag is characterised by a high degree of professionalisation which 
manifests itself in expert committee work. Europeanisation, it is argued here, has not 
changed the Bundestag’s working style. As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is 
strong party competition in a system of five parties, and the parliamentary majority 
shares the power to control the agenda with the government. It has therefore 
considerable influence on the agenda. As European integration is no cleavage in 
German politics, it has not altered patterns of party competition in the Bundestag. It 
has rather been integrated into the already existing committee work.  
 
6.2.1 Legislative Europeanisation 
Legislative Europeanisation refers to the scope for policy and law-making affected by 
European integration. It is a crucial aspect of parliamentary Europeanisation and 
affects MPs’ day-to-day work, because the more policy areas have Europeanised, the 
higher the number of MPs dealing with EU policy in their committees. Measuring 
legislative Europeanisation is however easier said than done. European ‘prompts’ on 
national legislation include directives, regulations, Council decisions including 
framework decisions, judgements by the European Court of Justice, and stipulations 
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of the Treaty (Töller, 2006: 8-9). In 2011, no study existed measuring legislative 
Europeanisation across the EU. 
Legislation passed by the British parliament has certainly Europeanised since 
Britain entered the EC. Unfortunately, there are no up-to-date data measuring the 
impact of the EU on UK legislation, and this chapter needs to draw on a study by 
Page (1998: 808) which assesses the scope of the impact of EU legislation on British 
public policy. He demonstrates that the policy areas of agriculture, trade and industry 
were the most Europeanised (with 51.1 per cent for agriculture and 28.6 per cent in 
trade and industry).  
In 2007, Brouard, Costa and Kerrouche measured the shares of all French laws 
with EU origins during the period between 1986 and 2006. In their study, 
Europeanised laws are those that either ratify international treaties, directives that 
demand national transposition, agreements between Member States or judicial 
decisions by the European Court of Justice (Brouard et al., 2007: 19, quoted by Töller, 
2010: 423). Brouard et al. come to the conclusion that across time, the yearly share of 
Europeanised laws increased from less than 3 per cent in 1986 to 13.3 per cent in 
2006. The highest shares of Europeanised legislation can be identified in the fields of 
‘space, science and technology’ (39 per cent), banking, finance and domestic 
commerce (28 per cent, Brouard et al,, 2007). Hence, it can be concluded that French 
legislation has significantly Europeanised in the past decades 
According to an official report by the Bundestag, 31.5 per cent of all legislation 
pronounced and ratified between 2005 and 2009 had EU origins (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/09/2009).  To be sure, there are significant differences 
between policy areas. For example, 23 per cent of laws in the area of justice and home 
affairs emanated from the EU. In agriculture, 52 per cent were of EU origin. In the 
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previous legislative period, 34.5 per cent of laws emanated from the EU while in the 
1990s, the share was approximately 25 percent. Looking at the overall amount of 
Bundestag legislation with European prompts, it can be claimed that legislative 
Europeanisation has taken place.  
These findings confirm that parliamentary party groups need to deal with an 
increasing amount of Europeanised legislation across a wide range of expert 
committees.  This should lead to the Europeanisation of MPs.  
 
6.2.2 Institutional Europeanisation  
Institutional Europeanisation refers to the development of institutional and procedural 
provisions to organise parliamentary EU scrutiny. It includes constitutional powers of 
national parliaments as well as the creation of European affairs committees and 
subcommittees, administrative bodies dealing with EU legislation, working groups 
etc. In a parliament that has created the infrastructure and know-how to effectively 
scrutinise the government’s EU policy, MPs are expected to Europeanise,  
In the case of the House of Commons, institutional ‘misfit’ was obvious when 
Britain joined the EC: the non-existing committee system meant a lack of expertise, 
and parliament was ill-prepared to handle the increasing inflow of technical legislative 
acts from the European level (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 6). Unsurprisingly, however, 
the House of Commons has experienced institutional Europeanisation over the years. 
EU documents are first examined by the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), which 
reports its opinion on the legal and political importance of each document. The ESC 
also has the right to question ministers. However, it is not in the ESC where EU 
documents are discussed in depth. The ECS can defer documents to one of the (ad 
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hoc) European Committees, or – by a motion put down by the government - to the 
Committee of the Whole House, which gives the government the opportunity to avoid 
a plenary debate on EU affairs. The European Committees can discuss European 
decisions and the respective governmental motion and make amendments to this 
motion. However, for the motions to become effective, the committees rely on the 
government. It is the government that puts down the final motion on the floor of the 
House, where it is generally voted on without further debate. Even though a scrutiny 
reserve ensures that parliament can deal with EU policies before they are negotiated at 
the EU level, EU debates in the House of Commons are rather rare. Although the 
European Committees may decide to pass the government's motion, amend it or even 
reject it completely, their motions have no practical effect. If the government dislikes 
them it can move a different motion in the House (Auel and Benz, 2005: 381). As a 
result, the European Committees have no possibility of binding the government, 
which puts Parliament in a weak position. Its overall influence on the government's 
European policy is negligible.  
However, even if formal scrutiny rights are modest, British MPs have 
developed informal scrutiny strategies. They continuously demand information on EU 
affairs and the government's position on them. Ministers are regularly invited before 
the committees so MPs can hold them to account, or receive letters in which the ESC 
asks them for information. Interestingly, this scrutiny mechanism is used by both the 
parliamentary majority and the opposition, and Labour MPs often attacked their own 
ministers during their time in government.  
Like the House of Commons, the National Assembly has experienced 
institutional Europeanisation as an incremental process. It has gained considerable 
constitutional rights in the context of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Treaty 
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changes. Article 88-4 of the French Constitution obliges the government to transmit to 
parliament all legislative documents immediately after their reception in the Council. 
The legislature has moreover been granted the right to vote on resolutions regarding 
these documents. The so-called reserve d’examen parlementaire, obliges the 
government to enable the parliament to vote on a resolution before the Council’s 
decision (Sprungk, 2003: 9). Another turning-point in parliamentary scrutiny has been 
the debate on the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty. In this context, the 
constitutional amendment of 1 March 2005 recognised for the first time the existence 
of EU legislation, which means that parliament is now entitled to vote on resolutions 
on any European act adopted under the co-decision procedure (Grossman and Sauger, 
2007: 1123). Like the House of Commons and the Bundestag, the National Assembly 
has an EU scrutiny committee, created in 1979. When the PS was in government, it 
was called Délégation pour l’Union Européenne (DUE) and was no fully-fledged 
parliamentary committee. The French Constitution limited the number of 
parliamentary committees to six. For the DUE, the procedure to adopt resolutions was 
somewhat complicated as it could do so on its own, but had to rely on the expert 
committees (Lequiller, 2005: 39, quoted by Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1124). As a 
consequence of this complication, the average number of resolutions declined while 
the DUE made increased use of opinions and conclusions (Grossman and Sauger, 
2007: 1124). In 2008, the DUE was made a proper parliamentary committee and was 
renamed Commission des Affaires Européennes (CAE). As Rozenberg (2011) writes, 
the CAE has more autonomy for adapting resolutions and no longer needs to consult 
with other committees.  
The French system of EU document transfer has become more centralised. 
The Sécretariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE, formerly SGCI) provides 
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the French Parliament with draft proposals for the former first and third pillar, while 
documents regarding CFSP are transferred by the Foreign Office. Hence, the National 
Assembly is well-informed about EU policy. Unlike their counterparts in the 
Bundestag, however, French MEPs does not receive explanatory memoranda to the 
documents, and get no information about deliberations at COREPER level or the 
negotiation processes in the Council (Szukala and Rozenberg, 2001: 238). What is 
more, members of government rarely reported to the DUE when the PS was in 
government. Compared to their German counterparts, French MPs have therefore put 
more formal pressure on the government to get information on EU matters (Sprungk, 
2003: 12).  
The National Assembly makes a regular, yet not excessive use of its 
possibilities to formally state an opinion and generally, the parliamentary majority 
supports the government (Sprungk, 2003: 14). Nevertheless, in the past the parliament 
has explicitly demanded from the government to provide them with more systematic 
information on the follow-up of resolutions (Hourquebie, 1999: 183, quoted by 
Sprungk, 2003: 16). Public debates on EU issues take regularly place on topics such 
as the scope of France’s financial contribution to the EU budget. In general, the 
number of debates is approximately as high as in the Bundestag, but the share of 
parliamentary initiatives for public debates on EU issues is higher. The reason is that 
the French government rarely reports about EU politics (Sprungk, 2003: 18).  
The level of parliamentary EU scrutiny in France is generally very low. The 
role expert committees play is considered ‘weak’, and so was the DUE’s power in 
giving the government voting instructions. The access to information (in terms of 
scope and timing) was considered ‘moderate’ (Raunio, 2005: 324). Grossman and 
Sauger (2007) blame this weakness on three factors: institutional weakness, self-
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restraint and governmental autonomy. Institutional weakness relates to the fact that 
the French parliament is weak and that the DUE suffered from the same limitations as 
the parliamentary committees. According to Raunio (2005) a strong parliament and a 
Eurosceptical public opinion increase the probability of the legislature subjecting the 
government to tighter EU scrutiny. The French parliament is a weak legislature, 
which confirms Raunio’s findings. At the same time, however, Euroscepticism is on 
the rise amongst the public, and this can explain the latest reforms aimed at 
strengthening parliamentary EU scrutiny powers (Rozenberg, 2011).  
The pro-European consensus in the Bundestag and the political elite in general 
was seen as an integral part of the German ‘raison d’état’ after the Second World 
War. Due to this ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) the main 
questions of European integration are, until today, very rarely an issue for party 
competition or intra-party division. Against this background it becomes more 
understandable that the EU scrutiny system in the Bundestag only developed very 
slowly. It took the Bundestag until 1994 to set up a fully-fledged European 
Committee. The decisive break-through was facilitated by the Federal Constitutional 
Court in the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Court 
put pressure on the government to create a EU affairs committee which was set up in 
October 1992 with the purpose of paving the way for the ratification of the Treaty. 
The participation rights of the Bundestag and Bundesrat (the upper house) were laid 
down in the course of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty through amendments to 
Article 23, the so-called ‘Europaartikel’ and the related Article 45. Article 23 states 
that any further transfer of sovereign rights to the EU requires ratification by a two-
thirds majority in both legislative chambers. Moreover, section two states that the 
Bundestag cooperates with the government in EU affairs. Accordingly, the federal 
 166 
government has the constitutional duty to inform both legislative chambers 
comprehensively and at the earliest point possible and enable the parliament to submit 
its opinion before a decision is adopted at European level. The federal government 
must take parliament’s opinion into account during negotiations at EU level. 
However, in contrast to the Danish Folketing, the Bundestag has no right to formally 
mandate the government’s bargaining position. The role of the Bundestag has been 
further strengthened in 2009, after Peter Gauweiler, a CSU politician who was 
supported by politicians from Die Linke, challenged the constitutionality of the Lisbon 
Treaty before the Federal Constitutional Court. In June 2009 the Court rendered its 
judgement (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 on 30/6/2009), holding that, while the Lisbon 
Treaty complies with the German Basic Law, the cooperation between government 
and parliament in EU matters needed to be reinforced so as to ensure that  both 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat enjoy sufficient scrutiny powers. As a consequence, in 
September 2009, new accompanying laws were adopted by both chambers to this 
effect. The government is now obliged to get parliamentary consent before 
transferring new competences to the European Union. But major changes in the 
Bundestag’s EU scrutiny system were not expected. This was confirmed by Axel 
Schäfer MdB who explained in an interview (25/06/2010) that the new accompanying 
laws merely formalise what had already been practiced.  
The Bundestag’s EU affairs committee (Europaausschuss, EUA) only deals 
with fundamental questions of European integration, such as Treaty amendments and 
decisions of historical importance, such as EU enlargement. Specific European 
policies are dealt with by the expert committees. Hence, the EUA does not usually 
translate European directives into national law, which is considered to be the task of 
expert committees. Nevertheless, the EUA enjoys a prominent role. There are 
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currently 22 standing committees in the Bundestag, and only four of them are 
mandated by the Basic Law, the EUA being amongst them. Its establishment is not 
subject to the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Standing Orders, which provided the EUA 
with the constitutional continuity needed to build up the necessary expertise and to 
provide a longer-term career perspective for EU specialists in the parliamentary 
parties (Saalfeld, 2003). The EUA’s composition is unique, as it not only consists of 
33 MPs, but also 16 MEPs (the latter without voting rights). MEPs, however, rarely 
have the time to attend committee sessions, as the parliamentary schedules often 
overlap. In cross-national studies of the EU-15, Germany scores relatively high 
regarding its level of parliamentary EU scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Bergman 
et al., 2003; Raunio, 2005). EU scrutiny rights of expert committees in the Bundestag 
are considered ‘strong’, and so is the access to information (in its scope and timing). 
Altogether, institutional Europeanisation is rather strong in the case of the German 
parliament. Especially in the last decade, the Bundestag has caught up and 
Europeanised its institutional settings. However, the question remains of whether the 
Bundestag makes use of its power. Strikingly enough, both the EUA and the expert 
committees only rarely make use of their formal scrutiny rights. They rarely issue 
opinions which could limit the government’s room for manoeuvre in EU negotiations. 
Dr. Eva Högl, SPD member of the EUA (interviewed on 20/07/2009) stresses that the 
work of the EUA was very consensual when the SPD was in government. Even a year 
later, when the SPD was in opposition, it hardly tried to attack the government’s EU 
policy or limit the room for negotiations (informal meeting with Dr. Eva Högl on 
12/07/2010). This is confirmed by Axel Schäfer (MdB, interviewed on 25/06/2010). 
Asked whether being in opposition had changed the SPD’s EU strategy in the 
Bundestag, Schäfer said: ‘clearly not’.  
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There are various reasons for this seemingly passive role of the Bundestag. 
Some scholars argue that the lack of parliamentary opposition (and public opinion) to 
EU integration is one important variable to explain weak EU scrutiny (Raunio, 2005). 
Moreover, EU policies have to be dealt with by the expert committees, and MPs from 
those committees already suffer from a heavy workload and do not spend their time 
on EU scrutiny. In addition, there tends to be a lack of coordination between the 
specialised committees and the EUA, and members of the EUA are not always 
satisfied with the amount of time and expertise the specialised committees spent on 
EU legislation. Dr. Eva Högl (interviewed on 20/07/2009) explains:  
Unfortunately, Europe is not prioritised in the committees for health, work 
and social affairs, and business, for example. There are differences, and I 
notice that it very much depends on the individual. In almost every expert 
committee there is a member responsible for Europe, but they deal with it 
with very different degrees of intensity and knowledge.   
Information overload is also seen as a cause of concern. Until recently the Bundestag 
had no ‘filter committee’. This shortcoming has been recognised and changed: in May 
2006 the Bundestag set up an EU affairs unit which provides efficient service. 
Reasons for the set-up of this service were that ‘in the specialised committees, EU 
legislative documents were often not discussed on time, and MPs did not always 
know their participation rights (...). Moreover, the way the Bundestag dealt with 
certain issues such as the EU services directive was criticised’ (Interview with Dr. 
Sven Vollrath, head of the Bundestag’s EU affairs unit PA1 on 17/07/2009). It took 
the Bundestag one year to set up a new EU affairs unit (called PA1). Officials got in 
contact with other national parliaments across the EU (notably Finland) to share best 
practice for the creation of this unit which today consists of an office in Berlin and 
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Brussels. PA1 does the same job as the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of 
Commons: it forwards documents received by the EU institutions and the government 
to the different factions and saves them in a database. It also allocates the legislative 
projects to the relevant committees. As Dr. Vollrath explains: ‘in sum, we receive 15.-
16.000 documents per year which have to be forwarded, classified, and this is what 
the PA1 does’. Ten research assistants working in PA1 are responsible for the 
different parliamentary committees, supporting the committees when it comes to 
content and timeframe of EU legislative documents. They also assess whether an EU 
legislative proposal needs to be discussed in the Bundestag or not – which is done in 
cooperation with the different party groups who are all consulted on the matter. ‘This 
mechanism’, Dr. Vollrath points out, ‘became very popular and is less bureaucratic 
than it may sound. 50-55 per cent of all legislative proposals are no longer transferred 
to the expert committees because the party groups decide, on the basis of the PA1’s 
recommendations, that these documents are not relevant for the Bundestag and 
Germany. As a consequence, committees now focus on the really important projects’. 
As mentioned earlier, before the set-up of PA1, Bundestag officials took examples of 
best practice from other national parliaments in the EU Member States into 
consideration, such as Finland. However, Dr. Vollrath argues that examples cannot 
simply be copied as parliaments ‘organise differently and have different constitutional 
competences. So we did take experience and ideas [from abroad] into consideration, 
but at the end, we had to bring them in line with our competences and the structure of 
our parliament’. This statement confirms institutionalist claims that when institutions 
change, they integrate changes into existing patterns. Dr. Eva Högl (interviewed on 
20/07/2009) states that PA1 is doing ‘excellent work’ in presenting lists to the 
committees, estimating in which EU projects the Bundestag should get involved or 
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not, ‘because we MPs could impossibly keep an eye on all dossiers’. Thus, the 
problem of information overload has now been solved. 
Another explanation for the Bundestag’s reluctant use of its institutional 
power could be that the procedures linked to the special rights (Article 23.3) are still 
too complicated, and therefore the EUA worked out a ‘semi-formal approach’: after 
deliberations amongst committee members had been completed and consensus on a 
specific topic reached, the federal government was notified in writing of the 
Committee’s position and requested to take it into account. The Bundestag’s rules 
committee, however, classified this practice as an unacceptable bypassing of formal 
procedures (Töller, 2006: 14). This is related to another explanation: since the 
composition of the EAC reflects that of the entire Bundestag, the government can rely 
on its support. Even if MPs have an incentive to influence their government, the 
majority parties have no incentive to do this publicly. German EU politics being 
largely consensual, the committee tends to avoid confrontation with the government 
(Töller, 2006: 15).  
The overall involvement of plenary sessions with EU issues has been 
relatively low in the Bundestag, only increasing occasionally in periods when EU 
Treaties are amended (Töller, 2006). Moreover, as Saalfeld (2003; 76) argues, 
German MPs have little rational incentive to spend their time on EU affairs if their 
goal is re-election. EU affairs have a low electoral salience in Germany and are thus 
not a very attractive area of expertise for MPs. The same applies to British and French 
MPs. Thus, even if the three parliaments have experienced institutional 
Europeanisation, the majority of MPs shows little interest in EU policy.  
Donald Searing (1994) applies motivational role theory to British MPs and 
distinguishes between MPs’ preferential and positional roles. Following his reasoning, 
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a MP sitting on the EAC will Europeanise because of his/her position as committee 
member, chair or spokesperson. Due to the daily involvement in EU affairs, 
Europeanisation comes with his/her positional role. Other MPs might not sit on the 
EAC or have any formal EU-related roles, but still show great interest in EU affairs 
by giving interviews on EU topics or publishing press releases. In this case, 
Europeanisation comes with their preferential role. It seems however that in all three 
parliaments, preferential Europeanists are a rare species.  
 
6.2.3 Strategic Europeanisation  
Strategic Europeanisation ‘consists in national MPs taking the European Union as a 
decision-making center into account – but also as an addressee for their action – and 
in adjusting action patterns and routines accordingly’ (Töller, 2006: 5). This type of 
Europeanisation relates directly to the MPs and their interest and engagement in EU 
affairs. A Europeanised MP would get in contact with European authorities or sister 
parties from across the EU in order to have a better, earlier access to information. This 
is the least researched aspect of parliamentary Europeanisation, but deserves more 
scholarly attention. First of all, a clearer definition of ‘strategic Europeanisation’ 
would be helpful. Secondly, more systematic, up-to-date, cross-country data 
measuring the awareness of MPs of European integration and their contacts to MEPs, 
MPs from their sister parties across the EU and the EU institutions could provide 
gainful insights into the Europeanisation of political elites.  
Members of the House of Commons’ ESC are in direct contact with the EU 
institutions and with MPs across the EU via COSAC. Contacts between British MPs 
and MEPs tend to be informal and irregular. Whilst representatives of the 
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Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the European Parliamentary Labour Party 
(EPLP) meet on a regular basis, MPs generally meet the MEPs from their 
constituencies on an ad-hoc basis, for example during election campaigns. Despite 
European integration being a political cleavage in Britain, few Labour MPs showed 
great interest in the topic when the party was in office. Europeanists amongst the 
parliamentary party, such as Denis MacShane, were exotics. This, however, was also 
true for the socialist and social democratic members of the National Assembly and the 
Bundestag. 
Strategic Europeanisation not only involves contacts between MPs and EU-
level actors, but also relations between sister parties. For example, exchanges took 
place between MPs of the House of Commons and Bundestag, especially after Tony 
Blair and Gerhard Schröder got elected prime ministers. In 1999 they published their 
common declaration ‘Europe: The Third Way/Die neue Mitte’ in which they called 
for a renewal of Social Democracy. The declaration was harshly criticised by the left 
wings of the SPD, including the trade unions. Later on, the relationship between the 
two party leaders became complicated due to the antagonistic views on the Iraq 
invasion in 2003, but also due to the SPD’s leadership crisis after Gerhard Schröder 
had resigned as party leader in 2004 and lost the chancellorship one year later. 
Relationships between parties depend on their ideologies, the views and interests of 
the party leaders, but also the question of whether the parties are in government or 
opposition. Another important question is whether the party can gain positive 
publicity from its relations with a sister party. For Blair, a close friendship with the 
SPD and PS was difficult in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. For ten years, no more 
high-level political declarations were published by the Labour and SPD leadership, 
and the next declaration was made by MPs as a critical response to the Schröder/Blair 
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paper. In April 2009, Labour MP Jon Cruddas and the SPD’s Andrea Nahles MdB 
published their ‘Declaration for a social Europe: Building the Good Society: The 
Project of the Democratic Left’. In it they declare that the ‘era of the Third Way is 
over’ and call for new, more democratic politics. The ‘Good Society’ debate has 
attracted a growing number of followers across Europe - mainly through the online 
version of the Social Europe Journal. The Good Society project is funded and 
promoted by the SPD’s affiliated think tank, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (interview 
with Karl-Heinz Spiegel, head of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s London office on 
10/09/2009) and Compass, a think tank affiliated with the left wing of the Labour 
Party. This, however, is a recent project and its potential for the Europeanisation of 
MPs (and the Labour Party and SPD more generally) requires more in-depth research. 
   Like their British counterparts, some members of the Assemblée Nationale’s 
DUE were in direct contact with the EU institutions and with MPs in other EU 
Member States via COSAC. Yet, while 48 per cent of German MPs claim to be in 
contact with their MEPs, less than half of their French counterparts (23 per cent) say 
they keep regular contact with MEPs (Wessels, 2005: 460). A possible reason could 
be the high turnover of French MEPs. To facilitate the contact between the French 
Parliament and the EP both Senate and the National Assembly have set up a Brussels 
office in 1999 and 2003 – even before the Bundestag was present. Nevertheless, 
contact between MPs and MEPs remains very informal and irregular, as interviews 
with MEPs (in Chapter 7) reveal. Research suggests that French MPs are more critical 
with the EU than their German counterparts. While 75 per cent of French MPs are 
satisfied with the degree of democracy in their country, only 55 per cent are satisfied 
with the working of democracy at EU level (Wessels, 2005: 452). Overall, however, 
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French MPs do not take significant interest in EU politics. As Rozenberg (2011:11) 
writes: 
Outside the small club of EU Committee members, French MPs do not 
seems to really care about the EU and hardly ever deal with Community 
matters. The enactment of EU resolutions is irregular. Committee hearings 
are poorly attended. Floor debates are scarce. 
Only very few Socialist MPs were known for their EU expertise, and all of them were 
appointed ministers by Jospin: Pierre Moscovici, Elisabeth Guigou and Hubert 
Védrine.  
As discussed above, German MPs make rare use of their constitutional rights. 
Instead, they explore informal channels of influence which appear to be effective. 
Party groups in the Bundestag have internal working groups dealing with all policy 
issues, including EU affairs. These working groups (Arbeitsgruppen) include MPs 
sitting on the EUA and other expert committees, but also party officials, 
representatives from trade unions and Länder. They offer a forum for the MPs to 
discuss EU matters from a party-political angle before they are debated in the EUA. 
Often, the EUA and the parties’ working groups invite experts from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to brief them on current EU issues (interview with Dr. Sven Vollrath 
on 14/07/2009). They do this because ‘the ministries are not always interested in a 
Europeanised Bundestag. The flow of information is not always the way it should be 
(interview with Dr. SvenVollrath on 14/07/2009). This is confirmed by MdB Axel 
Schäfer (interviewed on 25/06/2010) who remarks that the conservative-liberal 
government did not inform the EUA early enough and sufficiently about its bailout 
plans for Greece. MdB Dr. Eva Högl (20/07/2009) complains that the Bundestag still 
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relies too much on the government for information, but does not blame the 
government for this situation: 
We need more imagination: which kind of regulation do we need, and 
what should be dealt with at EU level? And these kinds of reflections 
hardly take place in parliament, but mostly in the ministries, and 
parliament relies too much on what the ministries are doing and in many 
cases does not develop its own ideas, which I regret very much. In 
European policy, we hold on tight to the executive, and I think that’s bad. 
It needs to change: parliament would have to become more self-confident 
in its European policy. 
This statement suggests a lack of strategic Europeanisation. Surprisingly, in 
2003, 48 per cent of German MPs claimed they were in contact with MEPs on a 
monthly basis and 6 per cent said they had regular contacts with both the 
European Commission and the European Council (Wessels, 2005: 460). 
Interviews with MEPs carried out for this study have however revealed that 
contact between MEPs and MPs remains loose and irregular. The fact that in 
2005 the Bundestag finally set up a liaison office in Brussels certainly helps 
MPs to get in touch with their MEPs, EU institutions and other EU-level actors.  
To sum up, various factors could lead to the strategic Europeanisation of 
Members of Parliament. They can exploit informal channels of influence by getting in 
touch directly with MEPs, MPs from sister parties or EU institutions in order to not 
rely on the government for information. Whilst the data are patchy, they reveal that in 
the past, German MPs made more use of their contacts to MEPs and EU institutions 
than their French counterparts. Moreover, they can set up EU working groups to raise 
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the awareness of the party group, as the example of the SPD shows. Overall, strategic 
Europeanisation seems to be a very slow process in all three parliaments.  
A topic for further quantitative and qualitative research could be the 
‘Europeanising effect’ of MPs who, before being elected to national parliaments, have 
gained EU expertise as MEPs or held other positions that required EU expertise. Two 
prominent examples from the French Socialist Party are Élisabeth Guigou and Pierre 
Moscovici, both of whom became ministers in the Jospin government (1997-2002). In 
the SPD, before becoming an MP, Dr. Eva Högl was the director of the department of 
European labour market and social policy in the Ministry for Employment and Social 
Affairs. Labour’s Anne Clwyd, Wayne David, Geoff Hoon and Joyce Quin were all 
MEPs before becoming MPs. Moreover, Labour’s Minister for Europe Chris Bryant 
(2009-2010) was head of European affairs in the BBC before becoming a MP. 
Judging from these few examples - which by no means can claim to be representative 
– MPs who have previously worked as MEPs or had other jobs requiring EU expertise 
could be more likely to join European Affairs Committees or even become (Shadow) 
Ministers for Europe. Whether and how their EU expertise and contacts contributes to 
the Europeanisation of parliament would be a topic for further research.  
 
6.3 Conclusions  
This chapter has demonstrated that the British, French and German parliaments have 
experienced legislative and institutional Europeanisation. All three parliaments have 
set up EU affairs committees and a centralised filtering system to coordinate EU 
legislation. However, the powers of these committees vary significantly from one 
country to the other. The Bundestag’s Europaausschuss has strong constitutional 
powers, but does not make use of them for a variety of different reasons. Both the 
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French and British EU scrutiny committees, on the other hand, are in a weaker 
position vis-à-vis the executive, but still try to hold their governments accountable. 
Has legislative and institutional Europeanisation led to the Europeanisation of MPs? 
When the SPD was in government, the Bundestag’s EAC mainly supported, but did 
not control the government.  Likewise, the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny 
Committee regularly held ministers to account, but could not mandate the 
government. It successfully identified matters which were of concerns to MPs (Lord 
and Harris, 2006: 74) and communicated them effectively, but its constitutional 
powers are very limited. Most of the MPs sitting on the British and French EACs are 
backbenchers. European politics, due to their low salience, are no prestigious area of 
expertise. As a consequence, there is little incentive for MPs to Europeanise despite 
the growing impact of the EU on national legislation.  
Overall, the strategic Europeanisation of national parliaments remains a vague 
area of research, and this chapter has brought up more questions than answers. 
Nevertheless, the patchy data reveal that the three parties in parliament only 
experienced limited Europeanisation. Most of the MPs from Labour, PS and SPD who 
showed interest in EU policy did so because of their positional roles and are not 
representative of their parties. This goes to show that it also depends on the MPs’ 
willingness whether they Europeanise or not. The parliamentary arena can be an arena 
for parties to Europeanise, if they wish to use the opportunity.  
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Chapter 7: The Europeanisation of policy-making  
This and the following chapter explore the Europeanisation of the Labour Party, the 
Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 
organisational arena.  
This chapter investigates how the three parties have Europeanised their 
organisations in the process of EU policy-making. After all, the formulation of policy 
programmes for government is one of a political party’s core functions. Policy-
making processes differ among parties and between policy areas, depending on 
factors such as party organisation, rules as defined by statutes, or traditions. However, 
the most important determinant is whether the party is in government or opposition. 
This chapter focuses on the actors involved in different stages of European policy-
making in the Labour Party, SPD, and PS. The policy process can be divided into 
various different stages (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 377-384). For the sake of 
convenience, this chapter focuses on the early stages: initiation, formulation, and 
implementation. It explores formal and informal decision-making structures and 
highlights the key actors and networks involved in the European policy-making 
process within the parties. The aim is to examine power relations within the three 
parties with regards to the formulation of European policy. After all, the 
Europeanisation of party organisation can only be grasped if we understand which 
party actors or networks contribute to the making of European policy. In this context, 
a Europeanised party organisation is one in which not only the top leadership and 
their advisers are involved in the process of EU policy-making, but also the broader 
party organisation. Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the party 
organisation can only take place if different levels of the party contribute to the 
making of EU policy. This includes institutions such as the party conference, national 
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policy forums, as well as MPs and MEPs. If EU expertise is spread across the party 
organisation, more politicians, activists and members may become interested in EU 
politics, which could contribute to the much-needed politicisation of the EU at the 
domestic level. This chapter explores whether there are differences in the way 
different types of EU policies are made (e.g. day-to-day policy-making versus highly 
controversial and politicised policy decisions, or decisions of historical importance, 
such as EU treaty revisions). Furthermore, this chapter investigates whether the 
policy-making process differs between parties in government and opposition. Two 
hypotheses guide the analysis: 
(1)  The process of EU policy-making empowers the party leadership vis-à-vis the 
party in central office and the party-on-the-ground; and 
(2) Processes of EU policy-making differ between parties in government and 
opposition. 
Both hypotheses have their basis in the existing literature, which will be discussed 
below.  
7.1 A short literature review 
For any party in government, EU policy-making is a challenging process (Wright, 
1996: 149). Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ concept attempts to capture the 
entanglement of domestic and international politics. Putnam (1988) posits that at the 
national level, domestic pressure groups lobby the government, and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to ‘maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences for foreign developments’ 
(Putnam. 1988: 434). This situation applies to European Union policy-making, a 
process in which national politicians try to satisfy domestic pressures whilst pushing 
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for a European agreement. However, even if politicians are keen to represent their 
party’s interests at the EU level, they retain room for manoeuvre and frequently take 
decisions that are afterwards criticised by their party at home. It has therefore been 
argued that the involvement in policy-making at European level strengthens the 
agenda-setting powers of party leaders (Raunio, 2002). Arguably since the 1960s, 
centralisation of power within parties has accelerated independently of the EU. The 
party in public office, and particularly party leaders, have strengthened their position 
at the expense of the central office and ordinary members. Membership of the 
European Union, Raunio (2002) argues, consolidates this centralisation of power and 
top-down decision-making by obliging the party leadership (such as cabinet members) 
to act in an arena (the EU) where the party organisation exercises little if any control 
over party representatives. When a party is in government, the head of government 
participates in European Council summits, where the EU’s political guidelines are set. 
Parties generally exert very little control over prime ministers’ and presidents’ 
behaviour in the European Council. Moreover, the meetings of the Council of 
Ministers, such as the highly influential Council of Economic and Financial Affairs 
(Ecofin) where important decisions regarding the single currency are made, take place 
behind closed doors. ‘Party representatives back home, even vice-chairs or ministers 
in charge of less “Europeanized” portfolios, are thus restricted in their ability to 
scrutinise Council meetings’, Raunio (2002: 411) writes. Carter and Poguntke (2010) 
confirm these findings. The authors sent a questionnaire to key actors of all major 
parties in 15 pre-2004 enlargement EU member states and found out that party elites 
receive only modest levels of instructions when they are involved in EU-level 
decision-making (Carter and Poguntke, 2010: 309). The vast majority of respondents 
(around three-quarters) said that party elites enjoy very high levels of discretion in EU 
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politics. National parties are thus ‘caught between a rock and a hard place: they 
recognise that their party elites need to be given sufficient room for manoeuvre in 
order to negotiate meaningfully in Brussels, and yet the organisational structures of 
political parties demand that elites are held accountable to national party bodies’ 
(Carter and Poguntke, 2010: 320).  
If national parties are limited in their attempts to hold their leadership to 
account, there is always the possibility of domestic parliamentary EU scrutiny. 
However, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 that parliamentary EU scrutiny is still 
relatively weak and inefficient across the EU. Even parliaments with relatively strong 
constitutional scrutiny powers, such as the German Bundestag, tend not to make use 
of them. The involvement in EU policy-making is therefore expected to empower the 
party leadership vis-à-vis the party organisation.  
The second hypothesis relates to the resources that come from being in 
government. A party in government, unlike a party in opposition, is able to draw on 
the civil service (different ministries and the countries’ Permanent Representation in 
Brussels) for EU expertise and contacts. Officials working for the party headquarters, 
but also the formal party structures like party conferences and policy forums are 
expected to play minor roles in the policy-making process. The reason is that EU 
policy-making requires considerable technical expertise. Moreover, it is a dynamic 
environment where complicated policy decisions are often decided in the early 
mornings of Council meetings. Therefore, day-to-day EU policy can hardly be 
formulated at annual conferences or policy forums. At best, general guidelines can be 
defined in these formal party structures. Hence, it is the party leadership in office, 
relying mainly on the civil service, who is expected to be involved in EU policy-
making. When a party is in opposition, it needs to draw on its own sources for EU 
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policy expertise. Such resources could mean party officials with relevant expertise 
(e.g. the international secretary), party MPs with an EU brief and party MEPs who are 
actively involved in the EU policy-making process. Moreover, as a party in opposition 
rethinks its policy programme, it might involve the broader membership through 
consultations or referenda.  
Investigating processes of European policy-making within the three parties is 
both fascinating and challenging, especially because EU policy is distinct from other 
policies. Whilst all policy areas overlap to a certain extent, EU policy is increasingly a 
‘crossover issue’ covering all policy areas - albeit to a different extent. Its crossover 
relevance is what distinguishes it from foreign policy. Over the past twenty years, EU 
policy has become domestic policy. At national party headquarters, however, there is 
still one single department dealing with EU policy as a single issue, and it is often 
subjoined to foreign policy. As a consequence, staff deals with EU policy and foreign 
policy at the same time, and the number of EU experts working for a party is expected 
to be small. Moreover, being an EU expert is still no promising career path for a 
politician seeking (re-)election due to the low salience of EU policy at national level. 
EU policy networks within the three social democratic parties are therefore expected 
to be small. Like other policy networks, EU networks are expected to be mostly 
informal, depending to a large extent on personal contacts. Some networks might be 
more formal, such as permanent working groups and committees, yet most of them 
are expected to be informal and ad-hoc.  
 
While there exists a growing body of literature examining the European 
policies of parties in government or the formal processes of European policy-making 
of different member states, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of the 
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party organisation in the policy-making process. One reason for this might be that 
when a party is in government, it is very difficult to disentangle government and party 
organisation. Writing about the SPD, Stroh (2004) and Lamatsch (2004) argue that 
European policy is government policy. The party relies on government resources and 
areas of the personnel overlap. Moreover, the informal aspects of policy-making can 
only be revealed through interviews. This chapter analyses the literature on the three 
parties’ European policies and the formal structures of European policy-making in 
Britain, France and Germany. The following sections will examine the roles played by 
(1) the three parties’ formal policy-making structures (party conference and executive 
committee), (2) the parties’ international departments, (3) the parliamentary party, and 
(4) the Members of the European Parliament.  The role of the party leadership in 
government has already been analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
7.2 The formal policy-making structures of the Labour Party, PS and SPD and 
their role in the making of European policy 
The Labour Party was founded on the basis that party policy was determined by its 
members, brought together in an annual conference, rather than by the party’s 
parliamentary leaders. However, as McKenzie (1955: 485) notes, in reality the party 
conference has no control over the parliamentary party or the government. 
In principle, between conferences the responsibility for policy fell to the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) which produced policy statements that the conference 
would be asked to agree (Russell, 2005: 129). The NEC was ‘the hub of a network of 
policy advisory committees and so oversaw the development of party policy in the 
longer term’ (Ingle, 2008: 82). The NEC’s influence began to wane under the party 
leadership of Neil Kinnock (1983-1992), John Smith (1992-1994) and Tony Blair 
 184 
(1994-2007). In 1990, the National Policy Forum (NPF) was established to formally 
oversee the development of party policy and broaden the involvement of the party 
organisation. The aim was to give ordinary party members a chance to discuss policy 
more frequently outside the party conference, where policy decisions reached within 
the NPF would merely be ratified (Kelly, 2001: 331). Representatives serving on the 
NPF are chosen by the constituencies. According to Labour’s website ‘the NPF meets 
several times a year to make sure that policy documents reflect the broad consensus in 
the party’. Between these meetings policy is generated and processed via policy 
commissions (Ingle, 2008: 83). One of them – ‘Britain in the World’ - is responsible 
for international and European policies.  
NPF members had direct access to ministers when Labour was in government, and 
ministers were sent to local party meetings and the NPF itself. This ‘kept government 
to some extent in touch with the concerns of the party’ (Russell, 2005: 158). 
Nevertheless, the government ‘remained very much in the driving seat’ (Russell, 
2005: 158) and in some cases even ignored decisions made by the NPF. When Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown were prime ministers, a small group of special advisers and 
public relations experts played a central role in Labour’s policy-making processes, at 
the expense of party bodies such as the NPF.  
The National Executive Committee (NEC) is the governing body of the 
Labour Party that oversees the overall direction of the party and the policy-making 
process. The party leader, the deputy leader, and the leader of the European 
Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) sit ex officio. On Labour’s website it reads: 
‘Throughout the year, NEC members participate with government ministers in Labour 
Party policy commissions that prepare reports on different areas of policy which are 
then presented to and consulted on with the party membership before going to annual 
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conference. This forms the basis of Labour’s general election manifesto’. In reality, 
the party leadership has ‘traditionally enjoyed considerable strategic freedom to 
devise election manifestoes and to govern relatively unimpeded by the extra-
parliamentary party once in office’, as Heffernan and Webb (2005: 46) argue. This 
finding is confirmed by Bara (2006: 267) who highlights that for Labour’s 2005 
election manifesto, ‘despite the semblance of consultation, most of the key decisions 
were taken by the leadership’. Labour’s 2010 election manifesto was officially written 
by Ed Miliband, minister for Energy and Climate Change. According to Patrick 
Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) who was head of Number 10 Downing Street’s 
Policy Planning Unit at that time, the different chapters were written by government 
ministers and civil servants and then polished by Number 10 Downing Street. Ed 
Miliband was the senior minister responsible for ‘signing it off, in effect, or for 
approving the manifesto’ (Patrick Diamond, interviewed on 16/03/2011). He also 
wrote most of the introduction and contributed to each of the chapters. Diamond 
confirms that the formal party structures, such as the NEC or NPF, were not involved 
in the manifesto-writing process. Thus, Labour’s election manifestoes are written by 
the party leadership, and the official party structures are marginalised in the 
formulation of policy.  
More generally, since the 1980s, policy-making and campaigning have 
become increasingly centralised within the Labour Party, and the NEC has often been 
circumvented and ‘stripped of many of its powers over the party’ (Foley, 2000: 304). 
Whilst the NPF and NEC certainly remain important forums for debates on party 
policy, day-to-day EU policy-making demands faster reactions and expert knowledge. 
In the Council of Ministers, negotiations demand a certain amount of flexibility, and 
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the government does not wait for the NPF and NEC to give them voting instructions. 
Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) confirms these findings, stating: 
 
It would be quite wrong to suppose that the formal policy-making 
structure within the party has very much influence at all how policy in the 
relation to the European Union is made when the Labour Party is in 
government. And obviously, the orientation shifts, so that the actors who 
control the process are obviously the senior ministers in conjunction with 
senior officials and civil servants. And I can think of almost no examples 
during the course of the 13 years when Labour was in government, when 
the policy-making process of the party was able to impose any particular 
positions on the government in terms of European policy 
 
It can therefore be concluded that when Labour was in government between 1997 and 
2010, European policy was not formulated by either the party conference, the NEC or 
the NPF. Can the same be said about the PS and SPD? 
 
The French Socialists have spent only five years in government since 1997. 
This has an important impact on the party organisation’s ability to influence European 
policy-making: Since 2002, the PS leadership has not been involved in EU 
negotiations in either Council of Ministers or European Council, nor did it appoint a 
European Commissioner. The centre-right President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a 
Socialist foreign minister (Bernard Kouchner, 2007-2010) who was expelled from the 
PS after accepting the post. Hence, the PS did not even indirectly influence French 
foreign or European policy during that period. The PS was still represented in the 
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European Parliament, but the number of MEPs decreased from 18 (2004-2009) to 14 
(2009-2014). Moreover, as it will be revealed, MEPs are not the key actors in the PS’ 
European policy-making process.  
Formally, the party conference (congrès national) is the PS’ highest party 
organ. It rallies every three years to define policy guidelines and elect the party 
leadership: the national bureau (bureau national) and the national council (conseil 
national). MEPs are delegates of the party conference ex officio. However, they do 
not have the right to vote. In the past, some party conferences have united the party. 
Others - like the conference of Rennes in 1990 - were overshadowed by infighting 
between as many as seven different courants. If the party is united behind a strong 
leader - such as Mitterrand or Jospin - the conference is in a position to give policy 
guidelines. Unsurprisingly, however, they tend to remain broad, leaving enough room 
for interpretation to the party leadership. As the case of Labour, the PS’ conference is 
not the forum where day-to-day party policy is formulated.  
According to the PS’ website the national council is the ‘party’s veritable 
parliament’. It executes the decisions made by the party conference and meets at least 
four times per year. Whilst this is a forum for discussion and networking between 
different levels of the party organisation, European policy is not formulated here. 
This, however, is not to say that the party at the departmental level (fédération) has no 
influence on European policy-making. The federations tend to support factions which 
in turn have been influential players in the party’s European policy-making. By 
supporting a faction, a federation supports a certain European policy, as has been 
demonstrated in context with the PS’ debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 
2004/2005. Hence, the party federation has certain leverage over European policy. It 
is moreover involved in negotiations over EU structural and regional funding. Today, 
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almost all 102 PS federations have EU working groups. At least, they have one 
elected representative for EU policy (interview with Maurice Braud on 22/06/2009). 
The PS secretary for international relations and Europe, Jean-Christophe-Cambadélis 
(interviewed on 18/06/2009), argues: 
The European question is treated in a bottom-up and top-down manner, 
even if it reserved to persons who are a bit specialised. What I mean is 
that the sections [local party, I.H.] do not often discuss European 
questions. They sometimes discuss them… it is part of their patrimony, 
their genetic make-up. At the same time there are highly specialised 
people who follow the subject. It’s a hybrid system and it is part of the PS 
history, yet unfortunately, it remains reserved to a certain number of 
specialists in the Socialist Party.  
Hence, when the PS was in government between 1997 and 2002, the lower levels of 
the party organisation had no significant impact on the party’s EU policy. The PS’ 
most important forums for policy-making are the national bureau and the national 
secretariat. The first is elected by the party conference and comprises 54 members and 
meets every Tuesday under the leadership of the party leader. According to the PS’ 
website, its role is to ‘assure the administration and direction of the party as decided 
by the party conference’. Highly politicised EU issues are discussed by the national 
bureau whilst day-to-day policy is rarely on the agenda. The appropriate forum for 
this is the national secretariat (secrétariat national) which is the real power centre of 
the Socialist Party. It is responsible for the management of the party. Chaired by the 
party leader, it meets every Tuesday morning. In the national secretariat, the party 
leader is surrounded by a group of close advisors and - in the case of Martine Aubry - 
66 national secretaries. All extra-parliamentary wings of French parties have officials 
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referred to as national secretaries. In the case of the PS they are elected politicians 
(Ladrech 2007; 91). The secretaries’ work is coordinated by Harlem Désir, MEP.  
Under François Hollande’s party leadership, a secretariat for Europe and a separate 
one for international affairs were created and integrated into the national secretariat. 
Martine Aubry merged them into one, and since 2008, the head of the national 
secretariat for international relations and Europe is Jean-Christophe Cambadélis. The 
role of the national secretariat in the PS’ EU policy-making process role will be 
examined in section 7.2. 
European policy-making has been an informal process ever since the PS has 
been in opposition. Whilst the party leader and his/her advisers in the national 
secretariat are the key players in the EU policy-making process, they lost their grip in 
2004/2005. The leadership was deeply divided over the EU Constitutional Treaty and 
François Hollande let the members vote in an internal referendum. Does this mean 
that in opposition, the PS leadership has yielded EU policy-making power to the 
members? It might have done so, but it was not a deliberate decision. As discussed in 
greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the controversy over the EU Constitutional Treaty 
was mainly a way for the factions’ presidential candidates to gain a stronger profile. 
In his weakened position as leader of a divided party, François Hollande let the 
members decide on the party’s official policy on the EU Treaty. Whilst the members 
voted in favour of the treaty, the leaders continued to be divided and campaigned in 
favour and against the treaty. Hence, the members’ empowerment in the policy-
making process should not be overrated. It was born out of Hollande’s desperation 
rather than the genuine willingness to involve activists into EU policy-making.  
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In accordance with § 9 of the German party law, the SPD’s highest decision-
making body is the federal party conference (Bundesparteitag) which meets every two 
years. It elects the executive committee (Vorstand), nominates the chancellor 
candidate, and also takes fundamental policy decisions. Importantly, it ratifies the so-
called ‘principal guidelines’ (Grundsatzprogramm) in which the party formulates its 
core values. These principle policy guidelines remain general, and, most of the time, 
are based on suggestions made by the party executive. In line with § 15 of the SPD’s 
statute, ten percent of the party’s MEPs are automatically invited to the conference. 
However, their role is merely to consult, and they do not have the right to speak.  In 
reality, the majority (three quarters) of the SPD’s MEPs attend conferences, since 
many of them are district delegates (Stroh, 2004: 131-132). Conferences are forums 
for networking and debate, where the leadership and party on the ground meet to 
exchange ideas. As Lösche and Walter (1992) argue, the party conference has been 
disempowered since the 1960s and replaced by federal conferences and symposia 
dealing with specific topics (including European integration). Hence, the conference 
plays no significant role in the SPD’s day-to-day policy formulation, just like 
Labour’s and the PS’ party conferences do not fulfil this role.  
There have been identified three main actors or forums relevant to European 
policy-making within the SPD (Bellers, 1979). These are: the executive committee 
(Vorstand) and steering committee (Präsidium)10; the executive of the SPD’s 
parliamentary party group and their EU policy working group; and the MEPs.  
                                                          
10
 In English, both 'Vorstand' and 'Präsidium' can be translated as 'executive committee'. However, 
Präsidium can also be translated as 'steering committee'. To avoid confusion, the German names will 
be used throughout this thesis.  
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The SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand) is elected by the delegates at the party 
conference and represents the different factions of the party. The party leader and four 
vice leaders, the general secretary, treasurer, and an EU advisor are the members of 
the Vorstand, plus a number of additional members as elected by the party conference. 
Amongst its members, the executive committee elects the Präsidium whose task it is 
to ‘implement the decisions made by the Vorstand’ (§ 23 Organisationsstatut der 
SPD, 14/11/2009). The Präsidium usually represents the different factions of the 
party, geographical zones, and, in equal measure, gender. It is, as Der Spiegel 
(23/11/2009) writes, ‘fastidiously balanced’. Both Vorstand and Präsidium are located 
at the SPD headquarters, the Willy-Brandt-Haus in Berlin. According to Lösche 
(1993: 40, quoted by Sloam 2005: 61), ‘the presidium is naturally the power centre, 
supported by the party bureaucracy’ (…) ‘the Vorstand however is more a centre of 
integration for the party, including different associations, wings and working 
communities, than a centre of power’.  
Sloam (2008: 61) argues that the formulation and coordination of European 
policy is done by European policy groups under the Vorstand when the party is in 
opposition. This view is contrasted by Stroh, who stresses the role of the 
parliamentary party group in the day-to-day formulation of EU policies. According to 
Stroh (2004: 120-121), the Vorstand gives general policy guidelines while the party 
group works on the actual content of policies. She writes that in general, the party 
headquarters suffer from a ‘lack of efficiency and expert knowledge’, and EU policy – 
which is considered to be a less important topic - is neglected. In this chapter it is 
argued that when the SPD is in opposition, the party group and the Vorstand are both 
important players in the formulation of EU policy. However, when the party is in 
 192 
power, EU policy was formulated in the relevant ministries and not by the party in 
central or public office.  
When the SPD was in government, two high-profile EU experts were 
members of the Vorstand ex officio: Martin Schulz (MEP and head of S & D group in 
the European Parliament) and Angelica Schwall Düren (in her role as vice chairman 
of the party group). Schulz was also a member of the Präsidium, which was a novelty 
in SPD history. As Marc Jütten, policy adviser to Schulz (interviewed on 07/10/2009) 
explains: 
It was for the first time that a SPD member dealing exclusively with EU 
affairs - who had a seat in the European Parliament - was striving for a 
seat in the Präsidium, demanding a seat for a European. It shows that the 
party is deeply rooted in Europe and cares for the European level just as 
much as it does for the other levels, the local, regional and federal. Thanks 
to this bridge-building he [Martin Schulz, I.H.] now plays a stronger role 
in national media. And now his position has been upgraded in the sense 
that the party said: we have a permanent Präsidium member responsible 
for Europe who is elected directly by the party conference. This means 
that his prominent position is once more confirmed. 
 
The Vorstand has been involved in European policy-making through its international 
department (which will be explored in section 7.2) and an EU working group called 
Europa Kommission (Commission on Europe). It was created at the beginning of the 
1980s after the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament. Name and 
membership have changed since, but its function remains the same: it complements 
the work of the Bundestag’s working group, and according to Stroh (2004: 126) it 
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tends to be dominated by the latter. Between 2005 and 2009, the Europa Kommission 
was co-chaired by Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren and Bernhard Rapkay (MEP and 
leader of the SPD’s delegation to the European Parliament). The purpose of this dual 
leadership was to ‘bring Bundestag and European Parliament together at the highest 
party level’ (interview with Thomas Vaupel, Abteilung IV, 07/08/2009). When the 
SPD was in office, the Kommission had between 40 and 50 members and met 
approximately every six weeks (interview with Felix Porkert, head of Abteilung IV’s 
EU section, 15/07/2009). It brought together Members of Parliament, MEPs, civil 
servants of SPD-led ministries, academics close to the SPD and representatives of the 
Länder governments. According to Thomas Vaupel (interviewed on 07/08/2009), the 
Europa Kommission also discussed the SPD’s 2009 European election manifesto, but 
it was mainly drafted by a small number of Vorstand members, including Martin 
Schulz, Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren and Achim Post, Abteilung IV’s director since 
1999. Thus, in the SPD– like in the Labour Party – manifestoes are written by the 
party leadership.  
To be sure, SPD EU working groups also exist at regional and – in an increasing 
number of cases – even local level. For example, Berlin’s SPD federation has set up a 
permanent EU working group (Fachausschuss Europa) which meets monthly and 
benefits from the fact that many of the SPD’s EU experts (party officials, civil 
servants, interest group representatives, MPs, advisors, academics) work in the 
capital. Asked whether he sees it as the Fachausschuss Europa’s role to Europeanise 
Berlin’s SPD, Dr. Philipp Steinberg (chair of the Fachausschuss Europa, interviewed 
on 15/07/2009) states: 
Of course. It is a perpetual task, but I think that the results of the European 
elections [in 2009, I.H.] have demonstrated once again how important it 
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is. You can’t make European policy from top-down. My hope is that 
European policy will increasingly be understood as domestic policy, and 
therefore it is certainly one of our tasks to try to point to the relevance of 
European policy as a crossover area for other policy areas. 
  
Other EU working groups exist in North-Rhine Westphalia and other Länder.  
Normally, however, ‘the lower levels of the SPD tend, quite naturally, to occupy 
themselves with issues closer to home’ and it is the preserve of the federal level of the 
party with its greater resources and inclination to look into EU policy (Sloam, 2005: 
59).  
In summary, when the SPD was in opposition, the party group and the 
Vorstand were the key players in the formulation of EU policy. Whilst the Vorstand 
gave general guidelines, the party group worked on the actual content of the policies. 
However, when the party was in government, EU policy was mainly formulated in the 
relevant ministries and not by the party in central or public office, but this has been 
explored in Chapter 5.  
 
7.3 Labour, the PS and SPD’s international departments and their role in 
European policy-making  
All national parties in the European Union have an international department where at 
least one official deals with EU policy. These departments differ in terms of their 
budget, size and role, which depend on the party’s budget and the importance it places 
on European and international affairs.  
Since 2003, Labour has employed an international manager working at the 
party headquarters’ ‘International Unit’, dealing with European and international 
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issues. On Labour’s website it explains that the International Unit ‘maintains and 
develops relations with sister parties and represents the Party at the European and 
international level through the Party of European Socialists and Socialist 
International’. According to Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011),  
The role of the international secretary has changed over the last 20 years. I 
think in previous eras the international secretary probably would have had 
more of a voice in some of the discussions about policy. But now they are 
employed by the party and their major role is to manage different 
relationships. 
The international manager liaises with the European Parliamentary Labour Party 
(EPLP), thus providing a channel of communication between the party leadership and 
the MEPs. He or she also attends meetings of the PES’ coordination team. In 2008, 
Labour’s international manager, Jo Billingham, managed a team of three people. Her 
employees were funded by the Foreign Office through the ‘Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy’ and worked specifically on a project building the capacity of political 
parties in developing countries and fragile and emerging democracies. Hence, these 
employees did not deal with EU policy at all. Instead, European issues were dealt with 
by the international manager herself and an international policy officer who was not 
part of the team but cooperated closely. Asked about the amount of time dedicated to 
European issues, Billingham (interviewed on 24/11/2009) states:  
If you define EU as our bilateral relationships with parties in the EU as 
well as with our work with the Party of European Socialists at European 
level, probably it takes up maybe two thirds of my time, so the majority of 
my time. And I think our international policy officer… maybe it takes up 
half of her time, but it obviously depends. 
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Labour’s international manager is thus responsible for the coordination of the 
relationship with the PES and Labour’s sister parties, as well as the European 
Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP). EPLP official Brian Duggan (interviewed on 
14/09/2009) explains:  
Labour’s International Unit is a fairly small department, and obviously its 
reach is beyond Europe. We tend to do a lot of the European side of things 
and help them with the information and knowledge, briefings and material 
on the European side of things.  
The EPLP also supports the International Unit with its work with sister parties. For 
example, if Labour’s sister parties’ branches in the UK want to invite a Labour MP or 
MEP to speak at a meeting or want to support Labour during an election campaign, 
the EPLP supports the International Unit (interview with Brian Duggan, 14/09/2009).  
It then becomes clear that the International Unit is no key player in Labour’s 
European policy-making process - as Billingham (24/11/2009) confirms:  
Well, I think – because we are a party in government – it’s obviously the 
government ministers who define our policies really. They take the lead in 
terms of policy-making. They and their advisers, and the Foreign Office. 
So in terms of the policy-making, that’s mainly done by government 
ministers. But we obviously work closely with them, particularly when it 
comes to relations with sister parties. 
 
The PS’ international secretariat is more loosely organised than the SPD’s 
Abteilung IV, which is mainly due to the lack of financial resources since 2002. For 
example, Alain Richard – a former defence minister and vice-president of the PES - 
represented the PS in the PES presidency without being a formally elected member of 
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the PS executive. The leader of the PS’ delegation to the European Parliament is also 
a member of secretariat for international relations and Europe. Furthermore, 
Cambadélis has two advisors. One of them works full-time and the other one is a 
volunteer who works part-time. Moreover, he has one administrator at his disposal. 
The national secretariat’s EU working group meets every Monday at noon to discuss 
EU policy. Invited are: MEPs, MPs as well as former ministers. Two to three subjects 
are discussed every Monday, and the amount of people attending the meeting depends 
on the topics. Pierre Kanuty, an official working at the secretariat (interviewed on 
23/06/2009) summarises: ‘we have a very good information network. There is nothing 
to rival it’. Asked whether EU policy-making within the PS is a formal process, the 
international secretary - Jean-Christophe Cambadélis - explains: 
No, it is not a formal process because the MEPs are quite far away. We 
are trying to bring them closer but it’s always complicated because they 
meet at a time when we meet here in France and it is difficult to do both at 
the same time. Then again, I am in quite regular contact with Philip 
Cordery [general secretary of the PES, I.H.]. But it is not formal. (…) It 
depends on the subject.  
In contrast, the SPD’s Abteilung IV: Internationale Politik was better staffed and had 
a section dealing exclusively with European politics. Thomas Vaupel, an official 
working for the latter (interviewed on 08/07/2009) describes its role as follows: 
It is first and foremost our role to prepare general European policy 
guidelines for our party leadership in coordination with actors involved in 
the SPD’s European policy in the Bundestag and European Parliament in 
order to define the SPD’s general policy guidelines regarding those 
fundamental issues. We don’t need to deal in detail with every single 
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directive that is discussed at EU level. We rather enter the game when an 
issue is of a more fundamental political relevance. Moreover, we liaise 
with our European sister parties and organise the cooperation with the 
PES’.  
Vaupel’s statement suggests that Abteilung IV’s not only liaised with the PES and 
sister parties, but was also in a position to provide the party leadership with general 
EU policy guidelines. It might have played a more prominent role in the party’s EU 
policy-making than Labour’s International Unit.  
In 2009, when the SPD was still in office, four persons were working on 
European policy in Abteilung IV: one policy officer, one research assistant, an 
administrator and a secretary. Whilst this might not appear impressive, the SPD’s 
Abteilung IV is still better staffed than Labour’s International Unit, where two persons 
were dealing with EU policy, but not full-time.  
According to Thomas Vaupel (interviewed on 08/07/2009), Abteilung IV is well-
connected to the Foreign Ministry’s European policy unit, but the relationship is an 
informal one: 
This relationship isn’t necessarily institutionalised. We occasionally go 
for lunch; we meet up when there is something on the agenda, or call each 
other on the phone. It happens very regularly, but there is no 
institutionalised working group.   
Although Abteilung IV was comparatively well-staffed, ministries have greater 
resources, expertise and contacts to the European institutions. Hence, when the SPD 
was in government, European policy was mainly formulated by the relevant ministries 
(see Chapter 4 for more details). This was confirmed by Thomas Vaupel (interviewed 
on 08/07/2009):  
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The party leader cannot coordinate European policy alone. He needs 
support. We are his suppliers, but it’s mostly the Foreign Ministry, which 
is better resourced. I believe that at the moment we will no longer be in 
government, the political work of the department and the [Willy Brandt] 
Haus more generally, will become more important than it is at this point 
in time. 
Of the three parties, the SPD had the biggest international department when it was in 
office. It was also the best-resourced party. In opposition it had to cut down the 
number of staff. Paradoxically, however - if the PS can be taken as an example - 
international departments play a more important role when the party is in opposition. 
With the party leadership no longer relying on the civil service, the international 
department becomes a hub of the party’s EU network.  
 
7.4 The Party Group’s role in European Policy-Making 
Members of Parliament sitting on the European Affairs Committee or other 
committees are also EU experts and could play an active role in the three parties’ EU 
policy-making process. Yet, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the House of 
Commons, Assemblée Nationale and Bundestag are not the environment in which 
party groups Europeanise. 
Indeed, in the case of the Labour Party, the influence of the party group on the 
party’s European policy was very limited when the party was in government. 
Labour’s Members of the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) tended to support the 
government’s EU policy. Additionally, Labour MPs were sitting on backbench 
committees on European affairs. These committees, however, have no decision-
making power and ‘really only act as a debating society for those (few) with an 
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interest in European matters’ (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 64). The EU scrutiny powers 
of the House of Commons are relatively weak and EU debates in the House of 
Commons are rather rare due to the government's firm control over the parliamentary 
process. There were only a handful of Labour MPs showing interest in EU policy. The 
most prominent were Denis MacShane and Gisela Stuart. MacShane was Minister for 
Europe (2002-2005) and represented Labour at the PES presidency. He was one of the 
more well-known and longer-serving Ministers and known for his very pro-
integrationist views. Gisela Stuart was a steering committee member of the European 
Convention whose task it was to write the European Constitutional Treaty. Both MPs 
made public statements on EU topics and issued press releases, but their influence on 
Labour’s EU policy should not be overestimated. Labour’s parliamentary party staff 
did however entertain close links to the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) 
staff and met up regularly. However, as EPLP official Brian Duggan (interviewed on 
14/09/2009) explains, MPs and MEPs rather keep informal contacts at regional level, 
especially during election campaigns.  
In a similar vein, the PS’ party group was not much involved in the party’s 
European policy-making. The general weakness of the French Parliament is reflected 
in the weakness of the parliamentary parties: the extra-parliamentary party tends to be 
far more influential in the policy-making process (Thiébault and Dolez, 2000). As a 
consequence, becoming an EU specialist in Parliament is not an attractive career path 
for French politicians. Prime Minister Jospin tried to involve Parliament more and on 
13
th
 December 1999 wrote a circular to his cabinet ministers, reminding them of 
taking Parliament’s resolutions into account when negotiating policies at European 
level (Grajetzky, 2002: 18, quoted by Krell, 2009: 357). This goes to show that most 
of the time, Parliament’s influence on the government’s European policy was 
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marginal. This can also be explained by the fact that in France - unlike in Britain - 
ministers are not members of Parliament. Pierre Moscovici, the Socialist minister for 
Europe did not report to Parliament but took his instructions from government. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 6, the SPD’s party group has set up a working 
group dealing with EU affairs (Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union) during the 1990s. Members of this group are: 
 MPs sitting on the EU affairs committee and/or expert committees;  
 Members of the European Parliament (who due to schedule overlaps do not 
attend meetings very often); 
 The representative of the SPD party group in the Bundestag’s Brussels office; 
 The representative of the SPD’s EP liaison office in Berlin;  
 Officials from the party headquarters’ international department (Abteilung IV); 
 A representative of the Foreign Ministry’s European department (when the 
Foreign Minister is a SPD politician); 
 A representative of the German trade union federation Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB);  
 Representatives of the Länder governments (who all have liaison offices in 
Berlin).  
On its website (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 2005-2009) the working group describes its 
role as follows: 
On the one hand, the working group prepares European policy decisions - 
on topics such as EU enlargement - for the entire party group. On the 
other hand, it coordinates the SPD group’s positions on European crosscut 
topics such as the services directive.  
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Between 2005 and 2009, MdB Axel Schäfer was chair of this working group. At the 
same time he was the party group’s spokesperson for EU affairs. Sebastian Gröning, 
coordinator of the working group (interviewed on 14/07/2009) explains:  
it is also our role to communicate European matters to the entire party 
group – even if it creates a certain overlap with the vice chairman of the 
party group’s role.  
It needs to be highlighted that the SPD was the only party group in the Bundestag to 
have a vice chairman dealing exclusively with European policy. Since 2002, Dr. 
Angelica Schwall-Düren has fulfilled this role. With both Schwall-Düren and Schäfer 
holding important EU policy-related posts, there existed a ‘double executive’ in the 
SPD’s parliamentary group (Freitag, 2008: 59). Both politicians met regularly to 
coordinate their activities and find a common line.  
Whilst the EU working group of the Vorstand and the international department 
get involved in the more politicised issues, the SPD’s parliamentary EU working 
group works on day-to-day EU legislation. This is essentially a reactive exercise 
(Sloam, 2005) as the EAC depended on the government for information and expertise.  
It needs to be stressed that in Germany, political parties make use of much larger 
parliamentary research staff than parties in many other Member States of the 
European Union (Paterson, 1981: 231) including Britain and France. In her 
comparative study of the Europeanisation of party groups in the Bundestag between 
2005 and 2009, Freitag (2008: 59) lists 250 people working for the SPD party group: 
110 research assistants (Referenten), 50 administrators and 90 secretaries. Out of this 
number, 6 ¼ research assistants, 4 ¾ administrators and 2 secretaries were working on 
European issues. Amongst them, two research assistants, one administrator and one 
secretary were working for Dr. Schwall-Düren’s office. 3 ¼ research assistants, three 
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administrators and a secretary were working for the SPD’s EU working group which 
was chaired by Axel Schäfer. The SPD moreover employed one assistant and a 
secretary in its Bundestag liaison office in Brussels, which was subordinated to Mrs 
Schwall-Düren. Hence, as a party in government, the SPD’s parliamentary group was 
relatively well staffed to deal with European policy.  
The SPD‘s MPs sitting on the European affairs committee (and hence the 
working group) played a certain role in the SPD’s European policy-making process 
when the party was in office between 1998 and 2009. They might not have been key 
players, but in some instances they were able to influence the government’s European 
policy. One example was the party group’s influence on the EU directive on services 
in the internal market. However, according to Schwall-Düren (interviewed on 
18/06/2010) this was an ‘informal process without formal resolutions’. The party 
group’s potential to influence government probably lay in the fact that one of the most 
prominent MPs involved in EU affairs – Dr. Schwall-Düren – also sat on the SPD’s 
executive committee (Vorstand) where she could push forward the party group’s 
positions. Hence, this overlap of personnel helped the party group to contribute to the 
government’s European policy.  
 
 
7.5 The Members of the European Parliament’s role in European Policy-Making  
The three parties’ most obvious EU experts are the Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). In theory, all three parties have recognised the increasing power 
of the European Parliament in the past two decades by including MEPs into their 
executive committees ex officio. Generally, however, MEPs are still not considered 
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key players in the parties’ EU policy-making process. For this study, 16 MEPs have 
been interviewed: 2 from Labour, 6 from the PS, and 8 from the SPD.  
 The SPD and PS did not give their MEPs voting instructions, as will be 
explained later. Labour however introduced the so-called ‘link system’ under Tony 
Blair, which was still in place in 2009. In order to gain a more effective control over 
the MEPs’ voting behaviour whilst at the same time benefitting from their EU 
expertise, Blair’s team created a formal relationship of policy coordination between 
themselves and Labour MEPs. In the beginning, it was a system of carrots and sticks, 
which rewarded MEPs with increased influence over EU policy-making at national 
level, but limited their independence of vote within the EP (Messmer, 2003).  
Under the link system, a ministry appoints MEPs to sit on the appropriate cabinet-
level, ministerial team according to their policy expertise. To make Labour’s 
European policy and discourse more coherent, a European Parliamentary Labour 
official works at 10 Downing Street to coordinate the work between Labour’s MEPs 
and government. EPLP official Brian Duggan (iinterviewed on 14/09/2009) explains: 
When a Labour Minister is delivering a speech on a key European issue, 
every MEP will know exactly what is going on. So this will be tied very 
closely together so we have a narrative that works from local to national to 
European level.  
According to Messmer (2003: 206) the link system has created a Labour Party ‘team’ 
approach to European policy, encompassing its MEPs and its frontbenchers. However, 
if Labour’s MEPs have gained influence over the government’s EU policy between 
1997 and 2010, they also lost independence. To create a sanctioning mechanism for 
disloyal MEPs, the Labour government changed the UK’s EP electoral system to a 
‘closed list proportional representation system’ for the 1999 EP elections. It gave 
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Labour’s national party machine a certain amount of control over the selection and list 
rank order of all Labour MEP candidates and allowed the party leadership to punish 
disloyal or unruly MEPs by placing them further down the electoral list than they 
would otherwise have been. Party members’ criticism led to a change in the selection 
procedures, and since 2004, this sanction has been removed (Carter and Ladrech, 
2007: 66). The link system was particularly appealing to the Labour government 
because it seemed to have enabled the party leadership to avoid situations in which 
government ministers negotiate one position in the Council, but MEPs support a 
different position in the EP. Since 2004, however, the link mechanism offers much 
more ‘of a carrot than a stick: while it offers MEPs the opportunity to be more 
involved in their party’s policy-making, they do little to discipline or sanction unruly 
or rebellious MEPs’ (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 67). It can hence be concluded that 
since 1997, Labour’s MEPs have become more involved in the party’s European 
policy-making process.  
The PS, in contrast, had no formal link system established between the party 
headquarters and its MEPs, neither in government nor in opposition.  
However, between 2004 and 2009, at least 6 out of 18 MEPs were at the same time 
national secretaries, which gave them the opportunity to retain close links with 
Solférino, the party headquarters. One example is Henri Weber, who is MEP (since 
2004) and at the same time national secretary in charge of globalisation. He argues 
that because of this double function, he is more regularly in touch with the party 
leadership, Members of the National Assembly and Senate (interviewed on 
03/07/2009). Bernard Poignant, MEP between 1999 and 2009 (interviewed on 
09/07/2009) is more critical and argues:  
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MEPs were almost too much involved in the party leadership. Out of 31 
MEPs, 10 or 12 were national secretaries, so the links were significant. 
However, after the difficult referendum [on the EU constitutional treaty, 
I.H.], the primaries and presidential elections, the PS delegation to the EP 
was divided.  
Hence, even if MEPs were national secretaries, their divisions made them weaker as a 
group vis-à-vis the party headquarters. Kader Arif, MEP since 2004, contradicts 
Poignant and argues that even if many MEPs (including himself) are national 
secretaries, there is still too much distance between the EP and Solférino. Arif 
(interviewed on 05/10/2009) states: 
I believe that the French Socialists need to make progress in this regard, 
especially when you look at the role played by MEPs within the SPD, and 
in particular Martin Schulz. The role he plays within the SPD is a very 
strong one when it comes to European policy-making.  
Most scholars agree with Ladrech (2007: 99) that the PS’ MEPs, despite having been 
in high-level positions in the European Parliament (committee chairs or socialist 
group presidency) did not gain influence within the party at national level. As all six 
MEPs interviewed confirmed, the party leadership normally does not give them 
voting instructions; only on key decisions of historical importance such as the 
adoption of the Euro or EU enlargement (interview with Pervenche Bérès, MEP on 
06/10/2009). The reason being - according to Bérès - that the party leadership trusts 
the MEPs:  
The majority of delegation members are naturally part of the same faction 
as the party leadership, so this [trust] seems quite normal.  
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Sylvie Guillaume (MEP, interviewed on 06/10/2009) is more critical in her 
assessment and describes this phenomenon as ‘trust and distance’.  
Bérès  (interviewed on 06/10/2009) remembers that when the PS was in government, 
MEPs sometimes contacted both the government and the party headquarters for 
guidance before they voted in the EP ‘in order not to bring the government into 
difficulties when it had written a petition for the sake of compromise in the Council’. 
Hence, in some cases, MEPs were more cautious in their voting behaviour when the 
PS was in government, yet no formal link system was set up. Overall, Solférino did 
not seem to draw on the MEPs’ policy expertise very often. Only on very rare 
occasions were MEPs consulted by the party leadership– and this applied to times 
when the PS was in government and opposition. According to Bérès, examples of 
consultation were highly politicised issues such as the directive on services in the 
internal market, when MEPs were in high demand at national level. Bérès explains 
this phenomenon, stating:  
Broadly, European issues are communicated by the national secretariat 
which reports our [the MEPs’] activities. And with regards to the technical 
issues I deal with, such as economic and financial questions or 
employment questions, the first ones to tackle those issues within the 
party are the ones at national level. Not really the Europeans.  
All six socialist MEPs interviewed for this study confirmed that they were rarely 
consulted by the party headquarters, and that EU policy was generally made at 
Solférino. At the same time, their expertise seems to be more demanded at 
constituency level where they get invited to speak about certain aspects of European 
policy. Whilst the PS’ MEPs are rarely involved in the party’s EU policy-making 
process, the group of MEPs sitting on the national executive usually makes 
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contributions to early drafts of national and European election manifestoes. However, 
even when it comes to European matters, the key actors in the process of manifesto 
writing remains the party leadership which ‘constructs a final document from the 
contributions of the various factions’ (Ladrech, 2007: 97). The international secretary 
is part of the team who goes over the final text.  
Prime Minister Jospin tried to involve the MEPs more into the European 
policy-making process. Shortly before the European elections in 1999, the PS 
organised its third extraordinary party conference on EU affairs within five years. The 
organisers of this conference, which was entitled ‘Nation – Europe’ were MEPs and 
party officials.  During the conference, divisions between the party in government and 
activists became apparent. For example, motions brought forward by activists during 
the conference were far less pragmatic than the government’s European policy, 
calling for an EU-wide 35 hours week
11
 and minimum wage - recalling the PS’ 
rhetoric in times of opposition (Wielgoβ, 2002: 100-101). This goes to show that the 
involvement of party activists in EU policy-making is not always easy for the 
government. Nevertheless, the involvement of the party was more important for 
Jospin than for Mitterrand (Krell, 2009; Cole, 2001). François Mitterrand, like most of 
his predecessors, subordinated the party when it came to policy formation, personnel 
selection, policy selection and electoral campaigning (Clift, 2005: 225). Jospin has 
been characterised as a more inclusive leader who made a point of formally 
associating the party leadership, party group and the EP delegation with preparing the 
                                                          
11
 The 35-hour working week - the 'Loi Aubry', named after Minister of Work Martine Aubry - was 
adopted at national level by the Jospin government in 2000. The reduction of the working week from 
39 to 35 hours also involved reducing employers’ social contributions with the aim of creating jobs. 
For a detailed discussion of the Loi Aubry, see Clift (2003; 168-172).  
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French EU presidency of July-December 2000 (Cole, 2001: 22). Overall, however, 
MEPs were not well integrated into the party. Henri Nallet, international secretary 
under Jospin and at the same time vice-president of the PES (interviewed on 
18/06/2009) explains: 
The MEPs were men and women who were parked in Brussels without 
any relationship to the party. Every once in a while we invited a MEP to 
speak about a certain directive at national bureau meetings. But this 
wasn’t a priority. 
The situation has not changed much since 2002. Even in opposition, MEPs and MPs 
did not meet very often. Exceptions are party congresses (taking place every three 
years) and ‘journées parlementaires’ (parliamentary days), taking place every 
autumn. As Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) explains: 
Every time we [MEPs and MPs] meet, we criticise our lack of 
cooperation, but we still haven’t found a solution. Each assembly has its 
own calendar. It happens sometimes, in the case of specific texts, such as 
the debate on the services directive, when the issues discussed at 
European level will affect the national level in a highly politicised 
manner. At that point there is a well-organised interaction. 
Sylvie Guillaume, MEP (interviewed on 06/10/2009) confirms this lack of regular 
cooperation between MPs and MEPs and criticises the lack of visibility of MEPs 
during parliamentary days: 
Last week the PS delegation had a parliamentary day at Toulouse together 
with the party groups of National Assembly and Senate. I think we looked 
a bit like a subgroup… as if we were not a group in its own right. 
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The problem is also recognised by Solférino. Maurice Braud (PS party official, 
interviewed on 22/06/2009) acknowledges that MPs, being in the majority, dominate 
the agenda of parliamentary days, ‘so it becomes too difficult to Europeanise the 
debate’.  
Robert Ladrech (2007) posits that French politicians generally pay little 
attention to the activities of the European Parliament, as there is a long-standing 
preference of intergovernmental action at the European level. He moreover writes that 
‘the activities of MEPs have been ignored, at least among the party membership and 
mid-level leadership bodies’ (2007: 100). In addition, since the French parliament is 
already in a weak position vis-à-vis the executive, many MPs regard the European 
Parliament as an ‘unwelcome competitor for legitimacy’ (Ladrech, 2007: 99). It can 
thus be concluded that MEPs only played a minor role in the PS’ process of European 
policy-making between 1997 and 2009. They got involved in highly politicised issues, 
but day-to-day EU policy was made by the party leadership at Solférino.  
The SPD leadership’s relationship with its MEPs is similar to the one of the 
PS, but with one notable exception. As explained earlier in this chapter, Martin Schulz 
(MEP and leader of the S & D group in the European Parliament) was member of the 
Vorstand ex officio and an elected member of the Präsidium, which was a novelty in 
SPD history. In the 2009 European election campaign he was the party’s top 
candidate and was later made the party’s official EU adviser. According to long-
standing MEP Barbara Weiler (interviewed on 05/10/2009) Schulz’ role as EU 
adviser and membership of the Präsidium should not be treated as something 
exceptional, but taken for granted:  
Members of the European Parliament are obviously the ones knowing 
most about the EU and what is going on at the moment.  
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With Martin Schulz, at least one MEP is represented at the highest level of the party 
organisation. It is the result of a long struggle for recognition. Jan Kreutz, a PES 
official (interviewed on 15/06/2009) argues that it was only possible because of 
Schulz’ rootedness in the domestic party organisation: 
In the SPD Martin Schulz plays a crucial role. He is amongst the top 10 of 
the party leadership. But he plays this role not only because he is the chair 
of the S & D group in the EP, but because he is deeply rooted at 
grassroots level and has retained a close relationship with his regional 
party in North Rhine-Westphalia and still does a lot of work at home. 
Thus, Martin Schulz acts as a bridge between the Willy-Brandt-Haus and the 
European Parliament. He also represents the SPD at PES presidency meetings and is 
one of the few MEPs to have taken over this role within the PES.  
MEPs are invited to the Europa Kommission and the parliamentary EU working 
group, but rarely attend due to overlapping working schedules. Links between the 
Willy-Brandt-Haus and the SPD’s two leading MEPs (Martin Schulz and Bernhard 
Rapkay, who is the leader of the SPD delegation in the EP) were close and regular, 
whilst most other MEPs entertained close links to their constituency, but not to the 
party headquarters.  
Contacts between MPs and MEPs are irregular and informal, often based on 
personal contacts. For example, many MEPs are in touch with the MPs from their 
constituency. MEP Barbara Weiler (interviewed on 05/10/2009) explains that contacts 
with MPs are mostly spontaneous and initiated by herself rather than the MPs. This 
was confirmed by three other MEPs. Some MEPs, like Jutta Haug, were in regular 
contact with members of the regional parliament, especially because they had an 
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official function at the regional party level. Asked about her European network within 
the SPD, Haug (interviewed on 07/10/2009) states: 
I cannot say that I have a European network within the party. Because I 
think that overall, our party is by far not Europeanised enough. In my 
opinion, everything that happens at the EU level in terms of legislation 
etc. has not yet reached the minds of the Members of the Bundestag, 
Members of the regional Parliaments or party members.’ 
In sum, with the exception of the two ‘leading’ MEPs Martin Schulz and Bernhard 
Rapkay, the SPD leadership made very little use of the MEPs’ EU expertise. Martin 
Schulz was a member of the Vorstand and Präsidium and could bring in the MEP’s 
perspective. It has to be kept in mind, however, that when the SPD was in government 
EU policy was primarily made in the relevant ministries and not the party 
headquarters. Therefore, MEPs were not able to be key players in the EU policy-
making process.  
 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the Europeanisation of EU policy-making within 
the Labour Party, SPD and PS. A Europeanised policy-making process was described 
as one in which not only the top leadership and their advisers are involved, but also 
the broader party organisation. It was argued that top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation of the party organisation only take place if different levels of the 
party contribute to the making of EU policy. This includes formal policy-making 
bodies such as party conferences, national executive committees, and policy forums, 
as well as MPs and MEPs.  
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This chapter has found that within the three parties, a small circle of party 
leaderships and their EU advisers were the key actors in the European policy-making 
process. European policy was government policy, whilst the formal policy-making 
bodies were marginalised in the formulation of European policy. Even when the 
parties were in opposition, as the example of the PS suggests, the formulation of EU 
policy was left to a narrow circle of party elites. A Europeanised process of EU 
policy-making involving the broader party organisation therefore remains wishful 
thinking.  
These findings do not come as a total surprise, given that party leaders have 
always dominated in the formulation of policy, and that the increasing centralisation 
of the party organisation is likely to accelerate this trend. Furthermore, we know that 
EU policy tends to be very technical in nature, and that - in contrast to the party 
organisation – party elites in government and highly specialised civil servants have 
access to the expertise needed to deal with it. The broader implications for the parties’ 
internal democracy should however worry Labour, the PS and SPD. As the party 
organisation is not enough involved in the making of European policy, decisions made 
by the leadership might not reflect the membership’s preferences. In the long term, the 
broader party organisation could lack the knowledge and expertise to lead well-
informed EU parliamentary election campaigns, and EU policy might become even 
less salient in domestic politics. The party organisation could be expected to show less 
and less interest in EU policy – which can become detrimental for essentially pro-
European parties like Labour, the SPD and PS. 
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Chapter 8: The Europeanisation of European election campaigns  
 
Campaigning is one of the main activities political parties engage in, and election 
campaigns can tell us a great deal about a party’s Europeanisation. This chapter 
examines the 2009 European parliamentary election campaigns of the Labour Party, 
the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The 2009 
campaigns were chosen for a number of reasons. First of all, when would parties 
prioritise their European policies, if not during European election campaigns? These 
campaigns should thus be an indicator of the parties’ Europeanisation. Secondly, at 
the time of the elections, Labour and SPD were still in government whilst the PS was 
in opposition for already seven years. This contrast should be reflected in the parties’ 
campaign strategies and ultimately demonstrate whether parties Europeanise 
differently when they are in government or opposition. Thirdly, for the first time, the 
Party of European Socialists (PES) had a headquarters separate from the S & D party 
group in the European Parliament and their own campaigns budget. This could have 
led to a stronger involvement of the PES in national campaigns, and ultimately, 
increased the degrees of Europeanisation of the three national campaigns.   
This chapter analyses the 2009 European election campaigns of the the Labour 
Party, PS and SPD in connection with the one led by the Party of European Socialists 
(PES). Applying the concept of Europeanisation to the 2009 campaign, it creates an 
ideal type of Europeanised election campaign. The underlying argument is that a 
Europeanised party organisation leads Europeanised election campaigns in which the 
politicians speak about EU topics and involve the PES. In turn, Europeanised election 
campaigns contribute to the Europeanisation of the party organisation. It is a 
bidirectional process with a feedback loop.   
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8.1 A Brief Literature Review  
Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, European election 
campaigns have been fought primarily at national level, organised and lead by 
national parties. This is not surprising, considering that national parties put together 
the lists of candidates, formulate election manifestoes and fund the campaigns. One of 
the consequences is that European Parliament elections are used as mid-term contests 
for national parties to win national government office. There is an extensive literature 
focusing on the lack of ‘Europeanness’ of European elections (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004; Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 2007; Franklin, 
2006). Another body of literature analyses national election campaign strategies in 
different Member States of the European Union (EU) (Bicchi, Blondel and Svensson, 
2003; Tenscher, 2005; Carlson and Strandberg, 2005; Niedermayer, 2005; Maier and 
Tenscher, 2009) because electoral campaigns work differently in each Member State. 
Indeed, ‘to speak about an “election campaign” in the singular when referring to 
European Parliament elections is an audacious choice’, as Gerstlé (2007) points out. 
The fact that most national political parties are members of ‘Europarties’ has received 
far less attention (the exceptions being: Day and Shaw, 2006; Chan, 2005; Raunio, 
2005; Moschonas, 2002; Smith, 1996). A Europarty can be defined as an 
institutionalised form of party organisation at the EU level that has seen a partial 
transfer of sovereignty from national member parties (Johansson and Zervakis 2002). 
However, the question if Europarties are political parties is contested. In the past, 
parties have only existed at the domestic level where they fulfil specific roles: vote-
seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Some scholars argue that Europarties 
cannot be regarded as parties in the traditional sense but as loose coalitions of national 
parties (Marsh and Norris, 1997) while others believe that Europarties need to be 
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interpreted within the context of the EU (Hix, 1993; Ladrech, 1993). The reason why 
the campaign literature focuses on the national level is that in the past, Europarties 
had neither the financial nor organisational means to organise large-scale pan-
European campaigns. They depended financially and organisationally upon their party 
group in the European Parliament which brings together the members of the 
Europarties’ national member parties and can be viewed as the parliamentary party. 
Although linked to their party group in the European Parliament, Europarties like the 
PES are distinct entities.   
8.2 Europeanisation and European Election Campaigns  
Europeanisation has never been systematically applied to European election 
campaigns, and at first sight this idea might seem paradoxical: would not an election 
campaign to the European Parliament be Europeanised by nature? For the purpose of 
this chapter, the definition given by Radaelli (2000: 3) is most useful. He defines 
Europeanisation as: 
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of 
doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies.  
However, the multidirectional aspect of Europeanisation is not emphasised in this 
definition. After all, a Europeanised election campaign would be a complex, 
multidirectional process in which national parties upload their national and European 
policy paradigms, values, knowledge and campaigning experience to the Europarties. 
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The latter, in turn, download their ‘European’ campaigning experience and policy 
expertise to the national level while also providing national parties with European 
networks. Moreover, sister parties from different EU Member States can Europeanise 
each other through campaign exchanges or policy learning processes. A Europeanised 
election campaign would therefore entail a constant dialogue between Europarties and 
their national member parties; an exchange of information, ideas and experience in all 
directions. Putting this concept into practise, it is argued that the interlinked 
prerequisites of a Europeanised election campaign would be: increased campaign 
funding; a campaign focussing on European topics; a widely supported and used 
common European election manifesto; close cooperation between the Europarties and 
their member parties at different levels of the party organisation; and a common 
candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.  
8.3 The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections: the case of the PES 
8.3.1 Campaign Funding 
If Europarties and their national member parties want to fight a successful, modern, 
awareness-raising campaign, they need to have adequate resources and funding. The 
quality of campaigning is certainly linked to voter turnout, which in European 
elections is continuously decreasing.  
For the Europarties, the funding situation has changed fundamentally over the 
last years. The fact that in 2009 the PES was able to lead an election campaign 
independently from its group in the European Parliament is a new and important 
development which is the result of the Europarties’ lobbying for constitutional 
recognition and funding regulation.  
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The European Parliament has achieved constitutional recognition of the 
Europarties in the Treaty as well as binding regulations on party funding. This has 
been a long, still ongoing process, starting in the 1990s with the inclusion of the Party 
Article into the Maastricht Treaty. The latter, however, specified neither the funding 
of Europarties nor their role in European elections and particularly in the nomination 
procedures, and can therefore be interpreted as an ‘incomplete contract’ (Johansson 
and Raunio, 2005: 522). Ever since, the Europarties kept up the pressure for a revision 
of the article. In 2003, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation 
which would lay out the rules for Europarty funding. This binding regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003) entered into force before the European elections in 
June 2004 and the rules of party funding applied from the date of the opening of the 
first session of the newly elected EP, although it took until October for the EP to 
distribute the funds (Lightfoot, 2006: 307). The regulation defines political parties at 
the European level and gives clear rules for party finance. The amount of money 
Europarties receive each year is now set from the general budget of the European 
Parliament. Therefore, the EP can increase the amount without Council approval. The 
clarification of their financial situation had an important impact on the activities of the 
Europarties and their internal organisation. In the past, the PES’ organisational and 
logistical infrastructure was very slight, which was an index of the party’s ‘weak 
institutionalisation’ (Moschonas, 2002: 270). The secretariat (or headquarters) 
depended on the parliamentary group.  The regulation’s requirement for the 
Europarties to obtain a legal basis in a EU member state meant that they had to move 
into an office outside the European Parliament buildings and could no longer ‘borrow’ 
staff from the parliamentary group. All Europarties now have a permanent salaried 
staff, and this break with the European Parliament has significantly increased the 
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number of professional party workers. All the staff currently working for the PES has 
only been employed since the adoption of the regulation. In 2007, the regulation has 
been amended to clarify one crucial aspect: from the EP election campaign in 2009 
onwards, Europarties could use the money from the EP budget to fund their electoral 
campaigns. In the past, party regulation specifically banned EP funds from being used 
to fund national election campaigns. The funding situation is transparent, as 
Europarties need to publish their accounts at the end of each year listing the different 
sources of income and all categories of expenditure in detail.
12
 Not so surprisingly, the 
grant given by the European Parliament has increased over the years, from € 
2.580.000 in 2006 to € 3.100.000 in 2009, so approximately 17 per cent in a period of 
three years. All Europarties rely heavily on this grant, which is their biggest source of 
income. The PES has spent € 188.521 for the 2009 election campaign, which 
compared to some of the PES’ member parties is a very low budget. However, 
compared to general elections, European campaign budgets tend to be much lower, as 
the case of the SPD illustrates (see table 8.1).  
 
                                                          
12
 The Budgets 2006-2008 are available on the website of the PES. See: http://www.pes.org/en/pes-
action/pes-documents/other-documents (22/09/2009).  
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Table 8.1: Campaign budgets of the SPD in 2004, 2005 and 2009  
Type of election, year  Campaign Budget of the SPD in € 
General elections    2005 almost 24.000.000
13
 
European elections  2004 12.500.000
14
 
General elections    2009 27.000.000
15
 
European elections  2009 9.000.000
16
 
 
While the PES Secretariat had a permanent staff of 20, it increased during the 
electoral campaign 2009 to around 34 (including trainees and voluntaries). This is a 
significant progress, but still a very small number of people compared to some 
national parties’ headquarters. For example, in 2009 the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) employed a total of around 180 people in its headquarters (while in 
government), and the Labour Party employed 80 people. Most striking is the fact that 
in 2009, the ‘Superwahljahr’ where local (in some regions only), European, and 
federal elections all took place; the SPD spent three times more on its federal 
campaign than on the European campaign. As Maier and Tenscher (2009: 23) point 
out, all German parties have reduced their campaign expenditures radically for 
European elections in the past, which had various consequences for the organisation 
and conduct of the campaigns. This clearly indicates that European elections continue 
                                                          
13
 http://www.tagesschau.de (07/05/2009)  ‘Europawahl 2009: Wie die Parteien im Web werben’.  
Author: Christian Radler.  
14
 Maier and Tenscher (2009), p. 23.  
15
 Die Welt (19/09/2009) ’62 Millionen Euro: Steuerzahlerbund geißelt hohe Wahlkampfkosten’. 
Available at: http://www.welt.de/politik/bundestagswahl/article4569370/Steuerzahlerbund-geisselt-
hohe-Wahlkampfkosten.html (19/10/2009) 
16
 http://www.tagesschau.de (07/05/2009)  ‘Europawahl 2009: Wie die Parteien im Web werben’. 
Author: Christian Radler.  
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to be treated as the ‘poor cousins’ of federal elections. It could be argued that 9 
Million Euros is a surprisingly high budget for second order elections, given that a 
federal election was in the offing. Yet in the case of the SPD, the European elections 
on June 7
th
 were treated as a ‘warm up’ for the general elections on September 27 th.  
The Labour Party spent a total of £2.302.244 on its European election 
campaign, thus less than a third of the SPD’s budget.17 Whilst it was the party 
leadership’s strategy to lead a low key European campaign with little focus on EU 
issues, the comparatively low campaign budget must also be interpreted in the context 
of Labour’s general financial malaise.  
To sum up, the PES could for the first time lead an independent campaign in the 
2009 European elections, although its campaign budget was very low compared to 
those of its biggest member parties. It amounted to approximately 2 per cent of the 
SPD’s budget. Under those conditions, top-down Europeanisation is difficult to 
imagine. Rather, the ‘richer’ member parties such as SPD and Labour relied on their 
own budgets, manifestoes, slogans and branding. 
8.3.2 A campaign focussing on European topics  
A Europeanised election campaign would focus on ‘European’ topics, that is, topics 
which are or should be in the sphere of control of the European institutions. At least, 
these topics should have a European dimension. However, it is obvious that a 
‘European debate’ every five years and only during the election campaign cannot lead 
                                                          
17
 For the Labour Party’s 2009 European election campaign budget, see : 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/83460/Labour-party-return-
2009.pdf  
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to a Europeanised campaign. After the electoral defeat, PES President Rasmussen 
(2009) concluded on his blog that the voters ‘simply didn’t see the relevance of these 
elections. They did not see the political choices at European level - perhaps not 
surprising since these elections were mainly fought over national political disputes’.  
An analysis of the three campaigns’ content can only confirm Rasmussen’s statement. 
Indeed, most of the debates were not Europeanised. Moreover, the three parties did 
not share the same views and concerns, which lead to three very different campaigns. 
Ideological divergence within the PES is hardly a new phenomenon, and PES 
manifestoes traditionally represent continental social democracy (Moschonas, 2002: 
275).  In the 1994 EP election campaign, Labour had to ditch the PES manifesto as its 
commitment to the 35h week was seized upon by the Tories and the press (Lightfoot, 
2005: 73). In 2009, trying to avoid this situation, the Labour Party negotiated the PES 
manifesto ‘with greatest attention to the detail’ (Duggan, 2009: 11).  
Labour’s local and European election campaign lacked funding and visibility, 
and a European debate was missing. Party officials and MEPs blamed this lack of 
Europeanness on an expenses scandal among MPs in the House of Commons, which 
overshadowed the campaign. Labour, as the party of government, was under attack. 
The Guardian (14/05/2009) wrote that during the EP campaign launch event, in 
private, ‘cabinet ministers admitted their two major campaign themes - the need to 
end isolation in Europe and the government success in limiting the recession's impact 
- were going to be lost in the noise’.  In an interview, Labour MEP Derek Vaughn, 
(interviewed on 03/02/2010) stated:  
Unfortunately, the Westminster expenses scandal dominated the debate. 
We wanted to talk more about European economic issues and European 
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structural funds. But well, we did talk about the economy, about 
investment in education and the environment.  
Richard Corbett, the other Labour MEP interviewed for this study, confirmed that the 
Westminster expenses scandal dominated the debate (27/01/2010).  
However, the party leadership did nothing to Europeanise the campaign, and the result 
was an invisible, defensive campaign. While a party-wide EP campaign was lacking, 
MPs and MEPs arranged their own local campaign activity around PES campaign 
days or independently. As usual during election campaigns in the UK, MEPs and 
activists knocked on doors, organised telephone canvassing and distributed leaflets. 
The Labour Party hosted a PES campaign exchange and an ECOSY (Young European 
Socialists) campaign session. Mostly, MEPs and MEP-candidates campaigned 
together with local party activists and politicians who ‘are often closer to the people in 
their constituency’ (Interview with MEP candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm on 
22/01/2010).  
The SPD’s European election campaign was from the beginning perceived as a 
warm-up for the federal elections on September 27
th
 2009. The European, federal, and 
in some regions even regional and local election campaigns were fought at the same 
time, which is one of the main reasons why the debate was not Europeanised. Another 
part of the problem was the slogan ‘Social Europe’. Long-standing MEP Bernhard 
Rapakay, who is the SPD’s delegation leader to the European Parliament, 
(interviewed on 07/10/2009) stressed:  
For the first time it wasn’t a purely national election. We preached social 
Europe, so the debate was necessarily European. However it looked as if 
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we had a social Germany, but no social Europe. And with hindsight, the 
topic was quite abstract.  
The point is that ‘Social Europe’ has always been a vague and abstract slogan, one 
that is difficult to discuss with the voters because of its diffuse meaning. It has been 
chosen by the PES to ‘take refuge in rhetoric’ as Moschonas (2009: 177) remarks. The 
SPD’s credibility as a supporter of a social Europe had suffered in the past years. In 
government between 1998 and 2005, the SPD under Gerhard Schröder’s pragmatic 
chancellorship was very hesitant to support social legislation at EU level, which 
caused major rifts with the PS (Wielgoß, 2002: 74-112). In 2009, being the junior 
partner in a great coalition with the Christian Democrats, selling ‘Social Europe’ to 
the voters was no easy task for the SPD which had lost many of its core voters due to 
labour market and pension system reforms. It is hence not surprising that ‘Social 
Europe’ did not dominate the SPD’s election campaign. A number of MEPs 
interviewed stressed that the debates during the campaign were more Europeanised 
than in 2004, when purely national issues such as unemployment benefits dominated 
the debate. However, none of the interviewees labelled it a Europeanised campaign. 
As in the case of Labour, the SPD leadership did little to Europeanise the debate, and 
focussed instead on national issues. The fact that Martin Schulz, leader of the socialist 
group in the European Parliament, was head of the SPD’s list and played a more 
prominent role as top candidate was evaluated positively by most MEPs, with Barbara 
Weiler stating: ’We tried to Europeanise the campaign by appointing a real front-
runner’ (05/10/2009). Kerstin Westphal (MEP, interviewed on 07/10/2009) said: 
‘Whenever I joined the campaign with Martin [Schulz] the discussions were very 
much Europeanised’, but this seems to be the exception. The SPD’s campaign 
television spot and posters were far more provocative than usual. ‘Funny and 
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polemic’, this campaign was meant to mobilise the voters, as campaign manager Kajo 
Wasserhövel (Der Spiegel, 25/04/2009) underlined. The SPD openly attacked the 
opposition parties as well as the co-governing Christian Democrats in this cartoon-like 
spot, which is an unusually provocative and confrontational strategy for a German 
election campaign. No European message or policy commitments were brought across 
in the spot and on the posters, and a link to ‘Social Europe’ was clearly missing.  
The French Socialist Party, relying on the PES manifesto, wanted to lead a 
campaign on ‘Social Europe’. Since the 1970s, the PS has been one of the most ardent 
advocates of social legislation at EU level, even though the Jospin government took a 
more pragmatic approach than many activists had hoped (Wielgoß, 2002). Party 
leader Martine Aubry, very pro-European in her outlook, was certainly engaged in 
this campaign and supported the pledges of the PES manifesto - after all, the PS relied 
exclusively on the PES manifesto.  From the beginning, however, the campaign 
focussed on attacking incumbent conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy; even the 
term ‘Anti-Sarkozysm’ was coined when Aubry called for a ‘sanction vote’ against 
the president. When this strategy proofed unsuccessful and the PS did not score well 
in surveys, Aubry called for a ‘useful vote’ and then for an ‘efficient vote’ in favour 
of the PS, trying to appear more ‘proposing rather than opposing’ (Libération, 
18/05/2009). In the end, the PS did not manage to bring its European message across, 
although some long-standing MEPs interviewed stated that their campaign was more 
about European issues than previous ones.  
To sum up, for a variety of reasons, none of the three parties led Europeanised debates 
during the 2009 election campaign. The processes of up- and downloading of policy 
issues between the PES and the three member parties was almost invisible, as the 
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three campaigns had a strong national focus. In neither France nor Germany, the 
message of a ‘Social Europe’ came across. The Labour Party did not even use the 
slogan – knowing how controversial EU social legislation was amongst the party and 
the general public. It failed to bring any European message across in its invisible 
campaign.  
8.3.3 A common European election manifesto 
In every campaign, manifestoes are the document candidates can refer to when selling 
their parties’ past achievements and future commitments. Manifestoes are important 
documents with ‘a special standing as the only collective policy statement that parties 
as such ever make, and no other resource represents the combined views of the party 
as an organisation’ (Budge, 2001: 51). Moreover, manifestoes support party 
mobilisation before elections. In a Europeanised campaign, European, national, and 
subnational manifestos would be distributed and discussed on an equal footing by 
candidates, voters and the media. The Europarties’ manifestoes can be seen as a 
symbol of transnational values and policy commitments, while national and regional 
manifestos break down European topics to the national electorate in each member 
state, focussing on national and regional concerns and priorities. 
All Europarties have common election manifestoes, formally agreed by all 
member parties. Yet, considering that Europarties are ‘broad churches’ with member 
parties of very different historical origin and political outlook, their election 
manifestoes tend to represent the lowest common denominator. In the past, they were 
written in very general and vague terms.  For the 1999 PES manifesto, any issues that 
might have given rise to disagreement (such as measures to promote employment or 
the reform of the EU budget) were either avoided or dealt with in extremely vague 
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terms. The result was a minimalist document, which could not be transformed into an 
instrument of action or an authentically European campaign (Moschonas, 2002: 276). 
For the 2009 manifesto, the PES decided to launch an open consultation process. 
Instead of drafting the manifesto amongst party leaders behind closed doors, the PES 
decided to launch an open consultation process between October 2007 and July 2008, 
allowing for both online consultations and meetings across Europe. The PES collected 
contributions not only from the national member parties, but also from trade unions, 
NGOs, affiliated political foundations and PES activists. This consultation process 
could be interpreted as a means to indirectly empower the PES. While before, the 
leadership of member parties were the sole actors involved in manifesto-writing, the 
PES has taken away this monopole and opened up the process to other actors, trying 
to create a direct link with the electorate. Has this led to a centralisation of power for 
President Rasmussen and the PES in general? It is still too early for this assumption. 
The PES has no interest in circumventing its member parties, and after all, the parties 
were heavily involved in the manifesto-writing, drafting the chapters. Moreover, the 
ratification of the manifesto is consensus-based, meaning that the national parties 
have the final say. Nevertheless, the consultation process can be interpreted as a sign 
to member parties that the PES is now capable of maintaining a direct link to the 
grassroots level. It is a weak link, but it has the potential to grow stronger. 
‘Yourspace’ – the campaign website, had 300.000 visitors, 500 posts, 100 videos, and 
the Facebook group counted 1350 members. There were more than 60 written 
contributions from PES member parties, NGOs, foundations and activists
18
. Overall, 
3000 activists from a cross-section of the PES joined the process, which involved 
                                                          
18 These are the official numbers quoted on the PES website, see: 
http://old.manifesto2009.pes.org/en/whywedoit (08/09/2009) 
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much organisational effort which in previous years the PES could not have made. 
Interviews with PES activists in Paris, Berlin and London show that at grassroots 
level, the consultation process was much appreciated. In Britain, PES activists 
together with Compass Youth (Compass is a think tank affiliated with the Labour 
Party’s left wing, and Compass Youth is their branch for young people) organised 
several meetings to collect written contributions to the manifesto. On their blog they 
appreciate ‘this creative space’ (…) and the ‘great opportunity and a great 
responsibility - to engage those around us (…) to join the debate so that we can build 
support across the European electorate because we will have reflected the needs of all 
our citizens’.19 Even if the contributions of the activists were small they could not be 
ignored by national parties.  
According to a party official, Labour’s amendments to the PES manifesto were 
‘reductionist in nature’ as the party approached the text ‘thinking that anything we 
give would be picked up and used against us’ (Duggan, 2009: 31). The PES manifesto 
practically played no role in Labour’s 2009 election campaign (see table 8.2), and one 
party official stated that after the PES manifesto negotiations ‘you end up with a deal 
to the left of Labour but you can use it to reassure the left of the party of our 
commitments on this side. It acts as a signifier to the trade unions and the Social 
Europe side of the party’ (Duggan, 2009: 32). Labour would have preferred a ‘values 
based’ text to the PES manifesto’s policy commitments which were more left-wing 
than the Labour leadership had wanted them to be.  As a consequence, Labour fought 
its campaign on the basis of its own manifesto (‘Winning the Fight for Britain’s 
future’). Finding the manifesto on the party’s website was however a challenge and it 
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http://compassyouth.blogspot.com/2008/01/compass-youth-pes-manifesto.html (09/09/2009) 
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was only added after a complaint by the European Parliamentary Labour Party 
(interview with Giampi Alhadeff on 17/06/1010). Labour’s manifesto addresses most 
of the issues tackled by the PES manifesto but puts greater emphasis on the party’s 
political achievements at EU level and Britain’s benefits of EU membership. Like in 
the past, Labour’s manifesto drew on the PES manifesto, picking up many of its 
themes and pledges, even if during the campaign it did not play a role. Asked why the 
PES manifesto was not used, Labour’s international secretary Jo Billingham  pointed 
out that the material provided by the PES was often ‘not helpful’ in the British context 
as it does not break down European issues to the local level. Labour activists, the 
official stressed, do not feel the need to discuss European integration in general, but 
focus on local issues such as funding provided by the EU (interviewed on 
24/11/2009). Yet, while the PES’ campaign material was criticised, Labour’s own 
manifesto was not used either. MEP candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm 
(interviewed on 22/01/2010) explained:  
There were only very few printed copies of Labour’s European manifesto. 
While in theory, manifestos are important, they don’t play a big role 
during the election campaign, at least not when you speak to people at 
their doors. In that case, short leaflets are more useful.  
Long-standing MEP Richard Corbett (interviewed on 27/01/2010) explained that he 
hardly ever used any manifesto during the campaign, stating:  
Well, you don’t hand out manifestoes very much during the campaign but 
when people ask you for Labour’s policies you refer to it, and also when 
the press asks you.  
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Hence, Labour hardly used its own manifesto – not to mention the one of the PES. 
Like Labour, the SPD used its own manifesto (‘SPD Europamanifest’). Party leader 
Franz Müntefering (2008) praised the PES manifesto, saying ‘the manifesto is good, 
Europe is good’. All MEPs interviewed were aware of the PES’ manifesto and had a 
positive attitude towards it – yet none of them used it. Instead, they referred 
exclusively to the SPD’s manifesto. The content of the two manifestoes is similar; 
calling for a ‘Social Europe’, a stricter regulation of the financial markets and 
combating climate change, only that the SPD highlighted some topics of national 
concern, such as the principle of subsidiarity.  
MEP Bernhard Rapkay (interviewed on 07/10/2009) said that during his campaign, 
the PES manifesto did not play a big role. However: 
For the internal mobilisation of the party, it did play a role because for the 
first time a manifesto has been discussed; at least to a certain extent. It 
[PES manifesto] was more than the bulletins we used to have.  
The SPD used its own branding for the campaign, a red cube which nevertheless 
resembled the PES cube (see Table 8.2). As PES official Jan Kreutz (interviewed on 
15/06/2009) put it:  
With the federal elections approaching, the SPD did not want to confuse 
its voters by using different logos and brandings. Also, the SPD did not 
see the added value of putting the PES’ logo on its posters because the 
voters would not notice it. Who would travel across Europe and compare?  
The PS’ campaign relied exclusively on the PES manifesto and the party put the PES 
logo on posters, campaign material and the voting bulletins (see Table 8.2). For the 
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first time, the PS did not produce a separate manifesto. Long-standing MEP 
Pervenche Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) commented:  
I don’t see how we could have been more European in our approach to 
this campaign. The PES was very present in our campaign. Unfortunately 
this did not translate into better election results. 
 PES activist Aleksander Glogowski (interviewed on 10/06/2009) said that within the 
Paris federation of the PS, more than 200 party activists contributed to the PES 
manifesto, and expectations were high. ‘That’s why we are frustrated to see that many 
party leaders in other European parties have not used the manifesto’, the activist 
stressed. The question remains why the PS was the only party of the three to have 
used the PES manifesto. MEP Kader Arif stated that the PS used the PES manifesto to 
stress the difference between the left and right. Especially after the PS’ internal 
division over the EU Constitutional Treaty and the national referendum on the same 
matter in 2005, ‘Europe was a politically very sensitive topic’ and the ‘use of the PES 
manifesto seemed to be the most European thing to do’ (interviewed on 05/10/2009). 
Perhaps more importantly, the PS has always been ideologically much closer to the 
PES than Labour. For example, it wholeheartedly supported the PES’ commitments to 
the regulation of the financial markets - which were contested amongst the Labour 
Party. Moreover, as a party of opposition, the PS could commit itself to the PES’ 
policies more easily. Last but not least, being in opposition, the PS had a lower budget 
for campaigning and less staff working at its headquarters. The use of the PES 
manifesto and logo therefore seemed to be a rational and straightforward strategy.  
Table 8.2: Use of election manifestoes and campaign material in 2009  
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National Party  Use of national 
election manifesto 
Use of PES 
manifesto  
Use of PES logo 
on posters and 
leaflets  
Labour Party National manifesto 
existed, but was not 
used 
no no 
SPD yes no no 
PS no yes yes 
 
To summarise, the 2009 PES manifesto, created in an open consultation process, had 
the potential to Europeanise national election campaigns through the mobilisation of a 
larger part of the electorate. However, top-down Europeanisation has its limits, and 
the PES cannot enforce the use of its manifesto upon its member parties. It has been 
demonstrated that for ideological and practical reasons, both Labour and the SPD 
showed little enthusiasm for the use of the common manifesto. The PS, as a party in 
opposition that is ideologically closer to the PES, could commit itself more easily to 
the PES’ policies and exclusively relied on the PES manifesto.  
8.3.4 Common Campaigning  
A Europeanised election campaign would be an integrated one: Europarties and their 
national member parties would campaign together at all levels of the party 
organisation. In practice, this would mean that PES officials, MEPs, MPs, local 
politicians as well as activists from European sister parties would together attend 
campaign rallies, television shows, debates, online chats to name but a few.  
In 2009, PES President Rasmussen campaigned in almost all 27 Member States 
alongside party leaders or MEP candidates. At local level, campaign exchanges have a 
tradition, most notably in border regions. The most interesting development however 
has been the introduction of a kind of individual PES membership, the ‘PES activists’ 
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in 2006. In the past, party members did not feel that they belonged to a Europarty, as 
contacts in the PES were limited to a narrow circle of international affairs specialists 
in the national parties and thus remained an ‘elite exercise’ (Moschonas, 2002: 271). 
The PES tried to change this through the introduction of the ‘PES activists’. Every 
member of a PES member party is automatically a PES activist, but needs to register 
online with the PES. In 2009, there were over 70 PES activist city groups all over 
Europe.
20
 On the occasion of the PES activists’ forum in 2009, President Rasmussen 
said: ‘I see our activists as the bridge-builder between the national and the European 
scene’21. For the PES, individual membership can foster increased legitimacy and 
contribute to the Europeanisation of national party organisations. The concept of 
individual membership is not new to the PES. During the 1990s the PES set up local 
associations, an example being the PES-London-Association which however failed to 
become officially recognised as a component part of the PES.  Moreover, it did not 
receive funding from either Labour or the PES (Day and Shaw, 2006: 110-111). It 
remains to be seen whether the PES activists will become an integral part of the PES 
and be embraced by its member parties. Generally, a fear of ‘capture’ of the national 
parties by the Europarties still needs to be addressed (Day and Shaw, 2006: 103). 
During the election campaign, the PES provided the activist groups with information, 
whilst giving them the freedom to organise original campaign events. Most of the 
activists’ activities were coordinated online. In France, Germany and the UK, PES 
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 A map listing all city groups and contact persons is available on the PES website, see: 
http://www.pes.org/en/pes-activists/city-groups (24/10/2009)  
21
 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen at the PES Activists Form 2009 in Dublin,  see: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ggn-uaU6f9Y (20/10/2009) 
 
 234 
activists supported the election campaign, although to a different extent.  The PS has 
fully embraced the concept and has integrated the PES activist groups into their party 
structure at regional level through a statute defining the cooperation between the PES 
activists and the PS. It is hence not surprising that in the beginning, the majority of 
PES activists were French. In the meantime the situation has diversified, and city 
groups are all over Europe, but mainly in capitals and bigger cities. In France, there 
were almost 30 ‘Commissions Europe’ (European committees at regional level) and 
overlapping PES city groups in 2009. The question is why the PS has been most 
enthusiastic about the introduction of the PES activists. The leader of the PS’ London 
branch, Axelle Lemaire, stressed that since the PS had been strongly divided over the 
EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004/2005, many activists now wanted to demonstrate 
their pro-Europeanness, and the PES activists offered a platform to express these 
feelings (interview on 14/09/2009).  
In the beginning, the SPD leadership regarded the PES activists with suspicion, 
worrying about parallel structures outside the party organisation. In the meantime, at 
least at local level, attitudes seemed to have shifted, at least to a certain extent. PES 
activists supported the election campaign in 2009 either as city groups or alongside 
the Young Social Democrats (Jusos). However, the number of people involved is still 
limited and the SPD has not yet formally integrated the PES activists into their party 
structure. 
The British Labour Party tolerates a somewhat loose cooperation with the PES 
activists who are affiliated with the ‘Labour Movement for Europe’ (London and 
South East branch) and ‘Compass Youth’, Like in Germany, the number of activists is 
still low, the organisation is very loose, and the activities seem to be focused 
 235 
exclusively on London and the south eastern region of the UK. Moreover, as MEP 
candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm explained, PES activists from other European 
countries are not used to the British campaigning style, meaning door-knocking and 
telephone canvassing, and it was not easy to involve them in those activities 
(22/01/2010). Generally, efforts to include PES activists in the campaign were very 
low despite Labour’s predictable defeat. 
To sum up, during the election campaign, there has taken place an exchange 
between the PES, the leaders of its member parties and the international departments 
of the member parties. As PES official Sandrine Bertin (interviewed on 17/06/2009) 
explained, smaller member parties, in particular from the new EU Member States in 
central and Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean, tend to rely more on the PES as a 
platform of exchange and expertise than parties from the EU 15. The SPD, Labour 
and the PS are part of the institutionalised dialogue with the PES.  However, it alone 
cannot contribute much to the Europeanisation of the election campaign, as it does not 
reach activists at local level. To fill this gap, the PES has introduced the PES activists 
as bridge-builders between the European and national level. During the 2009 their 
number was still limited, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom. PES 
activists still rely on national parties’ willingness to integrate them and provide them 
with funding and membership lists. Both Labour and the SPD have been indifferent, if 
not hostile towards PES grassroots activism. A closer cooperation between the PES 
and its member parties could contribute to the Europeanisation of the campaign by 
raising awareness of European issues and the exchange of knowledge and 
information. The PES activists are a well-connected network of campaigners, working 
at grass roots level, offering European policy and campaigning expertise and therefore 
feeling comfortable discussing European issues. Many of them come from different 
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EU Member States, providing contacts and speaking several languages. They could 
strengthen national party members’ awareness of the PES and contribute to their 
Europeanisation.  
8.3.5 A Common Candidate for the Commission Presidency  
Vote-seeking is one of the goals of parties alongside office- and policy seeking. In the 
past, the PES was not seen as vote-seeking because European elections did not 
designate an executive at EU level (Lightfoot, 2005: 7). However, the situation has 
changed with the increasing powers of the EP regarding the investiture of a new 
Commission. The selection of a common candidate for the European Commission 
Presidency could contribute to the PES becoming a vote-seeking party – even if the 
direct link to the electorate remains weak. If Europarties could agree on a common 
candidate for the European Commission Presidency, there would be more rivalry 
during the election campaign. More would be at stake and the top candidate would 
give politics a face. Modernisation of election campaigns goes hand in hand with 
personalisation, whereby the campaign focuses on personalities rather than issues 
(Roper et al., 2004). Simon Hix (2008) posits that the EU needs a contest for political 
leadership, which could also lead to a personalisation of the campaign. If the 
Europarties could each agree on a candidate for the presidency of the European 
Commission, their campaigns could be better coordinated with the campaigns of their 
member parties. Confronted with a European top candidate, voters would become 
aware of the ‘Europeanness’ of the elections, which could lead to a more 
Europeanised debate.  
In the case of the PES in 2009, there was no common candidate to compete with 
the EPP’s incumbent Commission president, José Manuel Barroso. The PES failed to 
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nominate a common candidate due to internal disagreements between PES president 
Rasmussen and the influential parliamentary group leader Martin Schulz, which 
shows that the party group exerts considerable influence on the PES. In addition, 
influential party leaders such as Gordon Brown and Franz Müntefering openly backed 
Barroso. The PS, under Martine Aubry, on the other hand, very strongly supported the 
idea of a common socialist candidate, and as her campaign manager and international 
secretary Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (13/06/2009) stated, a common candidate could 
have contributed to the bipolarisation of the campaign. All French MEPs interviewed 
for this study very much regretted the fact that the PES did not have a common 
candidate for the Commission presidency. Pervenche Bérès (interviewed on 
06/10/2009) stressed:  
 
We [the PS] did not manage to make our voice heard within the PES when 
we called for a common candidate. I am absolutely convinced that our 
campaign suffered from that.  
 
The attitude amongst German MEPs was more diverse; most stated that in the future, 
a common candidate would be a positive development, leading to a more personalised 
campaign. However, MEP Petra Kammerevert (interviewed on 16/10/2009) argued 
that ‘a European top candidate can impossibly speak all EU languages which would 
make campaigning abroad quite difficult’ - a statement showing how low expectations 
are when it comes to European elections. Some German and most British MEPs 
interviewed saw no value in a common candidate for their campaign. 
Stated simply, the PES, including national party leaders could not agree on a common 
candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. As a result, national 
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politicians continued to be at the centre of the campaigns. A European top candidate, 
however, could led to a top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the campaign. 
Campaigning in 27 member states, the candidate would automatically bring in the 
‘European’ perspective and discuss European topics. At the same time, he or she 
could engage with the electorate and strengthen the direct links between voters and 
the PES. After the 2009 elections, the PES committed itself to select a common 
candidate for the European Commission Presidency for the next European elections. 
This could raise the European profile of future campaigns and politicise the debate, 
and as a result, the media and voters might pay increased attention to European 
politics, which is currently not the case.  
 
8.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the 2009 European election campaigns of the PES, the 
Labour Party, SPD and PS. It has established an ideal-type model of Europeanisation, 
arguing that a Europeanised campaign would imply increased campaign funding, the 
use of the common pan-European manifesto, a debate on topics with a European 
dimension, a close cooperation between Europarties and national parties, and the 
selection of a common candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.  
The Europeanisation of election campaigning cannot be achieved in a top-down 
manner; it can only happen when Europarties and national parties work together at all 
levels and exchange values, policy expertise and campaigning experience. Moreover, 
European topics would have to be on the agenda of national parties at all levels at all 
times and not just during the election campaigns. As Day and Shaw (2006) argue, the 
development of linkages between Europarties and party members at national level is 
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seen as the sine qua non for enhancing the Europarties’ legitimacy which may 
facilitate an enhanced pan-European role for Europarties. For this to happen, 
Europarties will need to enhance their significance at European and national level. 
The case of the Party of European Socialists demonstrates that, thanks to new funding 
regulations, Europarties can enhance their role as campaigners during European 
elections. PES secretary general Philip Cordery (interviewed on 16/06/2009) stated 
that before 2004, the PES was ‘really a coordination body between European social 
democrats, full stop. Now it has become much more of a party, we’ve had a real sort 
of common work to get a programme.’  
By creating their 2009 manifesto in a more bottom-up approach through an open 
consultation process, the PES has demonstrated the willingness and need to involve a 
more diverse group of actors and provide the grassroots level with a sense of political 
ownership. The introduction of the PES activists follows the same trend: the 
establishment of a direct link between the PES and party activists at national level. So 
far, only national parties had a direct link with the voters, and ‘genuine Europarty 
development has suffered as a result’, as Bardi (2005: 296) puts it. The role of the 
activists has been strengthened after the European elections, as the PES has decided to 
recognise their role in the PES statutes, which implies a formal recognition. What it 
means in practice needs to be seen. These developments can certainly enhance the 
Europeanisation of future election campaigns.  
Overall, however, the Europeanisation of election campaigning is only in its 
infancy. The 2009 European campaigns led by the British Labour Party, the French 
Socialists and the German Social Democrats were national contests and suggest that 
the party organisations were not sufficiently Europeanised. The underlying question 
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remains if national parties see a benefit in Europeanising their election campaigns. In 
2009, this was not the case.  
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Chapter 9: The Europeanisation of social democratic party 
organisations  
 
The purpose of this chapter it to bring together the empirical evidence presented in 
previous chapters. In Chapter 2 an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party was 
developed. Table 9.1 (below) reminds us of the indicators of Europeanisation in the 
three arenas: the public face; in government; and as organisations. Now it is time to 
pull together the findings of the six empirical chapters and discuss the degree of 
Europeanisation the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) have experienced in the past decade.  
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Table 9.1 Summary: Indicators of the Europeanisation of party organisations  
 
Arena Indicators of strong 
Europeanisation  
Indicators of weak 
Europeanisation 
Public face The party leadership regularly gives 
speeches and interviews explaining 
and defending the party’s EU policies. 
The party leadership avoids 
speaking about EU policies in 
public. 
European policy is easily available on 
the party’s website. 
There is little to no information on 
the party’s EU policy on the 
website. 
In manifestoes, European policy is 
treated as domestic policy. In 
addition, there is a separate section on 
the party’s general stance towards 
European integration. 
 
In manifestoes, there is little to no 
reference to the EU. European 
policy is dealt with together with 
foreign policy in one short section. 
 
Behaviour of 
those in office 
The party leadership in government 
drives forward institutional adaptation 
of central government to the EU. 
Institutional adaptation of central 
government and parliament to the 
EU is neglected. 
Party leadership in government 
facilitates effective EU scrutiny in 
parliament. 
Party leadership in government 
tries to prevent parliamentary EU 
scrutiny (e.g. by delaying 
important information). 
Party leadership empowers EU 
experts in government and parliament. 
EU experts have junior-level 
positions in the executive or 
parliament without decision-
making power. 
Internal 
workings of 
the party 
organisation 
A wide range of party actors, 
including formal policy-making 
bodies, are involved in European 
policy-making. 
European policy is made by a 
narrow circle of party elites. 
Party leadership involves membership 
in EU policy-making. 
Membership is excluded from 
European policy-making. 
Party leads Europeanised European 
parliamentary election campaigns and 
interacts with the Party of European 
Socialists. 
During European election 
campaigns the party focuses on 
national issues and does not make 
use of the Party of European 
Socialists. 
Party has close links with sister 
parties across the EU at all levels of 
the party organisation. 
Party shows little or no interest in 
sister parties from other EU 
member states. 
 
In the following three sections, each party’s Europeanisation in the three arenas will 
be examined individually, on the basis of the academic literature and original 
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interview data. In addition to what has been written on the Europeanisation of the 
parties in the electorate in Chapters 3 and 4, an analysis of the Europeanisation of 
election manifestoes will be presented. This analysis does not focus on the parties’ 
actual EU policies, or on the question of how pro-integrationist they were. This has 
already been done extensively by scholars contributing to the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP, see: Klingemann et al., 2006). On the basis of CMP data, Chapter 3 has 
demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD have been pro-integrationist throughout 
the past two decades. This chapter thus examines which significance the three parties 
gave to the European Union in their general elections manifestoes between 1997 and 
2012.  How often did they refer to the EU, and in which parts of the manifesto? Was 
European policy part of foreign policy, or was it treated as a policy area in its own 
right? This analysis can reveal how the parties presented themselves to the public. 
Furthermore, a brief analysis of the Europeanisation of the parties’ websites helps us 
to understand how Labour, the PS and SPD communicate their European policies to 
their members and the wider electorate. After all, next to manifestoes, websites have 
become an important instrument for parties to present their policies. They have 
become part of the parties’ public face. 
The last section of this chapter will put the findings into a comparative perspective 
and discuss their broader implications.  
  
9.1 The Europeanisation of the Labour Party organisation  
It was established that in a Europeanised party organisation a broad range of 
actors are involved in a democratic process of EU policy-making. Chapter 7 has 
examined the Europeanisation of policy-making and revealed that Labour’s formal 
policy-making bodies, such the annual conference or the National Policy Forum, had 
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no major formal or informal influence on the party leadership’s European policy. It 
therefore does not come as a surprise that election manifestoes were written by the 
party leadership, with the support of the civil service. Interviews with Labour 
politicians (such as a former head of Number 10 Downing’s Streets Policy Planning 
Unit; a former EU-adviser to Tony Blair; and the party’s international manager) 
revealed that the prime minister, the foreign secretary, the chancellor and their 
advisers were the key actors in Labour’s EU policy-making process when the party 
was in government. A top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation has not 
taken place. It is however true that under Blair’s leadership Labour’s MEPs got more 
integrated into the making of European policy. For the first time the party made 
systematic use of their EU expertise by letting them sit on cabinet-level, ministerial 
teams. At the same time, Members of the House of Commons seemed to have played 
only a minor role in the making of Labour’s European policy. They were under the 
tight control of the government and had very limited formal powers to influence the 
leadership’s European policy.  
Labour’s International Unit played an important role in establishing and tightening 
links with social democratic sister parties and the Party of European Socialists. 
Already in the early 1990s, Labour’s relationship with its social democratic sister 
parties and the Party of European Socialists had improved (Hix, 1999). In 1994, the 
Labour Party had signed up to a PES manifesto that was ideologically adverse to its 
own policies. It committed to a 35-hour week (Lightfoot, 2005: 46).  As a 
consequence of this embarrassment, Robin Cook, the then foreign secretary, was 
heavily involved in drafting the 1999 PES manifesto. He also became PES president 
in May 2001. Hence, under Blair’s party leadership, the working relationship between 
Labour, the PES, and sister parties across Europe became closer. Labour’s 
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International Unit certainly facilitated these networks by organising party leader and 
parliamentary committee visits across the EU. Yet it was too small a unit to have real 
influence on the government’s EU policy, which the international manager herself 
confirmed in an interview. The international manager also needed to deal with global 
and European policies and therefore had less time available for European policy.  
Compared to the SPD, Labour had less staff working in the party headquarters, so less 
funding was available for the Europeanisation of the party bureaucracy.  
If European policy was up to the leadership – was there a role left to play for the 
rank and file members in the formulation of European policy? Has the Labour party 
leadership tried to Europeanise them by involving them in referendums or 
consultations? The answer is no. Nation-wide referendums on Britain’s EU 
membership and the European Constitutional Treaty were promised but never carried 
out. An internal party referendum or consultation on European issues was not on the 
agenda of either the Blair or Brown governments. It is therefore not surprising that at 
the local level the Labour Party has experienced little Europeanisation. Perhaps an 
exception to the rule was the Labour Movement for Europe (LME) which, according 
to its website, 
is an organisation aiming to improve the quality of debate about Europe in 
the Labour Party, the wider Labour movement and the UK overall. 
Bringing together MPs, MEPs, progressive sister organisations and 
activists from all over the UK, we put the case for Europe in Labour and 
beyond (LME, 2012). 
The LME is a bottom-up movement that is organised by pro-European party activists. 
The number of members is still relatively small according to the LME’s chair, David 
Schoibl (interviewed on 07/12/2009). Thus, whilst the leadership has done little to 
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Europeanise the party organisation in a top-down manner, there are attempts at the 
grassroots level to Europeanise the party organisation. However, this bottom-up 
Europeanisation appears to be in its infancy.  
Unsurprisingly, Labour’s European election campaigns are not Europeanised. 
It is common knowledge that parties and voters treat European elections as second-
order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).  However we can still expect a pro-European 
party such as Labour to lead a pro-European campaign in which it showcases its EU 
policy. Chapter 8 has outlined an ideal model of a Europeanised election campaign 
and applied it to the 2009 European elections. It was argued that the prerequisites of a 
fully Europeanised election campaign would be: increased campaign funding; a 
campaign focussing on European topics; a widely supported and used common 
European election manifesto; close cooperation between the PES and its member 
parties at different levels of the party organisation; and a common candidate for the 
presidency of the European Commission. In 2009, the party leadership led an 
invisible, defensive campaign on domestic issues without reference to the PES. In fact 
the party leadership surrounding Gordon Brown had tried everything to contain the 
salience of European integration in a Eurosceptical domestic environment - just as 
Blair had done previously (Oppermann, 2008). Foreign secretary David Miliband was 
outspokenly pro-European but this seemed to have little impact during the invisible 
European election campaign.  Unsurprisingly, neither top-down nor bottom-up, or 
even horizontal Europeanisation of the party organisation had taken place during the 
campaign. Overall, we can summarise that Labour’s party organisation has 
experienced only weak Europeanisation. Table 9.2 (below) summarises the findings.  
Table 9.2 The Europeanisation of Labour as an organisation 
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
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European policy was made by a narrow 
circle of party elites without much 
involvement of formal policy-making 
bodies. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
Party membership was excluded from 
EU policy-making. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
2009 European parliamentary election 
campaign focused on domestic issues. 
Little to no reference made to EU topics 
and the Party of European Socialists. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
Labour had established links with sister 
parties at different levels of the party 
organisation.  
 Intermediate Europeanisation  
 
The lack of organisational Europeanisation is reflected in a lack of Europeanisation of 
Labour’s public face. Chapter 4 has demonstrated on the basis of Eurobarometer data 
that the British public is generally unenthusiastic and indifferent towards European 
integration. It has also discussed how Labour had to face the deeply Eurosceptical 
conservative party and the UK Independence Party. In addition, the overwhelmingly 
Eurosceptic nature of the British newspapers (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999) 
contributed to an environment where pro-integrationist views were under attack. It is 
therefore not surprising to note that Blair and his colleagues rarely gave EU-
enthusiastic speeches at home. According to Oppermann (2008) Labour used a mix of 
different strategies to contain the electoral salience of European policy in Britain. It 
(1) tried to defuse the European policy differences between itself and the conservative 
party; (2) it depoliticised its decision-making on EU issues by tying the decision to 
join the Euro to five economic tests; (3) it delegated the final responsibility for 
decision-making to the general public, e.g. through referenda on the Euro and the EU 
Constitutional Treaty; and (4) it deferred controversial decisions to some future date. 
Thanks to this fourfold strategy, ‘European policy was thus transformed from a 
decidedly high-salience issue at the beginning of the Blair government’s tenure into a 
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downright low-salience issue at the end of Tony Blair’s period in office’ (Oppermann, 
2008: 177). Blair was however willing to stress his support for EU integration when 
he was overseas. For example, on the 24
th
 March 1998 Blair told the French National 
Assembly (in French) that he shared the European ideal, stating: ‘L'avenir de la 
Grande-Bretagne, c'est d'être un partenaire à part entière de l'Europe’. Yet Blair’s 
greatest contribution to the European debate was expressed in a speech to the Polish 
stock exchange on 6th October 2000 in which he stressed the UK’s commitment to 
European integration and outlined a set of proposals for institutional reform. Thus, 
Blair engaged in a EU debate when he was abroad, giving speeches in Brussels, Paris 
and Warsaw rather than at home. Hence, the pro-European outlook of the party 
leadership in government did not contribute to the Europeanisation of the party’s 
public face. High-profile, pro-integrationist speeches to the British public were 
avoided. 
 Furthermore, Labour did not make its European policy easily accessible to the 
public via its website. On Labour’s website, European policy was treated as part of 
the party’s broader international activities. It was integrated into a section entitled 
‘international’ where reference was made to Labour’s international unit, which 
maintains and develops links with the Party of European Socialists and the Socialist 
International. However there was no information available on Labour’s European 
policy. Not even European election manifestoes - which could be used as authoritative 
European policy statements – could be found in this section. In fact, an interview with 
a European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) official has revealed that the 2009 
European manifesto was only uploaded to the website after the EPLP had complained. 
Hence, little effort was made by the Labour Party to communicate European policy 
through its website.  
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It was also argued that a party eager to fully Europeanise its public face 
would treat European policy as domestic policy, thereby acknowledging that an 
increasing amount of formerly domestic policies have become Europeanised. It 
would integrate European policy into all the policy areas mentioned in its 
manifestoes. Thus, instead of having a single section dealing with European and 
foreign policy, the European dimension of each policy area would be 
highlighted throughout the manifesto. Table 9.3 (below) shows how Labour 
dealt with the EU in its general election manifestoes between 1997 and 2010. 
The table depicts how often ‘Europe’ (or ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’) was 
mentioned throughout the document. This is only a very small indication of how 
Europeanised a manifesto is. Therefore the table also shows whether there was a 
separate section or chapter dealing with European policy, or whether European 
and foreign policy were tackled together in the same section. Table 9.3 also lists 
the other sections or chapters of the manifesto in which a reference was made to 
the European Union. Interestingly, none of the four manifestoes had a separate 
section or chapter dealing with the EU. Instead, European policy and foreign 
policy (issues such as global security, poverty, and the reform of international 
organisations such as the United Nations) were dealt with under the rubric 
global politics. The EU was referred to in other policy sections (e.g. business, 
productivity, immigration or environmental recovery) but this was done 
differently in each manifesto. Arguably, Labour’s most Europeanised manifesto 
is the one from the general elections in 2001. It includes 93 references to the EU 
in five different sections/chapters. The following two manifestoes refer to the 
EU less frequently, and the 2010 manifesto can be described as the least 
Europeanised according to the indicators outlined above. There are only 37 
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references to the EU and none of them in either the foreword or introduction. 
Apart from the chapter dealing with European and global affairs - which comes 
last - only two other chapters referred to the EU. It is striking that the chapters 
on global and European policies always come at the end of Labour’s 
manifestoes, namely as the last or second to last chapters.  
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Table 9.3 Labour general election manifestoes (1997-2010) and the European 
Union  
Year  Name of 
the 
Manifesto 
Mention 
of 
‘Europe’, 
‘European 
Union’, or 
‘EU’  
Is there a separate 
chapter/section on 
European policy? 
In which other section(s) of the 
manifesto is ‘Europe’ 
mentioned? 
1997 
 
‘Because 
Britain 
deserves 
better’ 
 
 
40  
No. The section ‘We 
will give Britain 
leadership in Europe’ 
also deals with issues 
such as the reform of 
the United Nations 
and global 
development.  
 
 Foreword 
 Introduction  
 ‘We will help create 
successful and profitable 
businesses’  
2001 
 
 
‘Ambitions 
for Britain’ 
 
 
93  
 
No. The section 
’Britain strong in the 
world’ also deals with 
global defence policy; 
development policy; 
and environmental 
policy.  
 Foreword 
 ‘The productivity challenge - 
Staying better off’  
 ‘No one left behind - Helping 
everyone become better off’   
 ‘Responsibility from all: 
Winning the battle against 
Crime’  
2005  
 
.  
‘Britain 
Forward 
Not Back’ 
47 No. The section 
‘International policy: 
A stronger country in 
a secure, sustainable 
and just world’. Also 
deals with the 
worldwide promotion 
of peace and human 
rights; defence; 
reform of the United 
Nations; climate 
change; and fair trade.  
 Introduction  
 Economy: Rising prosperity 
in an opportunity society’  
 
 
2010 
 
‘A Future 
Fair For 
All’ 
37  
 
No. The section ‘A 
global future’ also 
deals with defence, 
global poverty; and 
the reform of global 
institutions.  
 ‘Crime and Immigration’  
 ‘Green Recovery’  
 
This decreasing Europeanisation also manifests itself in the findings of the CMP 
(see Chapter 3). The latter demonstrate that Labour was most pro-European 
during the mid-1990s but that EU support declined slowly at the beginnings of 
the 2000s.  This trend is also confirmed by Julie Smith who writes that: ‘in 
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some ways it would be easy to characterize the Blair government’s first term as 
European in outlook, the second as Atlanticist’ (2005: 703). The Atlanticism 
certainly continued to dominate the rest of Labour’s time in office. When 
Gordon Brown took over the premiership in 2007 he tried to avoid 
confrontation over the EU with the opposition and the press, thus following 
Blair’s strategy of containment. Brown made sure there would be no referendum 
on the Lisbon Treaty and he missed the ceremony where the 26 other EU 
leaders signed the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007. Due to a small 
parliamentary majority, Brown ‘has arguably been more concerned than Blair at 
managing the electoral salience of the European issue’ (Bulmer, 2008: 606). 
The example of the election manifestoes demonstrates that the Labour 
government did not seriously attempt to turn around the Eurosceptic public. The 
party has not Europeanised its public face. Table 9.4 (below) summarises the 
findings. 
Table 9.4 The Europeanisation of Labour’s public face  
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
European policy was not 
prioritised in party leaderships’ 
speeches.  
 Weak Europeanisation 
There was very little information 
on European policy available on 
Labour’s website. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
In election manifestoes European 
policy was not always treated as 
domestic policy. Strong 
Europeanisation of 2001 
manifesto, but weak 
Europeanisation of 2010 
manifesto. 
 Intermediate 
Europeanisation  
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Last but not least, we need to establish to what extent Labour has 
Europeanised in the governmental arena. As chapter 5 has demonstrated, the Labour 
leadership accelerated the Europeanisation of central government. In I998 Blair 
announced a 'step change' in the UK's relations with the EU. It included the 
requirement that ministers, MPs and civil servants all step up bilateral contacts with 
their opposite numbers in other EU member states. Furthermore, a significant 
centralisation of EU policy-making took place under the Labour leadership: more 
resources and powers were given to the ‘centre’ of government. It was a system based 
on the sharing of information across government departments and on coordination 
between officials, ministers and Members of the European Parliament. The Labour 
leadership thereby made sure that Britain could speak with one voice in the different 
EU institutions and at home. The Cabinet Office European Secretariat was also 
strengthened in staff numbers, and Sir Stephen Wall was appointed in 2000 as its 
head. His office was moved into Number 10 Downing Street. Furthermore, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office integrated its European policy and bilateral 
relations into one large directorate. As Bulmer (2008: 614) writes, ‘the overall impact 
has been of facilitating a constructive European policy with partner states while 
making negligible impact upon public perception of the EU within Britain.’ Like 
central government, the House of Commons has experienced Europeanisation. 
Chapter 6 has demonstrated how legislative, institutional, and – to a lesser extent – 
strategic Europeanisation has taken place over the past decades. In the House of 
Commons, the process of EU scrutiny has been institutionalised over the past decades.  
However, the European Committees – which have the power to discuss European 
decisions and governmental motions and make amendments to these motions - have 
no possibility of binding the government. This puts Parliament in a weak position vis-
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à-vis the government, and its overall influence on the government's European policy 
is negligible (Auel and Benz, 2005: 381). Moreover, as part of its strategy to contain 
the salience of European policy, the Labour government has avoided plenary debates 
on EU issues. As a reaction to their weak formal EU scrutiny powers, MPs have 
developed informal scrutiny strategies: they continuously demanded information on 
EU affairs and the government's position on them, and they regularly invited cabinet 
ministers before the committees. Overall, however, the strategic Europeanisation of 
Labour MPs was rather weak. On the basis of the interviews conducted with a Labour 
MP, a former MEP, and two officials from the European Parliamentary Labour Party, 
this thesis has found that contacts between MPs and MEPs tended to be informal and 
irregular. MPs seemed to meet the MEPs from their constituencies on an ad-hoc basis, 
for example during election campaigns.  
We still know relatively little about the Europeanisation effects of exchanges 
between sister parties. We know that exchanges took place between MPs of the House 
of Commons and Bundestag, but whether they have led to a more Europeanised 
behaviour is far from certain. The overall logic would be that legislative 
Europeanisation leads to institutional institution, which – in an ideal case scenario - 
leads to the strategic Europeanisation of MPs. The House of Commons however was 
not a forum for the Labour Party to Europeanise. Its scrutiny powers continued to be 
weak, and the party leadership did little to encourage plenary debates on EU issues.  
Overall, the party has Europeanised only to an intermediate degree whilst in 
government. Table 9.5 (below) summarises the findings.  
Table 9.5 The Europeanisation of Labour in Government 
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
The party leadership drove forward 
institutional adaptation of central 
government to the EU.  
 Strong Europeanisation 
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Party leadership did facilitate EU 
scrutiny in Parliament. However the EU 
scrutiny powers of the UK Parliament 
remain weak. The government remained 
in control of the legislative process.  
  Weak Europeanisation 
Empowerment of EU experts? The party 
leadership involved MEPs more in EU 
policy-making. Other elected EU experts 
(MPs with EU brief or minister for 
Europe) had junior positions within the 
party. Empowerment of civil servants 
and personal (unelected) advisers to the 
party leadership. 
 Intermediate Europeanisation  
 
 
9.2 The Europeanisation of the Parti Socialiste (PS) 
As an organisation, the PS has experienced only a low degree of Europeanisation over 
the past decade. In fact, Robert Ladrech’s (2007) finding that French party 
organisations remain ‘immune to EU adaptive pressures’ can be confirmed in the case 
of the PS. A strongly Europeanised party organisation is understood as one that 
involves a wide range of actors into the European policy-making process. However, 
as chapter 7 has demonstrated, the PS’ EU policy-making process was highly 
centralised. When the PS was in government (1997-2002) the party’s EU policy was 
formulated by Prime Minister Jospin who was supported by the party’s international 
secretary, the foreign minister and the minister for Europe. In opposition, the PS’ 
international secretary and the party leader became the key players in the formulation 
of EU policy. The formal policy-making bodies, such as the party conference, had 
very little impact on the party’s European policy. It only rallied every three years and 
was in no position to give guidelines on day-to-day European policy. The socialist 
MEPs were rarely consulted by the leadership. Long-standing MEPs have confirmed 
in interviews that European policy was formulated by the party leadership in Paris. 
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MPs were not included in the formulation of European policy either. The French 
Parliament has relatively weak legislative powers and EU scrutiny is no exception to 
this rule. Furthermore, MPs with a EU brief (e.g. the chair of the European Scrutiny 
Committee) had no particular statutory positions on national party bodies, which 
made it difficult for them to formally influence the party’s European policy. The PS 
was thus Europeanised at the executive level in the sense that European policy was 
formulated by the leadership, whilst the party conference, the parliamentary party and 
the European parliamentary party played no major roles in the EU policy-making 
process. Neither did the party at the lower levels. EU working groups have been 
created at the regional (departmental) level – although even Jean-Christophe 
Cambadelis, the international secretary, admitted in an interview (18/06/2009) that 
they do not often discuss European politics and that European policy remains reserved 
to the PS’ EU experts. However, there exists one exception to this rule: when the PS 
was divided and party leader Hollande put the EU Constitutional Treaty to an internal 
referendum in December 2004. The referendum led to an internal debate focussing not 
only on the Constitutional Treaty, but also on the PS’ general stance on the future of 
European integration and the European single market. As over 80 per cent of party 
members participated in the referendum, it had a Europeanising effect on the 
membership in the sense that it brought EU policy on the top of the policy agenda. In 
the end, however, the referendum did not empower the members because its outcome 
did not bind the party leadership. The latter continued to be divided and campaigned 
both in favour and against the Treaty. One interviewee - namely the leader of the PS 
London branch - suggested that the negative outcome of the nation-wide referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty led the PS to fully embrace the PES activists and make 
stronger reference to the PES during their 2009 European election campaign. Perhaps 
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as a consequence, the divisions over European integration led to an initial degree of 
Europeanisation: the PS formally integrated the PES activists into their party 
organisation at the departmental level (fédération). In historical institutionalist terms, 
the French referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty can thus be understood as a 
critical juncture at which the PS further Europeanised its organisation. Since 2004, 
when the PES introduced the PES activists, the PS has created numerous PES activist 
city groups across France, some of which campaigned during the 2009 European 
elections. Yet, despite the close relationship between the PS and the PES and the use 
of the PES manifesto, the 2009 European election campaign focused on domestic 
issues and was targeted against the incumbent President Nicolas Sarkozy. We must 
however keep in mind that through the PES activists, campaign exchanges were 
organised between the PS’ Paris federation and the SPD in Berlin and in the border 
regions of West Germany and East France in 2009. PES activists from across Europe 
also supported the PS during the 2012 presidential election campaign. This goes to 
show that contacts with social democratic sister parties were not only maintained 
through the PES leaders’ conference, but also at the lower levels of the party 
organisation. There is hence a potential for horizontal Europeanisation between the PS 
and its sister parties which is facilitated by the PES activists scheme. However, more 
systematic research needs to be done into the Europeanising effects of party 
exchanges. We can conclude that as a party organisation, the PS has experienced only 
a limited degree of Europeanisation in the past decade.  
 
Table 9.6 The Europeanisation of the PS as an organisation 
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
European policy was made by a narrow 
circle of party elites without much 
  Weak Europeanisation 
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involvement of formal policy-making 
bodies. 
Internal referendum on EU constitutional 
Treaty in December 2004: party 
membership was involved in EU policy-
making. 
 Intermediate Europeanisation 
2009 European parliamentary elections: 
despite the use of the PES manifesto, the 
campaign focused on domestic topics. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
PS has established links with the PES 
and sister parties at different levels of the 
party organisation.  
 Intermediate Europeanisation 
 
Given that the Europeanisation of the party organisation was limited, has the PS 
Europeanised its public face? We need to remember that the salience of European 
policy is rather low in France, and Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the French are no 
Euroenthusiasts. Interest and trust in EU institutions tend to be relatively low amongst 
French voters. The hardest core of party-based Euroscepticism can be found amongst 
far left and far right parties whilst the parties with governing aspirations are pro-
integrationist (Milner, 2004: 60). As CMP data has confirmed, the PS has been the 
most pro-European party in France, especially under François Mitterrand’s leadership. 
His successor, Lionel Jospin, who took over the party leadership in 1995, was 
generally pro-integrationist, but at the same time critical towards certain 
characteristics of EU governance and EU policies. For example, he repeatedly 
criticised the EU’s democratic deficit and the convergence criteria that were put in 
place for the Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht (Krell, 2009). The 
interview with former PS European secretary Henri Nallet (30/06/2009) revealed that 
both Prime Minister Jospin and party leader Hollande focused their activities on 
national policy issues when the PS was in office between 1997 and 2002. At PS 
executive committee meetings, EU issues were at the bottom of the agenda. Both 
Jospin and Hollande were described by Nallet as ‘Europeéns de raison’ who were in 
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favour of European integration but thought nationally and put the national interest 
first in their speeches, interviews and campaigns. This attitude was reflected in 
Jospin’s slogan for the 1997 legislative elections ‘Faire l’Europe sans defaire la 
France’ (‘Doing Europe without undoing France’). Jospin’s most important speech on 
the EU was delivered in Paris in May 2001 under the title ‘L’avenir de l’Europe 
élargie’ (‘The future of the enlarged Europe’). Here he revealed his vision for the 
future of Europe, focussing on the European social model; the role of Europe in the 
world; and on the EU’s institutional reform. It was a pro-European speech but offered 
little innovative thinking, as Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2004: 228) notes. Neither 
Jospin nor Hollande gave more high-profile speeches focussing on the EU.  Whilst an 
intense debate over the future direction of European integration took off inside the PS, 
Jospin neglected the topic during the 2002 election campaign (Krell, 2009: 366).  
After Jospin’s defeat in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, the 
PS experienced a crisis, with different factions competing for party leadership. The 
party was deeply divided over its EU policy (amongst other policy areas). These 
divisions became most visible in 2004/2005, when President Chirac had announced a 
nation-wide referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty. PS leader François Hollande 
was in favour of the treaty but could not discipline the other factions (Wagner, 2008). 
After the French electorate’s rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, 
European policy was even less prioritised in the PS’ leaderships’ speeches and 
interviews. This could be interpreted as a rational response to a EU-critical electorate, 
but it was also due to the party’s deep internal divisions and ongoing leadership crisis. 
As a consequence, party leader Hollande did little to communicate EU policy to the 
electorate.  
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The PS makes its EU policy available to the public through its website. 
However, European and international issues are dealt with together in the section 
‘Europe et International’. There is very little information on the PS’ long-term policy 
on the process of European integration, and there are no links to party manifestoes or 
other authoritative policy statements.  Instead, statements made by PS politicians on 
current European and international issues are posted on this website. Interested voters 
or party members will therefore remain largely uninformed about the PS’ EU policy 
when they check the website.  
It is therefore surprising to note that the PS’ election manifestoes from 1997 
until 2012 are highly Europeanised. Table 9.7 (below) shows that all four manifestoes 
have a separate section dealing with the EU. European policy is not treated as part of 
foreign policy. Moreover, reference to the EU is made in many other sections of the 
documents, such as economic policy, justice and home affairs, Republican values, etc. 
The Europeanisation of the different, formerly domestic policy areas is highlighted in 
all four manifestoes.  The most Europeanised manifesto is the one from 2012 which 
makes 99 references to Europe in nine different sections. This is not surprising, given 
the context of the European economic and financial crisis. François Hollande’s 2012 
election campaign also had a much stronger focus on EU policy than any other 
campaign since 1997.  
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Table 9.7 PS legislative election manifestoes (1997-2012) and the European 
Union  
Year Name of the Manifesto Mention of 
‘Europe’, 
‘Union 
Européenne’, 
‘Union’, ‘Euro’ 
Is there a separate 
chapter/section on 
European policy? 
In which other 
section(s) of the 
manifesto is ‘Europe’ 
mentioned? 
1997 Changeons d’avenir. 
Nos engagements pour 
la France. 
 
41 
 
Yes.  Introduction 
 Economy 
 Home affairs 
 Justice 
2002 Programme pour les 
législatives 2002. 
 
 
35 Yes.  Introduction 
 Public Services 
 Civic Rights 
 Global Politics 
 Conclusions  
2007 Reussir ensemble le 
changement 
 
58 Yes.   Introduction 
 Employment and 
Sustainability 
 Constitutional 
Reform 
 Immigration 
2012  Projet Socialiste 2012. 
Le Changement. 
 
99 Yes  Introduction 
 Understanding that 
the world is 
changing 
 The end of 
Capitalism 
 Broken Hopes 
 French leadership 
 Act in order to 
avoid suffering 
 A new model of 
development 
 The Republican 
promise 
 Conclusions 
 
Overall, the Europeanisation of the PS’ public face has been a mixed experience. 
Whilst the consecutive party leaderships were pro-European in their outlook, EU 
policy was rarely prioritised in speeches or during election campaigns. After 2002 
there was no unified party line and the leadership sent conflicting messages to the 
voters. For those voters who wanted to learn more about the PS’ European policy the 
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party’s website did not provide much information. The election manifestoes however 
were strongly Europeanised, and it is surprising to note how little this is reflected in 
the party organisation. Table 9.8 (below) summarises the findings.   
Table 9.8 The Europeanisation of the PS’ public face  
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
European policy was not prioritised 
in party leaderships’ speeches.  
 Weak Europeanisation 
There was information on 
European policy available on PS 
website but it was presented 
together with international issues.  
 Weak Europeanisation 
In election manifestoes there was a 
separate section on European 
policy. Moreover, there were 
numerous EU references in other 
sections.  
 Strong Europeanisation  
 
In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that in the past three decades French central 
government has Europeanised, following its own institutional paths. In order to 
overcome the sectoral organisation of French ministries, the 'Secrétariat général des 
affairs européennes' (SGAE) was made the nodal point for the formulation of 
European policy. When the PS was in office, the SGAE was subordinated to Prime 
Minister Jospin and the ministry for finance. Hence considerable administrative and 
institutional resources were at the disposal of the prime minister. A certain 
centralisation of European policy-making has taken place within the French executive, 
yet it needs to be kept in mind that most of the SGAE’s officials were sent from 
ministries as watchdogs to protect sectorial interests and as a consequence, France did 
not always speak with one voice at the European level. The 1997 government 
turnover does not appear to have accelerated the Europeanisation of central 
government.  This cannot be blamed solely on the sectorial workings of the French 
government; rather, we need to take the complicated power constellation within the 
 263 
French executive into account, which made it difficult for the prime minister to 
change institutional patterns.  Not only did Prime Minister Jospin have to share power 
with conservative President Chirac (cohabitation); he was also restricted in his 
European policy by his ‘plural left’ coalition (gauche plurielle), made up of five left-
wing parties, some of which had been very sceptical towards the Maastricht Treaty 
and the creation of the European Single Market. During the 1997-2002 cohabitation 
President Chirac retained an important role in the making of European policy, and 
together with Jospin represented France at European Council summits. However, the 
PS leadership in government – mainly the prime minister, foreign secretary, and the 
finance minister - tried to pull their weight in the European policy-making process. 
The PS government managed to upload some of its policies to the European level. For 
example, Jospin achieved the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which led to the European employment pact (adopted in 1999). As discussed 
throughout this thesis, Jospin and the rest of the PS leadership in government (e.g. the 
foreign minister and the minister for Europe) were pro-integrationist, but this outlook 
did not translate into a top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation. European 
policy-making was the prerogative of the party leadership when the PS was in office.  
If we turn our attention to the Socialist parliamentary party we come to realise 
that institutional constraints prevented strong Europeanisation. Whilst the National 
Assembly has experienced legislative and institutional adaptation to the EU, the 
strategic Europeanisation of Socialist MPs has lagged behind. There are several 
explanations for this weak Europeanisation. The first one relates to the general 
weaknesses of the French parliament in the political system of the Fifth Republic. The 
parliament has virtually no power to hold the executive to account (Rozenberg, 2004). 
The 1958 Constitution grants governments the possibility to avoid plenary debates on 
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delicate issues such as new EU treaties or single market policy. In addition, until very 
recently, the EU affairs committee (DUE) was no fully-fledged parliamentary 
committee, which made its work seem even less rewarding to ambitious politicians. 
Given the weakness of parliamentary EU scrutiny, becoming a EU expert is no 
promising career path for a French MP. Moreover, during their time in opposition, the 
PS did not hold any major EU positions in the National Assembly that could have led 
to a more intense engagement with the EU. What is more, even when the PS was in 
government, being the chair of the EU committee did not translate into any particular 
statutory position on national party bodies (Ladrech, 2007: 95). EU experts in 
Parliament have thus not been empowered inside the party organisation. Perhaps as a 
consequence, very few Socialist MPs showed interest in European policy. This has 
been confirmed by six Socialist MEPs who revealed in interviews that contacts 
between themselves and Socialist MPs were sporadic and irregular.  The PS has thus 
experienced weak Europeanisation in the National Assembly and in government 
overall (see table 9.9 below).  
Table 9.9 The Europeanisation of the PS in government 
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
The party leadership drove forward 
institutional adaptation of central 
government to the EU but was restricted 
by cohabitation and coalition partners. 
 Intermediate Europeanisation 
 
EU scrutiny powers of the French 
Parliament remain weak and MPs 
showed little interest in the EU. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
Empowerment of EU experts in central 
government and parliament. 
 Weak Europeanisation.  
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9.3 The Europeanisation of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
Overall, the SPD’s organisation has experienced relatively weak 
Europeanisation. Chapter 7 has found that when the SPD was in government, 
European policy was up to the leadership, namely the Chancellor, cabinet ministers 
and their support staff. Formal party bodies, such as the conference, had little say in 
the making of either long-term or day-to-day EU policy. Election manifestoes were 
written by the party leadership. The party’s other EU experts, the MEPs, MdBs with 
EU brief had little influence on the party leadership. In opposition, the balance of 
power shifted slightly towards the parliamentary party, which had more staff at their 
disposal than the the SPD’s headquarters. After 2009, day-to-day EU policy was made 
by the party group in the Bundestag, whilst the party’s executive committee, 
supported by the international department, only got involved in politically charged 
issues such as the management of the Eurocrisis, or in the making of long-term EU 
policy.  
Neither the general public nor the SPD membership has ever been allowed to 
cast their votes in EU referendums. Consequently, EU debates do not often take place 
at the lower levels of the party organisation (for example in party branches at the local 
level, the Ortsverein). The majority of MEPs interviewed for this study (five out of 
eight) stated that they rarely got contacted by their constituency, but that they 
regularly took the initiative themselves and offered to give talks to the Ortsvereine 
about current issues in EU politics. EU working groups existed at different levels of 
the party organisation: at local, regional and federal level. Interviews with party 
officials have revealed that some of these working groups (such as the ones in Berlin 
and North-Rhine-Westphalia) were very active forums for networking and discussion. 
Yet again, only a small circle of Europhiles seem to attend these EU working group 
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meetings. A bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation has therefore not 
taken place. This lack of Europeanisation becomes visible during European 
parliamentary election campaigns. Chapter 8 has demonstrated that the June 2009 
European elections were treated as a warm-up for the September 2009 federal 
elections. As a rule, national-level politicians spoke about domestic issues whilst the 
European dimension was neglected during the campaign. In general, the SPD has a 
close working relationship with the Party of European Socialists. As one of the largest 
member parties the SPD drafted one of the 2009 manifesto chapters and integrated 
parts of the document into their own European manifesto. It is therefore surprising 
that they did not use the PES manifesto and made very little reference to the PES 
during the 2009 campaign. It remains to be seen whether the PES activists can raise 
the awareness of the EU in future election campaigns. In 2009, the SPD was rather 
suspicious and did not support them.  In summary, this study agrees with Poguntke 
who writes that ‘German party organizations have remained remarkably unaffected by 
the indisputable growth of the powers of the EU institutions of governance’ (2007: 
128). Table 9.1.0 (below) summarises the findings of this section.  
Table 9.10 The SPD’s Europeanisation as an organisation 
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
European policy was made by a narrow 
circle of party elites without much 
involvement of formal policy-making 
bodies. 
  Weak Europeanisation 
Party membership was not involved in 
EU policy-making. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
2009 European parliamentary elections: 
the campaign focused on domestic topics 
and national-level politicians.  
 Weak Europeanisation 
SPD has established links with the PES 
and sister parties at different levels of the 
party organisation, but didn’t make much 
reference to the PES during the 2009 
European elections.  
 Intermediate Europeanisation 
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Is this weak organisational Europeanisation reflected in how the SPD presents 
itself to the public?  Yes, to a certain extent. The SPD has Europeanised its 
public face only to a limited degree. This is rather astonishing, given that in no 
other large member state of the EU has the elite consensus on European 
integration been as stable as in Germany (Lees, 2002). EU issue salience tends 
to be rather low (De Vries, 2010) and party-based Euroscepticism was absent in 
Germany until the left party Die Linke emerged in 2007 and criticised the 
European Single Market for being too neoliberal. Thus, for most of the time 
when the SPD was in government (1998 until 2009) there was no real conflict 
within the German party system over European integration (Poguntke, 2007). 
CMP data summarised in Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the SPD has always 
been supportive of the EU, albeit to a varying degree. Between 1997 and 2000, 
EU support was stable within the SPD, but decreased during the early 2000s in 
line with the other mainstream parties at a time when the EU Constitutional 
Treaty was drafted; when Central and Eastern European countries joined the 
EU; and when the European Commission issued their directive on services in 
the internal market.  
Given how pro-European the political environment in Germany was at 
the end of the 1990s it is surprising to note how little emphasis the SPD 
leadership put on European policy. Before and during the general election 
campaign in 1998, Gerhard Schröder showed no interest in European policy 
(Krell, 2009: 190). During his first years in office he was a more openly 
assertive actor at the European level than his predecessor, the arch-European 
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Helmut Kohl. Schröder was more concerned with the way his European policy 
might generate domestic political capital when he demanded a reduction of 
Germany’s contribution to the EU’s 2000-2006 budget. Yet he underwent a 
certain learning process over the years in government (Harnisch and Schieder, 
2003; Krell, 2009). However, Schröder never delivered any high-profile 
speeches outlining his EU visions, neither at home nor abroad. He left this task 
to Joschka Fischer, the Green foreign secretary who was the most pro-
integrationist member of cabinet between 1998 and 2005. After Schröder’s 
defeat in 2005, when the SPD became the CDU’s junior partner in a grand 
coalition, the SPD experienced a leadership crisis with four leaders in four 
years. Two of these party leaders, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Franz 
Müntefering, were very pro-integrationist in their views. Yet they were not 
staying in office for a long time, and European policy was not on the top of their 
agenda.  
Did the SPD make its European policy easily accessible to the public via 
its website, as a fully Europeanised party would do? Did the website include a 
separate section presenting the SPD’s general views on the purpose and future 
of European integration in addition to its views on day-to-day issues? The 
SPD’s website has been and continues to be confusing for those voters and party 
members who want to learn more about the party’s European policy. It lists only 
a very limited number of policy areas - perhaps the most salient ones - such as 
health, renewable energies, equal opportunities and integration/immigration. 
Up-to-date information on the party’s European policy (and many other policy 
areas) is spread over different parts of the website such as documentaries, 
interviews, or most popular stories. The party executive’s EU working group 
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has its own website which is difficult to find and does not include any 
information on the SPD’s European policy. It is empty. There is a link leading 
to the SPD group in the European Parliament, but not to the SPD’s EU working 
group in the Bundestag. Manifestoes are not posted on this website. However, 
all of the SPD’s principal guidelines (Grundsatzprogramme) can be downloaded 
from the party’s homepage. German parties differ from most other parties in 
Europe - and certainly Labour and the PS - in that they publish principal 
guidelines presenting their fundamental values and policies. Between 1869 and 
2007 the SPD has ratified seven principal guidelines. The most recent one, the 
2007 Hamburg Programme, is translated into English, Spanish, and Turkish. It 
is very pro-integrationist in its tone and makes references to the EU in each 
section. In section three (‘our aims, our policy’) the subsection entitled ‘Social 
and democratic Europe’ deals exclusively with the EU, outlining the SPD’s 
views on the EU’s institutional make-up and policies. Both of the officials 
working for the SPD’s international department that were interviewed for this 
study referred to this document when asked about the party’s Europeanisation, 
highlighting its pro-integrationist tone.  The Hamburg Programme is indeed a 
strongly Europeanised statement. Table 9.11 (below) summarises the findings. 
Table 9.11 The Europeanisation of the SPD’s Hamburg Programme (2007) 
Mention of ‘Europa’, 
‘Europäische Union’; 
‘europäisch; EU. 
Is there a separate 
chapter/section on European 
policy? 
In which other section(s) of the 
programme is ‘Europe’ 
mentioned? 
104 Yes.  Introduction 
 Our lifetime 
 Our core values and core 
convictions 
 Our aims, our policy 
 Our way 
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Is this Europeanisation reflected in the SPD’s general election manifestoes? 
Table 9.12 (below) demonstrates that the degree of Europeanisation varied 
between 1998 and 2009. Keeping in mind that Gerhard Schröder did not 
prioritise EU policy during the 1998 election campaign it is not surprising that 
the manifesto made relatively little reference to Europe. In contrast, and perhaps 
as a consequence of the SPD’s experience in government, the 2002 manifesto is 
far more Europeanised. The first chapter of the manifesto introduces the SPD’s 
European policy, and 101 references to Europe are made in eight other chapters. 
The next manifesto, the one from 2005, has relatively short chapters. The EU 
chapter comes last, which was reflected in an election campaign where Europe 
was barely mentioned. This manifesto clearly focuses on the domestic level and 
only refers to Europe 45 times. The 2009 manifesto is again strongly 
Europeanised. It has a very long and detailed chapter on the EU, but only at the 
end of the document. It is chapter 15 out of 16. Here, the SPD describes itself as 
‘Germany’s European party’. Overall, Europe is mentioned 122 times in ten 
different chapters (excluding the one on the EU). This increased 
Europeanisation could be explained by the fact that 2009 was a Superwahljahr 
in Germany: European, federal and (in some Länder) regional elections all took 
place in the same year. Perhaps as a consequence, European policy was higher 
on the political agenda than usual. Overall, the SPD’s election manifestoes 
reflect a relatively strong Europeanisation of the party’s public face. They are 
all highly pro-European in their tone. Some make more reference to the EU than 
others, but in all of them European policy is treated as a policy in its own right 
and not as part of foreign policy. At the same time, reference to the EU is made 
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in many other policy areas, such as the economy, energy, or home affairs – 
which reflects the increasing Europeanisation of these policy areas. 
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Table 9.12 SPD legislative election manifestoes (1998-2009) and the European 
Union  
Year Name of the 
Manifesto 
Mention of 
‘Europa’, 
‘Europäisch
e Union’, 
‚europäisch‘
, ‚EU‘ 
Is there a 
separate 
chapter/secti
on on 
European 
policy? 
In which other section(s) of the 
manifesto is ‘Europe’ 
mentioned? 
1998 ‘Arbeit, Innovation 
und Gerechtigkeit. 
SPD-Programm für die 
Bundestagswahl 
1998’. 
60 Yes.  Stronger Economy 
 Complete the internal 
unification: a new chance 
for eastern Germany 
 Ecological modernisation  
2002 ‘Erneuerung und 
Zusammenhalt. 
Regierungsprogramm 
2000-2006’. 
101 Yes.   Preamble 
 Economy and Employment 
 Labour Market 
 Employment Rights 
 Research, Innovation, 
Sustainability 
 Eastern Germany 
 Home Affairs 
 Modern State  
2005 ‘Vertrauen in 
Deutschland. Das 
Wahlmanifest der 
SPD‘. 
45 Yes.  Introduction 
 We want wages covering 
our basic needs 
 We want a competitive 
agriculture 
 We want a self-confident 
and peaceful Germany that 
takes global responsibility  
2009  ‘Sozial und 
demokratisch. 
Anpacken. Für 
Deutschland. Das 
Regierungsprogramm 
der SPD‘.  
122 Yes.  Time to take decisions 
 Social market economy 
 Our aims 
 Keeping and securing 
economic prosperity 
 Germany as a pioneer for 
sustainable energy policy 
and mobility 
 Society is changing 
 Treating our environment 
with respect 
 Dare more democracy 
 For a global community of 
responsibility 
 For global peace and 
disarming 
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To summarise, the SPD has Europeanised its public face, but not to a very 
strong extent. Given that the party has been very pro-integrationist, the EU has 
played only a marginal role in the party leaderships’ speeches. The website does 
not give much information away; EU policy is spread over different sections 
and there is no general overview of the party’s long-term EU vision. There are 
however the principal guidelines available in which the SPD has outlined its EU 
policy in great detail. The election manifestoes differ in their degree of 
Europeanisation, but overall, they present the image of a party that thinks 
European. It is therefore surprising that the party organisation has Europeanised 
only to such a limited extent. 
Table 9.13 The Europeanisation of the SPD’s public face  
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
European policy was not prioritised 
in party leaderships’ speeches.  
 Weak Europeanisation 
On the SPD’s website there was 
relatively little information on 
European policy. 
 Weak Europeanisation 
In election manifestoes there was a 
separate section on European 
policy. Moreover, there were 
numerous EU references in other 
sections. 
 Strong Europeanisation 
 
Has the SPD Europeanised in government? As can be expected from a founding 
member of the EU, Germany’s central government has Europeanised incrementally. 
The SPD’s role in this process is not very clear-cut, which is due to the nature of 
coalition governments. German EU policy coordination is less centralised than in 
Britain or even France. One of the ministries is traditionally in charge of coordinating 
the German position on a given piece of EU legislation, and as a consequence, 
sectorisation remains strong in German European policy-making (Bulmer and Burch, 
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2001: 88). When the SPD and Greens took over government in 1998, the EU policy-
coordination system underwent further fragmentation. Yet Beichelt (2007) argues that 
that German EU policy coordination is ‘over-efficient’ as it involves several actors 
and levels of governance. He also notes that it is completely functional to the needs of 
the political system. However, he stresses that the growing efficiency of German EU 
coordination has been achieved by circumventing the public, political parties, and the 
Bundestag. Indeed, when the SPD was in government, European policy was 
government policy (Stroh, 2004; Lamatsch, 2004) with little involvement of the party 
organisation or the Bundestag – not to mention the public. Historically, the German 
Chancellor has played a key role in the formulation of European policy. Yet it has 
already been pointed out that Gerhard Schröder put little emphasis on EU policy. 
Nevertheless, he was the first Chancellor to create a EU division within the 
Chancellor’s Office in an attempt to keep EU policy-making under his control. 
However, this unit remained rather small and only focused on EU issues of relevance 
to Schröder, which were those relating to the EU internal market (Lamatsch, 2004: 
40). Overall, Schröder’s involvement in the day-to-day aspects of EU policy remained 
rather modest, and most key decisions were made ‘at least as much in the Foreign 
Ministry as in the Chancellery’, as Helms (2005, 120) states. Thus, when the SPD was 
the senior partner in the coalition government (1998- 2005), the Chancellor focused 
on domestic policy, and the majority of European policy was formulated in the 
Foreign Ministry, which was controlled by the Greens.  It has been argued that being 
in government and attending EU summits had a certain Europeanising effect on 
Gerhard Schröder (Krell, 2009: 195). Dr. Eva Högl (MdB and former government 
official on 20/07/2009) revealed that strong Europeanisation was however 
experienced by Franz Müntefering who held different ministerial and parliamentary 
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posts between 1998 and 2009. Being in government and exposed to EU-level 
decision-making can thus lead to a certain Europeanisation of party leaderships. 
However we still lack data measuring the EU attitudes of ministers before they enter 
government and after, before we can draw final conclusions.   
How about the Europeanising effects of the Bundestag on the SPD’s 
parliamentary party? In Chapter 6 it was demonstrated that the Bundestag has 
experienced institutional and legislative Europenisation in the past two decades. 
Critical junctures in this process were the ratification of new EU treaties, and most 
notably the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of a EU affairs committee. 
Successive governments have facilitated institutional Europeanisation.  For example, 
in 2006, when the SPD was in government, a central EU affairs unit was set up with 
the task of managing the heavy information load coming from Brussels. In cross-
national studies of the EU-15, Germany scores relatively high with regards to its level 
of parliamentary EU scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Bergman et al., 2003; 
Raunio, 2005). The EU scrutiny rights of expert committees in the Bundestag are 
considered strong, and so is the access to information (in its scope and timing). Do 
these strong scrutiny rights lead to the Europeanisation of the Members of the 
Bundestag? The answer is: not necessarily. One explanation is that the European 
affairs committee and the expert committees only rarely make use of their formal 
scrutiny rights. They rarely issue opinions that could limit the government in EU 
negotiations. Interviews with three social democrat MdBs have confirmed that the 
work of the European Affairs Committee was very consensual when the SPD was in 
government. Even in 2010, when the SPD was in opposition, it hardly tried to attack 
the government’s EU policy or limit the room for negotiations at the European level, 
as two MdBs stressed (interview with Axel Schäfer, MdB on 25/06/2010, and 
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informal meeting with Dr. Eva Högl on 12/07/2010). SPD and CDU-led governments 
tend to avoid EU plenary debates in the Bundestag. For the past sixty years, European 
policy has not been politicised in the Bundestag.  
Has strategic Europeanisation taken place within the SPD’s parliamentary 
group? Interviews with three MdBs and eight MEPs have revealed that there was only 
a small group of social democratic MdBs who took great interest in EU affairs. They 
tended to sit on the EU Affairs Committee and were part of the SPD’s parliamentary 
EU affairs working group. Furthermore, the interviews with the SPD’s MEPs have 
revealed that the contact between themselves and MdBs remained loose and irregular. 
Lack of time and overlapping work schedules were often blamed for this lack of 
communication, but also a general lack of interest in and knowledge of the work of 
the European Parliament. The majority of MdBs showed little interest in the EU. This 
situation is slowly changing according to MdB Dr. Eva Hoegl who said that the EU 
awareness of her colleagues was slowly increasing, but that Europeanisation was ‘a 
hard nut to crack’ (MdB, interviewed on 20/07/2009). However, whilst the strategic 
Europeanisation of MdBs is still lagging behind, the SPD leadership has empowered 
one parliamentary EU expert: at the time, the SPD was the only party group in the 
Bundestag to have a vice chairman responsible for coordinating the party group’s 
European policy. This MdBs also sat on the SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand) 
where she could push forward the party group’s positions. This overlap of personnel 
helped the party group to influence the government’s European policy. We can 
therefore conclude that the SPD has experienced an intermediate degree of 
Europeanisation in government. Interestingly, this has not rubbed off onto the party 
organisation. Table 9.14 (below) summarises the findings. 
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Table 9.14 The SPD’s Europeanisation in government  
Indicators of Europeanisation Degree of Europeanisation 
The SPD party leadership drove forward 
institutional adaptation of central 
government to the EU but showed rather 
little interest in the EU.  
 Intermediate Europeanisation 
The SPD in government did improve EU 
scrutiny in the Bundestag by setting up a 
new central EU unit. Yet despite strong 
EU scrutiny powers, only a small number 
of MdBs have Europeanised. 
  Intermediate Europeanisation 
Empowerment of a social democratic EU 
expert in the Bundestag: The vice-chair 
of the party group was also responsible 
for coordinating the party group’s EU 
policy. 
 Intermediate Europeanisation  
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9.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has pulled together the findings of the previous six empirical chapters. It 
has measured the degree of Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD as 
organisations, in the electorate, and in government. The comparison of Europe’s 
biggest three social democratic parties has revealed that overall, Europeanisation is 
still in its infancy. The three parties have done relatively little to Europeanise their 
public faces: very few speeches were given by party elites outlining their EU policies 
to a domestic audience. Furthermore, the three parties’ websites provided little 
information on EU policy, which was dealt with under international affairs. It was 
therefore surprising to note that both the PS and SPD have Europeanised their election 
manifestoes by integrating EU policy into the formerly domestic policy areas. 
Labour’s manifestoes were pro-integrationist in their tone, but treated European 
policy as part of their broader foreign policy agenda.  
The central governments of Britain, France and Germany have Europeanised over the 
past decades. Accordingly, the three parties have Europeanised in government, in the 
sense that the leaderships were exposed to EU-level policy-making. The same applied 
to the three parliaments, where EU policy is scrutinised. However, parliamentary EU 
scrutiny remained weak in the three countries, with the result that EU policy was 
under the tight control of the executive. One of the consequences is that MPs have 
experienced only weak Europeanisation, generally showing little interest in EU 
affairs. One exception to this rule was the SPD, who empowered one MP with a EU 
brief: one of the vice-chairs of the party group, who sat on the party’s executive 
committee, was also responsible for coordinating the party group’s EU policy. She 
acted as an important link between the parliamentary group and the party leadership.  
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Last but not least, having examined two core functions of a party organisation, namely 
policy-making and election campaigning, this chapter has concluded that only weak 
Europeanisation has taken place within Labour, the PS and SPD. The formulation of 
EU policy was in the hands of a small circle of party elites. Moreover, the 2009 
European election campaigns were mainly fought by national-level politicians on 
national-level issues, with little mention of the Party of European Socialists. Strong 
Top-down or bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation has not taken place 
in the processes of EU policy-making and election campaigning. Given that the EU 
has extended its powers in recent years, and that Labour, the PS and SPD are pro-
integrationist in their outlook, it seems surprising how little difference European 
integration has made to the three party organisations.  
Comparative research has been helpful in pinpointing this lack of 
organisational change amongst three of the EU’s most important parties and revealing 
common trends. Furthermore, the creation of an ideal model has helped to grasp the 
three parties’ degree of Europeanisation. At the same time, however, the ideal model 
does not explain everything. Most notably, we still know little about the drivers of 
Europeanisation. Since none of the three parties has experienced strong 
Europeanisation, we still do not know which - if any - factors will eventually lead to a 
fully Europeanised party organisation. As the comparison of Labour, the PS and SPD 
has demonstrated, pro-integrationist leaderships in government and opposition have 
not actively encouraged a top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation. Neither 
has a grassroots-level, bottom-up movement led to strong Europeanisation within the 
parties. The ongoing Eurocrisis could be a moment for the party organisations to 
claim their right to participate in the European policy-making process, but so far this 
has not happened. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions  
This thesis has examined how the British Labour Party, the French Socialist 
Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have ‘Europeanised’ their 
organisations in three different arenas: (1) in the electorate; (2) in central government 
and parliament; and (3) in their internal procedures and activities. This thesis has 
adapted Carter et al.’s (2007) definition of Europeanisation, viewing it as a process of 
intra-organisational change in national political parties, including the development of 
inter-organisational cooperation between sister parties in different member states, that 
is driven by the broader process of European integration.  
 
Throughout the thesis, Europeanisation has been interpreted as a 
multidirectional process: as a top-down process (in which the party leadership 
encourages the lower levels of the party organisation to adapt to the process of 
European integration); as a bottom-up process (in which the local or regional levels of 
the party organisation actively engage with the EU and put pressure on the party 
leadership to involve them in the formulation of European policy); as a horizontal 
process (in which parties across the EU discuss European policy, publish common 
statements, and organise campaign exchanges at all levels of the party organisation). 
 The Europeanisation of party organisations has also been interpreted as an 
ongoing process in which parties adapt to a continuously changing system of EU 
governance. It can be an active process in which party activists set up EU working 
groups, organise discussions and talks, plan exchanges with sister parties or visits to 
Brussels. Yet it can also become a passive process, forced upon parties by external 
pressures such as EU treaty changes. Europeanisation can be strong, intermediate or 
weak, depending on a different set of indicators in each of the three arenas. An ideal 
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model of a fully Europeanised party has been developed. It has been applied to 
Labour, the PS and SPD.  
Analysing and comparing the Europeanisation of party organisations is 
important. After all, national parties are very much affected by European integration, 
even if most effects are indirect. In the past two decades, an increasing number of 
policy areas have been transferred to the European level, and as a consequence, 
parties are constrained in their policy space. For instance, the European Single 
demands the reduction of state subsidies, and the Economic and Monetary Union sets 
limits to public spending. These constraints affect in particular social democratic 
parties, which tend to promote equality through state activity. Social democratic 
parties were expected to react to these challenges by Europeanising their 
organisations. In simple terms, the ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party 
would have a number of characteristics: 
 It is one that does not shy away from communicating its EU policy. Party 
leaderships regularly give speeches and interviews in domestic forums 
outlining the party’s EU policies.  
 European policy is easily available on the party’s website to those voters and 
party members who are interested to learn more.  
 A strongly Europeanised party would treat European policy as domestic 
policy, acknowledging that an increasing amount of formerly domestic 
policies have become Europeanised. This approach would be reflected in party 
manifestoes where the party would refer to the EU in each policy area. 
Furthermore, there would be a separate section in the manifesto where the 
party outlines its general views on the process and future of European 
integration. This section would be separate from foreign policy if the party has 
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experienced strong Europeanisation and treats European policy as domestic 
policy.  
 The leadership of a strongly Europeanised party would drive forward the 
Europeanisation of central government and parliament, thereby ensuring that 
they are equipped to make EU policy.  
 A strongly Europeanised party leadership would empower EU experts in 
government and parliament.   
 In a strongly Europeanised party organisation a broad range of actors would be 
involved in a democratic process of EU policy-making in order to increase EU 
awareness and knowledge across the party. This would involve the party 
leadership, but also official bodies such as the party conference and policy 
forums and the membership. 
 A strongly Europeanised party organisation would engage actively with the 
Party of European Socialists in order to create pan-European networks and 
lead Europeanised election campaigns that focus on European issues. It would 
also encourage exchanges with sister parties from across the European Union 
at all levels of the party organisation.  
In practice, of course, there are gradations of Europeanisation: Some parties 
have Europeanised more than others. 
This concluding chapter first summarises the main findings of each chapter. 
The second part of this chapter discusses the general strengths and weaknesses of 
Europeanisation as a concept and the particular difficulties of its application to party 
organisations. The third part identifies a number of additional questions that emerged 
during the course of this research and points the way to future research. Finally, the 
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chapter discusses the broader normative implications of the findings for party-
mediated democratic politics.  
10.1 Summary of findings 
Chapter 1, which is the introduction, has highlighted the relevance of political parties 
in the EU’s system of multi-level governance. It has argued that whilst national party 
organisations cannot participate in EU-level policy making, they are deeply affected 
by the increasing Europeanisation of formerly domestic policy areas. Next, chapter 1 
has provided a short overview of Britains’s, France’s and Germany’s relationship with 
the European Union and Labour’s, the PS’s and SPD’s organisational structures. It 
has also introduced the research design of this dissertation and discussed the strengths 
and weaknesses of comparative research. It has moreover reflected upon the 
usefulness of elite interviews as a method of data gathering. 
Chapter 2 has given an overview of the Europeanisation literature, 
highlighting the merits and shortfalls of the concept and its application to the polities, 
policies and politics of the EU member states. It has focused on the body of literature 
dealing with the Europeanisation of party politics. In its last section it has presented a 
definition of party organisational Europeanisation and presented an ideal model of a 
strongly Europeanised party. This model has been tested throughout the thesis and 
was re-visited in Chapter 9.  
Chapters 3 and 4 have looked at the electoral arena and examined the public 
political environment in which the Labour Party, PS and SPD operate. Chapter 3 has 
compared the Europeanisation of the British, French and German party systems and 
the effect this has had on Labour, the PS, and the SPD. A Europeanised party system 
is one where EU membership has led to the emergence of new parties and has 
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changed the mechanisms of party competition. Within a Europeanised party system, it 
was argued, parties have an incentive to Europeanise their organisations. After all, if 
EU policy is a contentious issue, parties can be expected to discuss it during and 
outside of election campaigns. Europeanisation was expected to be a two-way process 
between individual parties and the system they are part of. It means that on the one 
hand, parties as agents can make EU policy salient during and outside of elections and 
thereby pressurise other parties to react. They thereby contribute to the 
Europeanisation of the structure, which is the party system. On the other hand, if the 
structure - the party system as a whole - is Europeanised, individual parties were 
expected to have Europeanised both their policies and organisations. Chapter 3 has 
found that of the three party systems, the British has Europeanised the most, both with 
regards to its format and mechanics. The emergence of the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) has changed the format of the party system. In general, EU policy is heavily 
contested in Britain amongst mainstream parties and at the right fringe of the party 
system. In France, the EU has not generated new parties, and none of the mainstream 
parties are Eurosceptic. However, smaller parties on the left and right fringes of the 
party system are highly critical of certain aspects of European integration, which 
means that EU policy has been contentious in the past.  In Germany, up to now, 
European policy-making has taken place in a very consensual environment. Inter- and 
intra-party dissent on EU issues has been rather low and confined to a limited amount 
of topics such as EU enlargement. As a consequence, the German party system is the 
least Europeanised, both in terms of its format and its mechanics. The three parties 
thus operate in very different political contexts and this is expected to affect the way 
they exert their key roles and functions, such as policy-making and election 
campaigning.  
 285 
Chapter 4 addresses the Europeanisation of public opinion and links this to the 
Europeanisation of the three parties. European integration has become increasingly 
contested since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and in this context, the 
interaction between voters and political parties has arguably become more important 
for the future of European integration. Parties are therefore thought to respond to 
public opinion. A Europeanised public, it was argued, could be an incentive for 
parties to Europeanise their policies and organisations. A Europeanised public would 
be one with a high level of knowledge of the functioning of the EU.  Moreover, as 
various studies demonstrate that high levels of EU knowledge tend to be associated 
with positive attitudes towards European integration, we could expect a Europeanised 
public to be more likely to be pro-integrationist than a Eurosceptic public. The 
Europeanisation of parties vis-a-vis the public was expected to be a bi-directional 
process: In a bottom-up process, a Europeanised public was expected to exert pressure 
on parties to speak about the EU. Yet, in order to speak knowledgably about the EU, 
parties need EU expertise and adapt their organisational structures accordingly. In 
turn, party elites were expected to influence public opinion by shifting EU policy on 
the political agenda and Europeanise the electorate through policies, speeches and 
other statements. Chapter 4 has demonstrated on the basis of Eurobarometer data that 
neither the British, French, nor German public has Europeanised to a great extent. The 
mass-elite linkage is bi-directional but remains weak with regards to EU policy, 
regardless of the electoral system and EU referendums. Public pressure on Labour, the 
PS and SPD to Europeanise has therefore been very low. Party elites are more pro-
European than the public and would be expected to give more importance to the EU in 
their speeches and programmes. However, the problem for centre-left parties is that 
their voters and members are a diverse group of people with divergent EU attitudes. 
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Therefore, it can be easier for parties to either refuse to differentiate themselves from 
each other on their EU policies, or to play down the differences between them by 
refusing to address the question of European integration. In the long term, if Labour, 
the PS and SPD do not address the lack of EU knowledge and enthusiasm, their 
supporters and the wider public might become even more indifferent and critical 
towards the EU, as Eurobarometer surveys for Britain, France and Germany indicate.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, the Europeanisation of the three parties in the 
governmental arena was explored. The governmental arena included central 
government and parliament. Chapter 5 has analysed the Europeanisation of central 
government in Britain, France and Germany and has investigated how 
Europeanisation has affected party elites in government. After all, when a party is in 
government, the leaders (in particular the prime minister and senior cabinet ministers) 
are involved in EU-level policy-making, and this experience is expected to affect 
them. In return, party elites can actively Europeanise central government. A 
Europeanised central government was interpreted as one that has adapted gradually to 
the process of European integration and that seeks to shape the EU by uploading 
national institutional models and policy preferences to the European level. A 
Europeanised government is expected to have rubbed off onto the leadership of the 
three parties whilst they were in government between 1997 and 2009. Admittedly, the 
notion of a Europeanised party leadership is vague. It could best be defined as a group 
of politicians who recognises the importance of the EU and communicates it to the 
party and the wider electorate. A Europeanised party leadership would also initiate 
institutional reforms in order to make national processes of policy-making effective, 
efficient and compatible with the EU’s system of multi-level governance.  
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Chapter 5 has demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD operated in 
Europeanised central governments. However, the processes of European policy-
making differed significantly between the three social democratic governments, which 
confirms the claim that Europeanisation does not led to a harmonisation. The party 
leadership in office were generally Europeanised, although for the PS and SPD 
leaders, European policy was no priority. The EU preferences of the prime minister, 
or in the German case, the chancellor, are very important for the Europeanisation of 
central government and the party. It has been demonstrated that the EU policy 
network at the top of the three parties was very small. Only a few ministers were key 
players in the parties’ EU policy-making process, which could indicate that 
Europeanisation at the top of the parties did not necessarily rub off onto the party 
organisation. 
Chapter 6 has analysed the degree of Europeanisation of the British, French 
and German parliaments. The basic assumption was that if national parliaments have 
Europeanised, MPs will perform Europeanised roles within the parliament, which, in 
turn, will frame their outlook on and knowledge of the EU and have party 
implications. Europeanised MPs, it was argued, are in a stronger position to scrutinise 
the government’s EU policy because they are well informed. Moreover, Europeanised 
MPs can discuss current EU policy issues with members and activists in their 
constituencies, which can contribute to the Europeanisation of the parties at grassroots 
level. Chapter 6 shows that the British, French and German parliaments have 
experienced Europeanisation. All three parliaments have set up EU affairs committees 
and a centralised filtering system to coordinate EU legislation. However, the powers 
of these committees vary significantly from one country to the other. Whether 
legislative and institutional Europeanisation has led to the Europeanisation of MPs is 
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another question. The majority of the MPs who showed interest in EU policy did so 
because of their positional roles and are not representative of their parties. This goes 
to show that it also depends on the MPs’ willingness whether they Europeanise or not. 
The parliamentary arena can be an arena for parties to Europeanise, if they wish to use 
the opportunity. 
The two last empirical chapters, namely Chapters 7 and 8 have shed light on 
how the Labour Party, PS and SPD have Europeanised as political organisations.  
Two of a party’s key activities are policy-making and election campaigning, and both 
activities were examined with regards to their level of Europeanisation. Chapter 7 has 
investigated how the three parties have Europeanised their organisations in the 
process of EU policy-making. After all, the formulation of policy programmes for 
government is one of a political party’s core functions. Top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation of the party organisation, it has been argued, can only take place if 
different levels of the party contribute to the making of EU policy. This includes 
formal policy-making bodies such as the party conference, national policy forums, as 
well as EU experts such as MPs and MEPs. If EU expertise is spread across the party 
organisation, more politicians, activists and members may become interested in EU 
politics, which could contribute to the politicisation of the EU at the domestic level.  
Chapter 7 has demonstrated that a small circle of high-level politicians (who 
are not necessarily elected) and civil servants makes European policy. European 
policy is government policy, and the broader party organisation has yet to find its 
place in the process. Even when a party is in opposition, as the example of the PS 
suggests, the formulation of day-to-day EU policy is left to the leadership. An 
exception was the internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004, which 
was organised by the party leadership in a desperate attempt to unify a divided party.  
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In all three parties, the formal policy-making structures, such as party conferences, 
national policy forums etc. were barely integrated into the process of European 
policy-making. Europeanised policy-making therefore remains wishful thinking.  
           Chapter 8 has analysed the Europeanisation of the 2009 European 
parliamentary election campaigns. Election campaigns, it was argued, are moments 
when parties could be expected to display their degree of Europeanisation and 
prioritise their European policies. The argument was that a Europeanised party 
organisation would lead Europeanised election campaigns and in turn, Europeanised 
election campaigns contribute to the Europeanisation of the party organisation. In a 
Europeanised campaign, parties would (1) provide an adequate amount of funding; (2) 
use both their own manifestoes and campaign material and those provided by their 
Europarty; (3) discusse topics with a European dimension; (4) closely cooperate with 
their Europarty; and (5) appoint a common top candidate for the presidency of the 
European Commission. Chapter 8 shows that the Europeanisation of European 
parliamentary election campaigns is only in its infancy. The 2009 campaigns led by 
Labour, the SPD and PS were national contests. Some elements of Europeanisation 
were visible. For example, the PS based their campaign on the PES manifesto and 
integrated PES activists into the party. In the campaigns led by the three parties, 
however, national topics dominated the debate. The party leaderships showed little 
interest in Europeanised election campaigns, and the party organisations were not 
sufficiently Europeanised to exert pressure on the leaderships.  
     Chapter 9 has brought together the empirical material presented in the six 
empirical chapters. It has applied the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party to 
Labour, the PS and SPD in order to establish whether the three parties have 
Europeanised in the electoral arena, in government and as organisations. It came to 
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the conclusion that none of the three parties has experienced strong Europeanisation. 
There were however gradations of Europeanisation within and between the three 
arenas. For example, all three parties have Europeanised their public face to a certain 
extent. Especially the PS and SPD’s election manifestoes portray the image of highly 
pro-integrationist parties that prioritise European policy and view it as part of 
domestic policy. These perceptions, however, were not reflected in the party 
organisations. 
     
10.2 The limits of Europeanisation 
Having summarised the individual findings, it is time to take a step back and take 
stock of the concept of Europeanisation in general and the phenomenon of the 
Europeanisation of political parties in particular. As noted in the beginning of this 
thesis, Europeanisation has become a very popular concept over the past two decades. 
One reason for this popularity is that it helps to describe a process that is largely 
neglected by the major theories of European integration, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. The adaptation of domestic political institutions and processes 
to the EU is beyond the scope of such theories. Moreover, the concept is so broad and 
flexible that it can analyse and describe almost every aspect of domestic political 
change. As seen in Chapter 2, there are few areas of member states’ politics that have 
not been ‘Europeanised’ in one way or another. The concept thus appears to be broad 
enough to measure and explain EU-induced change within domestic political parties, 
their policy-making processes and their patterns of competition.  
As Chapter 2’s survey of the extant literature on the Europeanisation of political 
parties revealed, the concept has not been applied uniformly or systematically to all 
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aspects of parties and party competition. Thus, in most previous studies, the 
Europeanisation of parties and their organisations has been interpreted in a very 
narrow sense. Europeanisation has tended to be perceived as a top-down process led 
by party leaders. Much of the literature neglects the role of the lower levels of the 
party organisation in the Europeanisation process. This is surprising, considering that 
party members’ activities primarily take place at a local level. In addition, Europarties 
and their potential contribution to the Europeanisation of national parties have been 
neglected in the analysis of how and why party organisations have become 
Europeanised.  
This thesis has demonstrated the challenges and difficulties of applying the 
concept of Europeanisation to party organisations. The principal reasons behind these 
difficulties are twofold. First of all, despite two decades of elaboration, the concept 
remains vague. For example, the exact process of Europeanisation is rarely analysed 
in its multidirectional character. It is often interpreted as a top-down process in which 
national actors are passive observers, although it is common knowledge that member-
state actors are heavily involved in the policy-making process at European level. 
Thus, in many cases we still do not know who or what drives Europeanisation. In 
particular, the role of individuals in the Europeanisation of polities, policies and 
politics is still not sufficiently conceptualised. Secondly, applying Europeanisation to 
party organisations is challenging because parties are multi-level organisations 
operating in different arenas. They are too large and complex to be analysed on the 
basis of a broad-brush definition of Europeanisation. This thesis has demonstrated that 
Europeanisation is a different process in each of these arenas (in the electorate, in 
government and in their internal activities).  
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Nevertheless, the concept of Europeanisation is still of some value in 
understanding how political parties have adapted to the demands of European 
integration. If the concept is well defined and applied rigorously and systematically to 
party politics, it can be a valuable tool for comparative studies.  
10.3 Scope for further research  
Although this thesis has concentrated on exploring how centre-left political parties 
have Europeanised in three distinct arenas, the relatively broad-brush approach 
adopted has also served to highlight the importance of other areas of domestic politics 
that merit further study. The first of these issues highlighted by the thesis is the need 
to investigate, conceptually and empirically, the Europeanisation of public attitudes 
and behaviour, which has been addressed to some extent in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. A 
number of questions suggest themselves for further research. For example, how can 
we more adequately define the Europeanisation of attitudes? How can we measure 
them? What makes an individual Europeanised, apart from the level of EU 
knowledge? Should Europeanisation be linked solely to the idea of being pro-
European, or can a well-informed person who is a hard Eurosceptic and demands EU-
withdrawal be considered Europeanised? 
In a similar vein, the Europeanisation of political elites in government, as 
individual political actors, also deserves more scholarly attention. It seems that no 
cross-country study has systematically compared the EU attitudes of the party 
leadership before and during their time in government. Today, every cabinet minister 
is involved in EU-level policy-making, although the extent of involvement differs 
between policy areas. It would be revealing to find out whether the experience of 
being in government makes party elites generally more pro-European and whether it 
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changes their views on certain aspects of EU governance.  In-depth interviews would 
be one research method to map the EU attitudes of individual politicians. However, 
this would be very costly and time-consuming. One could also track parliamentary 
speeches or parliamentary votes over time. 
Further research specifically into party elites’ attitudes would also enable 
scholars to discover more about potential gaps in the preference and beliefs of party 
leaders, party activists and party supporters. For this thesis, relatively few interviews 
were conducted with party activists, and those who were interviewed were all PES 
activists and very pro-European in their views. Not surprisingly, they were also all 
fully aware of the importance of the EU and the roles played by Europarties in 
European parliamentary election campaigns. A broader study into the attitudes of 
social democratic party members and activists towards European integration could 
potentially reveal a gap between the elites and the members. The main question is 
whether party elites substantially and symbolically represent the members’ opinions 
towards European integration, and what this implies for intra-party power dynamics. 
Not only would it be interesting to find out more about party members’ EU attitudes; 
it would also be fascinating to learn more about the Europeanisation of the party 
organisation at the lower, local level. Parties operate at different levels of governance, 
and the Europeanisation of the party leadership, which is involved in EU policy-
making at the European level, can be expected to differ from the Europeanisation of 
the party on the ground, which is likely to be more interested in the local impact of 
EU integration. Interviews conducted for this thesis have revealed that many local 
party branches in Britain, France and Germany have EU representatives and/or EU 
working groups. Whether members show interest in this institutional Europeanisation 
 294 
and whether this development increases the members’ awareness of the EU has never 
been researched.  
Finally, a systematic comparison of the Europeanisation of party organisations 
from all major party families across the EU could provide valuable insights into the 
differences and similarities between parties with different ideological backgrounds.  
This thesis has focused exclusively on centre-left parties, primarily because European 
integration, and in particular the strict rules imposed by the European Single Market, 
put constraints on social democratic policies. A broader study might reveal whether 
ideology plays any role in the Europeanisation process, which was beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The study should include parties from Eastern and Central Europe, for 
whom Europeanisation is a more recent experience. Such a study might potentially 
highlight differences and similarities between parties from the old and new EU 
member states. 
10.4 Why parties still matter  
The findings of this thesis reveal that in the case of the Labour Party, the Socialist 
Party and the German Social Democratic Party, Europeanisation, in the words of a 
German MEP, is ‘work in progress’. The interviews conducted for this thesis have 
also revealed a gap between the party leadership and other EU experts such as MPs 
and MEPs. Party elites generally stressed their parties’ pro-European credentials and 
how their parties have responded to the challenges of EU integration. For instance, at 
a fringe event organised by the Fabian Society at Labour’s 2009 party conference, 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband said: ‘Of course, Labour is a Europeanised party. 
We are a very pro-European party with close relationships to our sister parties’. 
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Whether he used ‘Europeanised’ to describe Labour’s general pro-EU policies, or 
whether he meant it in a more academic sense is, of course, open to question. 
Echoing David Miliband’s words, the PS’ international secretary, Jean-
Christophe Cambadélis (interviewed on 18/06/2009) was also rather optimistic about 
the PS’ degree of Europeanisation. He declared:  
Europe is a very important issue for the French Socialists. It even creates 
trouble sometimes. The Socialist Party is divided, had an internal 
referendum on the Constitution, so it’s both an internal and an essential 
issue. Everybody reclaims Europe, everyone has an opinion on how to 
build it. But there is a Europeanisation of the Socialist Party which is the 
embodiment of a certain internationalism. 
Again, what he meant by ‘Europeanisation’ is open to question. 
SPD politicians and party officials appeared to be more cautious and 
critical about their party’s Europeanisation. Felix Porkert (Abteilung IV, the 
SPD’s international department, interviewed on 15/07/2009) said:  
Yes, the SPD is Europeanised, but not sufficiently. Like most of my 
colleagues in the Willy-Brandt-Haus, including the party leader, I am a 
glowing European. But when it comes to European elections, we always 
find it particularly difficult to mobilise our voters, including our core 
voters. It means that at grassroots level, awareness of the importance of 
the EU is not wide spread. People are generally aware of the fact that the 
EU has become more important, but they don’t spend much time and 
effort on EU policy. But the party leadership has increasingly 
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Europeanised in the past five years, both with regards to their EU-
awareness and the cooperation with the PES.  
Porkert points to the gap between the Europeanisation of party elites and 
citizens. In a similar vein, most MPs, MEPs and party activists interviewed for 
this thesis were far more critical of their parties’ handling of European 
integration and generally deplored a lack of Europeanisation at all levels of the 
party. Labour MEP Claude Moraes summarised this when he said: ‘Social 
Democrats think globally but ultimately still act nationally’ (Labour Party 
Conference, 27/10/2010). However, it also needs to be stressed that 
‘Europeanisation’ meant something different to each interviewee. Indeed, for 
most interviewees, Europeanisation simply meant pro-Europeanness and only 
included the party leadership and not the lower levels of the organisation. 
Moreover, it seems that politicians and party officials are generally unaware of 
the concept. One SPD official was aware of the academic debate surrounding 
the concept of Europeanisation, but this was rather an exception. This is 
unsurprising, considering the vagueness of the concept and also the tendency for 
many academic debates to pass by, or over the heads, of, many politicians.  
The broader implications of this lack of EU-awareness should however worry 
the three parties. Their lack of organisational Europeanisation has implications for 
intra-party democracy, the democratic process at the domestic level and the quality of 
democracy within the EU as a whole. If party organisations do not become fully 
Europeanised at all levels and in all arenas, the gap between the leadership and the 
lower levels of the organisation might widen. Already, the parties’ formal policy-
making bodies are excluded from EU policy-making, and it is a small group of (often 
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unelected) experts who makes European policy. This has led to the further 
empowerment of party leaders at the expense of the party organisation. In the long 
term, this power imbalance may threaten internal democracy within parties.  
More generally, the lack of Europeanised party structures can lead to a situation 
in which supporters of social democratic parties can become indifferent towards the 
EU or even Eurosceptic and cast their vote for extremist single-issue parties such as 
the UK Independence Party.  The SPD leadership is aware of the fact that many party 
supporters do not caste their votes in European parliamentary elections. After the 
SPD’s defeat in the 2009 EP elections, a social democratic MP suggested to penalise 
non-voters by making them pay € 50 (Welt Online, 09/06/2009). This however will 
not make party supporters (or citizens in general) aware of the importance of the EU. 
A more effective, long-term solution would be for parties to lead internal debates on 
EU issues and lead Europeanised election campaigns. At the moment, this is still 
wishful thinking. Interviews conducted for this thesis have revealed that during the 
2009 European parliamentary election campaign, the London branches of the PS and 
the SPD were invited to support the Labour Party. After asking for instructions, they 
were told to praise Labour’s successes in reforming the National Health Service, but 
they were asked not to mention Europe. In such a political environment, citizens 
cannot be expected to understand the relevance of European elections and the EU in 
general. Parties could however provide an otherwise missing link between citizens 
and the EU by playing a more pro-active role in adapting their organisations to the 
demands of European integration. 
This last point leads to a final note of caution about the role of political parties 
in the wider context of democracy within the European Union. As mentioned before, 
what national party organisations can achieve at the European level might be modest. 
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However, through their membership and engagement in the Europarties, they can 
contribute to the much needed politicisation of the EU. Moreover, all major 
Europarties offer some sort of individual membership (such as the PES activists) 
which allows party members to engage directly with them. It is, admittedly, a very 
small step towards European multi-level party politics, but it has the potential to grow. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews  
 
Name and position  Place and date  Time  
 
Mr. Giampi Alhadeff, 
Secretary General,  
European Parliamentary Labour Party 
 
 
London, 17/06/2010 
 
10.00-
11.00h  
Mr. Kader Arif,  
MEP (PS) 
 
Brussels, 05/10/2009 19.00-
19.30h 
Mr. Jürgen Aschmutat,  
Head of Office, SPD delegation to the 
European Parliament  
 
Brussels, 05/10/2009 10.30-
11.45h  
Mrs. Pervenche Berès,  
MEP (PS) 
 
Brussels, 06/10/2009 12.45-
13.15h  
Mrs. Sandrine Bertin,  
PES, Assistant: Relations with 
Members 
 
Brussels, 17/06/2009 17.00-
17.30h  
Mrs. Jo Billingham,  
Labour Party, International Manager 
 
London, 24/11/2009 16.00-
16.45h  
Mrs. Gabriele Bischoff, Federation of 
German Trade Unions (DGB), 
Department of European Affairs  
 
Berlin, 23/07/2009 18.30-
19.15h  
Mr. Maurice Braud,  
PS, Secretariat for European and 
Paris, 22/06/2009 9.30-
10.30h 
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Dr. Markus Broich,  
Head of Liaison Office of the SPD’s 
party group in the Bundestag in 
Brussels 
 
Brussels, 03/0672009 15.00-
16.00h  
Mr. Jean-Christophe Cambadélis,  
PS, National Secretary for European 
and International Affairs 
 
Paris, 18/06/2009 10.00-
10.30h  
Mrs. Françoise Castex,  
MEP (PS) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
14/10/2009 
11.15-
11.40h  
Mr. Yves Clairmont,  
PES Activist  
 
Berlin, 14/07/2009 16.00-
17.00h  
Mr. Richard Corbett,  
Labour Party, former MEP (1996-
2009) 
 
Telephone interview, 
27/01/2010 
8.00-
8.35h  
Mr. Philip Cordery,  
Secretary General of the PES 
 
Brussels, 16/06/2009  13.00-
13.30h  
Mr. Franz Xaver Danner,  
SPD, Jusos International Secretary 
 
Berlin, 24/07/2009 15.00-
15.45h  
Mr. Patrick Diamond,  
Policy Network. Former Head of 
Policy Planning in No. 10 Downing 
Street.  
 
London, 16/03/2011 11.00-
12.00h  
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Mr. Brian Duggan,  
Campaigns Officer, European 
Parliamentary Labour Party 
 
London, 14/09/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
Dr. Katharina Erdmenger, German 
Trade Union Federation (DGB), Head 
of EU office  
 
Brussels, 16/06/2009 9.30-
10.15h  
Dr. Marcus Fedder,  
Head of SPD-Freundeskreis London 
 
London, 09/09/2009 10.00-
10.45h  
Mr. Knut Fleckenstein,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 05/10/2009 18.30-
19.00h  
Mr. Gérard Fuchs,  
Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Researcher on 
International Cooperation. Former 
MEP and International Secretary of 
the PS 
 
Paris, 03/07/2009  16.00-
17.00h  
Dr. Andrae Gärber,  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Head of 
Brussels Office 
 
Brussels, 16/06/2009 11.00-
11.30h  
Mr. Jens Geier,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 06/10/2009 13.30-
14.00h  
Mr. Aleksander Glogowski, PES 
Activist (PS, Federation Paris) 
 
Paris, 10/06/2009 14.00-
15.30h  
Mr. Sebastian Gröning, Assistant to 
the SPD’s Parliamentary Working 
Group on European Affairs 
(Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der 
EU) 
Berlin, 14/07/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
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Mrs. Sylvie Guillaume,  
MEP (PS) 
 
Brussels, 06/10/2009 14.30-
15.00h  
Mr. Noel Hatch,  
PES Activist, Chair of Compass 
Youth  
 
London, 06/09/2009 16.30-
17.30h  
Mrs. Jutta Haug,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 07/10/2009 17.00-
17.45h  
Dr. Eva Högl,  
MdB (SPD) Member of European 
Committee 
Berlin, 20/07/2009 
and informal meeting in 
London on 12/07/2010 
14.30-
15.30h  
Mr. Marc Jütten,  
Advisor to MEP & head of the S & D 
group in the European Parliament, 
Martin Schulz  
 
Brussels, 07/10/2009 11.00-
11.20h  
Mrs. Petra Kammerevert,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
16/10/2009 
9.10-
9.30h  
Mr. Pierre Kanuty,  
PS, Secretariat for European and 
International Affairs  
 
Paris, 23/06/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
Mr. Jan Kreutz,  
PES, Advisor for Social and 
Economic Policy, Climate Change 
and Energy  
 
Brussels, 15/06/2009 15.00-
16.00h  
Mrs. Axelle Lemaire,  
Head of PS branch in London and 
parliamentary assistant to Denis 
London, 14/09/2009 12.30-
14.00h  
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MacShane, MP 
 
Mr. David Lebon,  
PS, Advisor to Martine Aubry and 
former President of Mouvement des 
Jeunes Socialistes  
 
Paris, 02/07/2009 10.00-
10.45h 
Mr. Pierre-Yves Le Borgn,  
PS, General Secretary of the 
Fédération des Français à l’Etranger  
 
Paris, 27/06/2009 19.15-
20.00h 
Mr. Roger Liddle,  
Chair of Policy Network, former EU-
adviser to Tony Blair (1997-2004) 
 
London, 12/10/2009 16.00-
16.40h  
Dr. Gero Maaß,  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Head of 
‘internationale Politikanalyse’ 
Berlin, 23/07/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
Mr. Stefan Marx,  
Media Advisor to Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier during the federal election 
campaign 2009  
 
London, 11/11/2009 18.00-
19.00h  
Mr. Carsten Meeners,  
Head of Office, the SPD group in the 
European Parliament 
 
Berlin, 08/07/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
Mr. Michael Meier,  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Department 
of International Dialogue  
 
Berlin, 13/07/2009 15.00-
15.45h  
Mr. Henri Nallet,  
PS, Former Secretary of State; 
International Secretary of the PS and 
Paris, 30/06/2009 15.30-
16.45h 
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Vice-President of the PES. 
 
Mr. Norbert Neuser,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 06/10/2009 16.45-
17.30h  
Mr. Mark Nottingham, Assistant to 
Mary Honeyball, MEP (Labour) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
14/10/2009 
11.45-
12.30h  
Mr. Mathieu Pagnoux, 
PES Activist 
 
Berlin, 07/07/2009 12.00-
13.00h  
Mrs. Alexandra Pardal,  
PES, Coordinator: Office of the 
President  
 
Brussels, 16/06/2009 17.00-
17.30h  
Mr. Bernard Poignant,  
PS, former MEP (1999-2009) and 
head of the PS delegation to the 
European Parliament  
 
Telephone Interview, 
09/07/2009 
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17.20h  
Mr. Felix Porkert,  
SPD Parteivorstand, Department of 
International Affairs, European 
Institutions and Policies/European 
Union/Western Europe/Middle and 
Eastern Europe 
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Mrs. Lesia Radelicki,  
PES, Advisor: PES Women, 
migration, diversity and integration 
 
Brussels, 16/06/2009 14.30-
15.15h  
Mr. Bernhard Rapkay,  
MEP (SPD), Leader of the SPD 
delegation to the European Parliament 
Brussels, 07/10/2009 16.00-16-
45h  
 342 
 
Mrs. Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, 
Director of ‘Notre Europe’ 
 
Paris, 30/06/2009 11.00-
11.30h 
Mr. David Schoibl,  
Chair of Labour Movement for 
Europe (London and South East 
Branch); PES Activist, member of 
Compass Youth  
 
London, 07/12/2009 18.00-
18.45h  
Mr. Axel Schäfer,  
MdB (SPD) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
25/06/2010 
10.00-
10.30h  
Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren, MdB 
(SPD) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
18/06/2010 
13.30-
14.00h  
Dr. Ania Skrzypek,  
Former Secretary General of ECOSY, 
and Policy Advisor at FEPS  
 
Brussels, 04/06/2009   
Mr. Karl-Heinz Spiegel, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Head of London Office 
 
London, 10/09/2009 11.30-
12.30h  
Dr. Philipp Steinberg,  
Head of EU working group of SPD 
Berlin 
 
Berlin, 15/07/2009 15.00-
15.30h  
Mrs. Gisela Stuart,  
MP (Labour Party) 
 
London, 27/01/2010 13.00-
13.30h  
Mr. Klaus Suchanek, Permanent 
Representation of the Land 
Schleswig-Holstein to the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
 
Berlin, 16/07/2009 11.00-
12.00h  
 343 
Mr. Samuel Tarry,  
Chair of Young Labour, PES activist, 
former chair of Compass Youth  
 
London, 23/11/2009 12.00-
13.00h  
Mrs Silke Thompson-Pottebohm,  
Media Advisor to the Party of 
European Socialists and Labour 
Candidate for European Elections in 
2009 
 
London, 22/01/2010 11.30-
13.00h  
Mr. Derek Vaughn,  
MEP (Labour Party) 
 
Telephone Interview, 
03/02/2010 
15.45-
16.10h  
Mr. Thomas Vaupel,  
SPD Parteivorstand, Abteilung V, 
Department of international affairs, 
European Institutions and 
Policies/European Union/Western 
Europe/Middle and Eastern Europe 
 
Berlin, 08/07/2009 15.30-
16.30h  
Dr. Sven Vollrath,  
Head of the Bundestag’s EU Unit 
(Referat Europa PA1) 
 
Berlin, 17/07/2009 12.00-
13.00h  
Mrs. Kathleen Walker-Shaw, 
European Officer, GMB Brussels 
Office 
 
Telephone Interview, 
28/06/2010 
9.30-
10.00h  
Mr. Henri Weber,  
MEP (PS) and National Secretary for 
Globalisation  
 
Paris, 03/07/2009 14.20-
14.40h  
Mrs. Barbara Weiler,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 05/10/2009 17.00-
17.30h  
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Mrs. Pia Wenningmann,  
Head of the Representation of 
Rheinland-Pfalz to the European 
Union and member of SPD group 
Bussels 
 
Brussels, 07/10/2009 15.00-
15.30h  
Mrs. Kerstin Westphal,  
MEP (SPD) 
 
Brussels, 07/10/2009 9.45-
10.15h  
Mr. Nils Wörner,  
PES, Advisor: PES Activists  
 
Brussels, 12/05/2009 21.00-
21.45h  
Mr. Frank Zimmermann,  
SPD, Member of the Berliner 
Abgeordnetenhaus, SPD spokesperson 
for European affairs 
 
Berlin, 15/07/2009 13.30-
14.15h  
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